The Search for Strategic Intelligence

[Bob's World]

Over the past 8 years I have served in 3 separate 4-Star Headquarters (Army Staff, PACOM/SOCPAC, and SOCOM), and have always been amazed at the level of intel product that has been requested, expected, provided, accepted.

Invariably it has been very very tactical in nature. Even if they looked at a broad area, they still focus on and talk about very tactical intelligence. Not that this is bad information, but it does tend to draw senior leaders down into the weeds that they grew up in and are comfortable with (plus it is sexy and fun) as opposed to much larger perspectives and issues that are the turf that these respective commands really need to be focused upon.

So, here is my question: WHAT exactly is strategic intelligence? and why is it so rarely asked for, and even more rarely provided?

Some thoughts on this as I work on some projects in my lane:

1. What types of Competitors are associated with a problem, probably laid out in 3 tiers from those directly engaged, those 1 degree of separation away, and those 2 degrees of separation away.
a. Who are the state actors?
1. Nuclear States
2. Non-nuclear States
3. Failing States
4. Criminal States

b. Who are the non-state actors working within these states and what are their relationships to the same and each other?
1. Quasi-State Competitors (LH, Hamas, etc)
2. Non-State Competitiors (AQ, Exxon, Red Cross, etc)
3. Insurgent Competitors (Taliban, MILF, etc)
4. Dissident Competitors (Green Peace, Individuals)

c. Of all of these, what are there stated and implied interests, and where are there points of shared interests and conflicting interests (goes to opportunities, risks, and predicting likely respones to various COAs)

These are things I think about, but get the 1,000 yard stare when I ask the intel guys about the same. Does anyone else have thoughts on what "strategic intelligence" should be?

[Entropy]

BW,

Good and timely post. I'll try to provide some detailed thoughts later when I have some more time.

In my experience (EUCOM, CENTCOM), "strategic intelligence" at that level is closely tied to the strategic warning function, which is usually under-resourced. Most intel people are forced into current intelligence to support the crisis du jour, so don't have much opportunity to research and examine the things you list. If you haven't already, I recommend you go talk to the people (or person) in the strategic warning shop and see what they have to say.

[max161]

BW,

Good and timely post. I'll try to provide some detailed thoughts later when I have some more time.

In my experience (EUCOM, CENTCOM), "strategic intelligence" at that level is closely tied to the strategic warning function, which is usually under-resourced. Most intel people are forced into current intelligence to support the crisis du jour, so don't have much opportunity to research and examine the things you list. If you haven't already, I recommend you go talk to the people (or person) in the strategic warning shop and see what they have to say.

Don't know if this is true but I heard a statistic that during the Cold War 75% of our intelligence professionals were focused on long term analysis with 25% on current intelligence production. However, in the post Cold War World the percentages are supposedly reversed. While those stats may be an exaggeration I would bet the concept is illustrative.

Part of the "problem" is the huge amount of information available and the proliferation of electronic media (both of the electronic storage kind but also of the broadcast kind - e.g., 24 hour news cycles). The real problem we have is when leaders say that they do not want to hear about it first on CNN or read about it first in the Washington Post. This drives our intel focus to current ops reporting so they do not get "scooped" by the news media. Again, this may be an exaggeration but I also think it is instructive. We need intel analysis that is useful not just immediately for targeting (the sexy stuff that Bob means, I think) but to allow for sound strategy development and effective campaign planning. We have to stop "chasing the shiny thing" (and there are good intelligence organizations that can do the targeting piece - but our theater level HQ, services, and national level leaders need good, thorough and useful analysis.

Dave

[Bob's World]

As Dave points out, we had a better balance of our approach to intel during the Cold War. Personally, I attribute much of this to everyone having a better grasp on what it was we were trying to do. The Soviets were a state like us, so we could mirrror image in large part and figure out what might most likely deter or provoke them.

AQ, on the other hand, is not like us at all. Therefore we have necked it down to a simple "We must capture or kill them as they cannot be deterred."

So what comes first, the proverbial chicken or the egg. Will once we achieve greater strategic understanding of this new threat, played in this new post cold war playing field/rules, we will be better able to focus our strategic intelliegence?

Or,

Will the intel community step up to the challenge that they cannot simply provide weather and threat info, and provide the insights that help senior leaders develop effective strategies for these new threats in this new playing field with new rules??

Intel guys, I'm asking. Seriously.

I will be sitting down with our guys and having this same conversation next week, so here is your chance to influence that conversation. I don't know what the right answer is, but I know what we've been doing isn't it.

[Jedburgh]

I concur with Entropy's statement about the neglect of strategic I&W in the COE. But ultimately, the shape of intelligence work is driven by consumer demand - Max's comment about Cold War intel reflects the perspective at the time that we had a (relatively) well understood adversary, and at the national command level consumers were focused on identifying their global strategic moves with regards to resources and positioning with enough lead time so that action could be initiated. Cold War intelligence consumers demanded accurate strategic warning intelligence.

Even then, there were often substantial issues and problems with strategic intelligence in general, and I&W in particular. Grabo's Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning remains the classic read in that context.

As you state, today's environment is very different. The focus too often tends to be down in the weeds, and everyone is a tactical analyst, looking for the next attack and the HVT of the week.

However, I don't believe it is a matter of the IC "stepping up to the challenge", but rather one of the consumer being educated on the necessity of true strategic focus. Without real consumer demand, the IC will not effectively resource or focus on strategic I&W in a manner in which we seemingly agree is a practical necessity. In this context, resource and focus also pertains to the fundamental building blocks of competence - training and mentoring analysts to effectively perform this type of task. The longer that true strategic I&W is relegated to the sidelines, the fewer people we end up with who are competent at the task and the harder it will be to rebuild the capability. This is a problem that can only be truly fixed at the most senior levels.

[davidbfpo]

Strategic intelligence like other types of intelligence can be a "leap in the dark" and as long as those involved as consumers and providers understand that is a first. Some "insiders" even suggest educating the consumers, the politicians; hardly an easy task assuming agreement.

Is strategic intelligence 'Driving a car by looking out of the rear window only', a pertinent point made by an insider who looks ahead. We do need to think a lot harder.

The UK prides itself on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC, a central co-ordination function); see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_I...United_Kingdom) and the official site: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secu...committee.aspx . A ppt is on: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets...el_Goodman.pdf

Mirroring BW's comments a Whitehall "insider" recently commentedin a speech:

JIC was very bad at predicting the onset of crisis; it was very good at predicting the course of a crisis.

And called for the involvement of outsiders to get real innovation, citing the Double Cross counter-intelligence success in WW2 reliance on Oxbridge brain power. A lot depends on the method used to follow history; a better method was not events but the broad impact of technological advances e.g. radio and direction-finding.

UK intelligence historians often refer to the 1982 Nicoll Report as seminal in describing how faulty intelligence assessment is; not fully in the public domain, but this helps: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/g...ers/PP1729.pdf Behind a 'pay wall' is this: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/con...ent=a782893438 which has a redacted copy of the report.

The role of analysts is covered by: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...in-the-uk.html

This point reminds me of the value given to HUMINT in the past thirty years has varied, often with a preference for other sources (SIGINT, IMINT etc). I have seen the use of low grade human sources almost disappear in LE, in preference use is made of the directed, paid informant on priority tasks.

Who would have thought the UK, let alone others, would have 9k troops in Afghanistan today? After all we left South Asia independent in 1947 and had kept out of Afghanistan as much as possible for a long time.

Judgement is what the consumer seeks in intelligence & warning and often that means saying what is going wrong. Judgement today depends on relationships, situational awareness, many other factors and not as most analysts I know prefer just information.

[Bob's World]

David,

I suspect that the national interest that the UK is servicing in AFG today, is the one of sustaining a good relationship with the US. We've put a lot of pressure on good friends, and it is wearing.

Good point though that it is up to senior leaders to elevate their sights, but I will not use that bit of reality to take the pressure off of the intel guys to be a little proactive...

[Rex Brynen]

I strongly suspect that perspectives on this very much depend on where one sits, or which shop one works in. I also suspect there is also a lack of consensus as to what strategic intel looks like, what time frames it ought to address, and whether it is actually much use. (I can think of a number of folks who would argue that, warning aside, it is actually not very useful at all.)

I can't comment on the down-in-the-weeds immediate threat material because I don't dealt with it. There is, however, a massive amount of medium term assessment (6-12 months), which addresses the full range of significant political, security, socioeconomic, ideological, and other trends. It is also typically pretty good in terms of accuracy--one recent unclassified calibration study of Canadian intel product found a 90%+ predictive accuracy rate.

In my experience, although this stuff is good building-block material for broader strategic planning, policy-makers rarely use it in that way, nor do they want product that looks much beyond the medium term, nor are they banging down anyone's door demanding strategic intel product.

[slapout9]

I would think that for Intelligence to be Strategic it would need to be that information to be collected in support of some Strategy. Or more important in support of some Grand Strategy, which during the Cold War dealt partially with containment but also with insuring that our internal economic and social conditions were sound and we were prospering as a nation in order to avoid war.

As I mentioned earlier on another thread one of the first houses my parents bought was totally electric because our future plan (as a Nation)was to build atomic power plants to power our future electictronics....Our Electric future as it was called and was part of the marketing plan at the housing development.

I have not seen anything close to any type of National Plan since then, exception was Carter's plan to reduce our dependence on foreign Oil, which was rescinded by Regan and we have been going down hill ever since.

Sort of a ramble but my point is before we start to collect Intelligence maybe we should develop a National Strategy First which would include an Energy Policy of the highest priority.

Other than that you are going to end up with an ever growing list of motivated targets looking for opportunities.

[Jedburgh]

...My answer is to start firing folks. That is one way to stir up a bureaucracy....

I wholeheartedly agree with you. But my experience over the past couple of decades is that it is far easier said than done. The old adage #### up, move up I've seen function in the intel world so often its painful.

....policy-makers rarely use it in that way, nor do they want product that looks much beyond the medium term, nor are they banging down anyone's door demanding strategic intel product....

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe that Bob isn't just talking about civilian policy-makers, but also senior military planners and decision-makers. Unfortunately, (but perhaps Bob has a different perspective) I also don't see senior military leaders banging down the intel shop's door demanding strategic product in the context of this discussion.

...I will not use that bit of reality to take the pressure off of the intel guys to be a little proactive...

It all comes down to leadership. By all means come down hard on the commander/supervisor/manager of the intel domain that supports you. State clearly what you want, why you want it, and why current production is failing to meet your needs. Put it in writing and CC the appropriate people. The analysts doing the grunt work will only be proactive and produce at a level beyond what exists in current requests and tasks if their leadership resources and incentivizes that sort of production.

[William F. Owen]

So, here is my question: WHAT exactly is strategic intelligence? and why is it so rarely asked for, and even more rarely provided?

Very good question. I do not see how you can have any such thing as Strategic intelligence. The word Strategic seems to be poorly used in place of "expensive" and/or "important."

Intelligence relating to strategy? So that would depend entirely on the strategy being used.

More importantly, intelligence should support or serve a Policy - because strategy is how policy is applied. Strategy is how something is done using force.