Looking back at the original post, I'd say there's a lack of clarity over the levels of strategy, which may be one factor in the reluctance of military intelligence agencies to provide strategic intelligence and the reluctance of military leaders to ask for it.

The setting of political goals and the development of a political strategy to achieve those goals is generally seen as the province of civilian leadership, and I suspect that it's assumed that "strategic intelligence" has already come into play at this level. Military strategy is one component of an overall political strategy, and even here the goals of military strategy tend to be set (or ignored) at the civilian leadership level. If we assume this, it's natural for the military apparatusd to focus on the tactical means by which strategies established at the civilian leadership can be achieved.

I agree with Wilf that uncertain or excessive goals represent a major problem: somewhere along the line the goal in Afghanistan seems to have changed form eliminating the AQ presence to reconstructing Afghanistan. The first goal may have been achievable, the second... I have my doubts.