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Thread: New book release

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default New book release

    The Defense Analysis Department at NPS has a new book to be published in January 2010. Doctrinally, war is looked at linearly as a spectrum of conflict. In SWJ, we discuss aspects of small, medium, and big wars. Others include additional adjectives like hybrid. The professors at DA relook the facets of war as three interlocking circles- intra-state war, civil war, and insurgency. They use Iraq as a case-study to show how OIF evolved through all three circles. While Iraq is the case study, the authors took their own experience and interviewed combat veterans of El Salvador, Colombia, Phillipines, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

    I haven't read the book, but I participated in different discussions while the Profs put together their ideas. Should be a good read and will hopefully add to our understanding of war.

    Mike

    The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq

    Product Description
    The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia.

    The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the “surge” in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.



    About the Author
    Heather S. Gregg is an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School’s department of defense analysis. Dr. Gregg is a contributing author of the RAND reports Beyond Al Qaeda (2006) and After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (2008).

    Hy S. Rothstein is a senior lecturer of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. He served in the U.S. Army as a Special Forces officer for more than twenty-six years. He is the author of Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2006).

    John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, with David Ronfeldt (RAND, 2002), and Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (National Book Network, 2008).
    Last edited by MikeF; 11-04-2009 at 03:54 PM.

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    Default How do

    civil war and insurgency differ? Mike, the objective of an insurgency is to overturn the existing order. The objective of a civil war is also to overturn the existing order. Insurgencies take place within a community (writ large or small ie El Salvador, the US, the "global community"), so, too, civil wars. Insurgencies use all types of tactics, operations, strategy from terrorism to conventional force on force conflict; so, too, civil wars. For example, what was Mao's revolution? An insurgency? A civil war? The answer is, "yes." To me, this is a distiction without substance (with all due respect to Hy Rothstein whom I've known since El Salvador days.).

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    I think that it is dangerous to resume war to just 3 kinds of wars, based on one military adventure and analyzed from only one side.
    ICRC came with international conflicts and non international conflicts and that is already complex enough.
    I will use the example of Lebanon 2006: a war between a State (Israel) and a militia group (Hezbollah) that took place on the land of a third party: Lebanon State.
    Is that an intra state war? Is that a counterinsurgency? Is that a Civil war?
    It is already difficult to know if it is an international conflict…
    Spanish civil war in the 30th. A group of rebels (the fascists) used the State tool (the regular army) to over come a legal government (the partisans) organized in small armed groups to defend the legitimacy of the law.
    If we call it the Spanish civil war, it is because it is a non international conflict between the people of one country and not the consequences of an external intervention, as is and was Iraq.

    Wars are more complex than just 2 or 3 boxes. There are means, aim, objectives…
    Iraq is a model for counterinsurgencies, yes. And should be analyzed to understand how it is or not part of a regular stabilization operation.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Smile Don't shoot the messenger

    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    How do civil war and insurgency differ? Mike, the objective of an insurgency is to overturn the existing order. The objective of a civil war is also to overturn the existing order. Insurgencies take place within a community (writ large or small ie El Salvador, the US, the "global community"), so, too, civil wars. Insurgencies use all types of tactics, operations, strategy from terrorism to conventional force on force conflict; so, too, civil wars. For example, what was Mao's revolution? An insurgency? A civil war? The answer is, "yes." To me, this is a distiction without substance (with all due respect to Hy Rothstein whom I've known since El Salvador days.).
    John,

    I just wanted to let everyone know about the book. Your question was one of the biggest debates we had, and I'm curious to see how well they address that topic in the book. Personally, I'm a fan of Ken White's description of small, medium, and big wars depending on scope, intensity, and duration.

    Mike

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    Default Not shoot the messenger????

    What's the world coming to???

    Mike, I didn't mean to come across as taking a shot at the messenger or the authors (I really thought Hy was one of the sharpest of the OPATT's I met in El Sal) but rahter at the notion that this was a useful distinction. How they define the terms will determine whther the ideas are useful. Will their definitions advance or constrain the conversation?

    Best

    JohnT

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Doctrinally, war is looked at linearly as a spectrum of conflict. In SWJ, we discuss aspects of small, medium, and big wars. Others include additional adjectives like hybrid. The professors at DA relook the facets of war as three interlocking circles- intra-state war, civil war, and insurgency. They use Iraq as a case-study to show how OIF evolved through all three circles. While Iraq is the case study, the authors took their own experience and interviewed combat veterans of El Salvador, Colombia, Phillipines, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
    Oh dear and thanks. Just expanded my library shelves from 23m to 34m so I do need to buy more books! - and reading some of them would be good as well!!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange View Post
    I think that it is dangerous to resume war to just 3 kinds of wars, based on one military adventure and analyzed from only one side.
    Well, we can only hope that Iraq/Afghanistan are the outliers of the 21st century, and we limit our future pre-emptive strikes. I can't speak for the authors, but in the preliminary discussions, the Israel/Hizballah conflict would fall into the space where the intra-war circle intersected with insurgency (I think). We'll have to wait and see what the final book looks like. Like I said initially, it should be a good read.

    At this point, I'm looking forward to reading anything of substance that gets past false debates like CT v/s COIN.

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    Well, we can only hope that Iraq/Afghanistan are the outliers of the 21st century, and we limit our future pre-emptive strikes.
    I think we are not looking enough into the Chinese concept of unrestricted war. From what I read, the last war game on economical war gave China winner with a long long advance... What about an insurgent use of economical aggressive war actions? Just like releasing thousands of fake banknotes? Or savage exchange market actions against key industries? From the testimony I heard, Taliban countered DDR with opium. The idea is good but the mean are wrong: opium is still a controlled resource. But they had a result.

    I know that China is looking at asymmetric war now, but still… They often come with good (dangerous) ideas.

    But yes, should be an interesting reading.

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    Default Legal or military concepts ?

    My thought about the trailer that Mike posted keeps coming back into my skull as I've returned to this thread a couple of times.

    The thought is: are the authors seeking to define "war" in legal terms or military terms; or are they creating some awful hybrid of legal and military mishmash ? Not having the book, I can't really say; but the trailer seems to point in the latter direction.

    The terms "intra-state war [or inter-state war], civil war, and insurgency" are certainly terms used in I Law and LOAC to define certain situations, as to which different legal rules apply. I'll spare you the legal stuff for now.

    What I fail to see is how legal terms can be transferred with any ulitility to the military realm without creating confusion. The concept of "small, medium, and big wars" (realizing that those terms are segments of a "violence" spectrum; and also realizing that a concomitant political struggle exists alongside the military struggle) seems a more useful construct. It also does not mix legal apples and military oranges - small, medium, and big wars are all armed conflicts legally, no more and no less.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    The thought is: are the authors seeking to define "war" in legal terms or military terms; or are they creating some awful hybrid of legal and military mishmash ? Not having the book, I can't really say; but the trailer seems to point in the latter direction.
    Mike, as always, you come with the thousand dollars brilliant question.
    I believe they come with a military classification of conflicts nature based on the nature and projects of the actors. But we will have to read first the book.

    At this point, I'm looking forward to reading anything of substance that gets past false debates like CT v/s COIN.
    I believe the real question would be how to reduce risks to fall into civil war and/or insurgency during hold phase.

    Looking at it quickly, I came out with this:
    - Not timely addressed internal collapse of political and/or economical local context leading to ethnic/political clashes.
    - External disruption of the political and/or economical institutions leading to ethnic/political clashes.
    - Mismanagement/dispatch of the occupant men power creating security vacuum leading to either or both ethnic/political clashes and insurgency.
    - Mismanagement of the former politico-military apparatus leading to insurgency.
    But there are more.

    Also, looking at US history, there are basically 2 main approaches for stabilization:
    - The post Civil War approach.
    Based on an immediate exploitation of economical resources of the conquered territory. That is what has been put in place in Iraq. This comes with the aim of the war: natural resources control.

    - The post WWII approach
    Based on a strong funding of development as the marshal plan. This is what was used for Europe in the 50. The aim being building a friendly ally from a previous enemy.

    For me the question of coming with a linear approach of conventional war followed by ethnic/political war ending into counter insurgency hides the main question: how to conduct hold. What are the immediate priorities that military and civil actions have to address for hold phase to be a success? And not taking as granted that you always end up into a ethnic/political clashes and an insurgency (that will always be there by the way).
    For example:
    - Do you first try to exploit natural resources and then dispatch significant forces and efforts to do so or do you first provide basic security in the streets and electricity at night in the main cities?
    Responding to that question may probably help. (But I may be wrong). From my point of view, if you end up into ethnic/political clashes and counter insurrection operations: you may have forgotten to finalize something.
    Last edited by M-A Lagrange; 11-05-2009 at 07:26 PM.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    The concept of "small, medium, and big wars" (realizing that those terms are segments of a "violence" spectrum; and also realizing that a concomitant political struggle exists alongside the military struggle) seems a more useful construct. It also does not mix legal apples and military oranges - small, medium, and big wars are all armed conflicts legally, no more and no less.
    Mike,

    Are you using your mind reading powers to read my magnum opus that I haven't written yet??? Another good thing about small, medium, big is that it gives guys like me an easy way to figure out which hammer to use .

    As far as M-A Lagrange's comment on unrestrictive warfare, I'm not sure how to answer that. I would submit that it's more of the greater IR "game" between nation-states not simply a military matter.

    Mike

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    Default Stabilized situations

    from M-A
    Also, looking at US history, there are basically 2 main approaches for stabilization:

    - The post Civil War approach.
    Based on an immediate exploitation of economical resources of the conquered territory. That is what has been put in place in Iraq. This comes with the aim of the war: natural resources control.

    - The post WWII approach
    Based on a strong funding of development as the marshal plan. This is what was used for Europe in the 50. The aim being building a friendly ally from a previous enemy.
    In both of those cases, the military struggle was pretty much placed on the shelf. The political struggle intensified. BTW, the economy of the South was destroyed - more so than its armies. So, Reconstruction - which meant many very different things to many very different people.

    Iraq and Astan presented and present quite different patterns - nationally, Iraq may be into the "build" phase (?); Astan is not even close.

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    Default Michael ....

    you are absolutely correct in this:

    from MikeF
    Are you using your mind reading powers to read my magnum opus that I haven't written yet.
    I am using my vastly enhanced "N" powers (iNtuitive of INTJ) to begin my program of examining and shaping the military mind - having now succeeded in knowing what the judge will do several weeks from now.[*]

    Worry not about which hammer to use - Remote Viewing will allow you to control the nail directly from your desktop.

    On a serious note, Chinese "unrestricted warfare" (much of which is not warfare in the "armed confllict" sense) is simply an amplification of Mao's ability to use both the armed struggle and the political struggle (and to switch emphasis back and forth as the situation demanded).

    In crude form, we find that in his "shape shifting" use of the Eighth Route Army - sometimes a conventional force, sometimes a guerrilla force, sometimes a special force ala Wingate; but still the same force. That and a sophisticated campaign of political infiltration and subversion among the ChiNat forces.

    --------------------------
    [*] It also helped that all of the interested parties have now signed consents to my proposed course of action and the proposed order.

    I have long since left the realm of sheep and goats as being beneath my talents.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Difference between civil war and insurgency

    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    How do civil war and insurgency differ?
    I found this in my personal notes from studying Mao's 3 phases and Vietcong's strategy. This is how I describe the difference. I haven't seen any academic literature or military doctrine that counters it.

    Phase Zero: Ideological/Revolutionary Movement
    Phase One: Insurgency
    Phase Two: Insurgency/Civil War
    Phase Three: Civil War

    I never figured out what 2.5 or the tipping point from insurgency to civil war is.

    Any thoughts?

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    Default Here's one suggestion

    Study our (US) Civil War - War of Rebellion. War of Northern Agression, or War of Divisions (my preference) - not only as to the events bellum, but also those ante-bellum and post-bellum. You will find your three initial phases ramping up to the main event and the same three phases in reverse ramping down during Reconstruction and after.

    Different terminology is used depemding on the author - I'd use different terms for Mao's and Giap's experiences.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    hey Mike,

    From my understanding of Mao, guerrila is a phase conducted by partisans or militias. It is very much a leninist approach of war: a small groups take the lead in the name of the people and conduct propaganda operation (including violent ones). At this stage, in Mao approach, you conduct guerrilla operations tagetting symbols and disrupt the opponent supply. Like in Indochina, you break the supply and communication lines and conquiere country side.
    Then you go for civil war: a conventional fight between 2 conventional armies. Mao end up in a very conventional form of war, as during China conquest by the communist after the long walk (grande marche). Just like the final stage against the Kuomongtang.

    Concerning stabilization and what leads to insurgencies, I may comme with the following reading recommendations:
    - Francis Fukuyama, State Building
    - Foucault about bio power and panoptic
    - Robert Chambers and all the economist of the theory of action (in economic development).

    The last ones are not so much useful to anticipate but rather to evaluate the social processes. You also have to be familiar with Rostow as it is the starting point for economic development (take off and linear development theory).

    Africa is a good example to understand most of the bad effects that will lead to a deterioration of your efforts... I would recommend:
    - The criminalization of the state in Africa, jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, Beatrice Hibou.

    I like very much criminalization of the state as it gives a real good base to picture all the side effects that most of new national governments are putting in place when artificially (out of the rule of law and democratic way) put in power.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Mike's theory

    Quote Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange View Post
    hey Mike,

    From my understanding of Mao, guerrila is a phase conducted by partisans or militias. It is very much a leninist approach of war: a small groups take the lead in the name of the people and conduct propaganda operation (including violent ones). At this stage, in Mao approach, you conduct guerrilla operations tagetting symbols and disrupt the opponent supply. Like in Indochina, you break the supply and communication lines and conquiere country side. Then you go for civil war: a conventional fight between 2 conventional armies. Mao end up in a very conventional form of war, as during China conquest by the communist after the long walk (grande marche). Just like the final stage against the Kuomongtang.
    Excellent points, mon ami. The description that I posted of defining Mao's phases is something that I came up with to try to conceptualize and understand a framework for what I saw in Iraq.* It also seeks to answer the social scientist questions of:

    1. Why do men rebel?
    2. How do they train, organize, and equip to rebel?
    3. How do they rebel?

    IMO, Mao's protracted war explains insurgencies, gangs, and social movements IF you take his work broadly and apply it individuallly to each situation. Keep in mind one of the beauty's of Mao's work is that his phases are not sequential, and the enemy can move in and out of phases depending on what the host nation is doing. Additionally, one never has to go to Ph 3 if the political objectives are met. It's probably time for me to write an essay for publication on my thoughts so that it can be peer-reviewed and confirmed/denied.

    As JMM pointed out, a thorough explanation would probably be a dissertation. The American Civil War is a great case study to compare and contrast with others. In the case of the Civil War, you have defining moments of transition (Battle at Fort Sumter is clear shift from Ph 2 to Ph 3, and Robert E. Lee's surrender is clear shift from Ph 3 to Ph 2). Other parts are still murky. When did the southern resistance move from Ph 2-1-0? One could argue that it did not fully occur until the 1960s.

    Mike

    *The Viet Cong's implementation of Mao in the Vietnam country-side helped me understand my enemy in Iraq. The study led to my publication of The Break Point for SWJ.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default

    These are concepts that differ based upon how one defines key terms. In other words, reasonable minds could and will differ.

    Mao recognized phases, and one could say his phase III is essentially civil war; but it also important to recognize that the insurgent can prevail in his cause in any phase, to include Phase 0, and that insurgency can also fluxuate between phases in time, and at any given time be in different phases within the same country.

    Adding confusion is that over time, history has labled various conflicts as "insurgencies" "revolutions" "rebellions" "civil wars" etc. This locks certain conflicts into certain categories in our minds, but many of these are not very accurate.

    For example, the "American Revolution" to me is much more accurately described as a "Separatist Insurgency."

    But there are value in such constructs regardless of where one personally draws the lines as understanding the purpose and causation of conflict is the first step in understanding how to resolve the same. Divisions based on size only really help drive logistics. A small insurgency is much like a large insurgency in terms of what causes and cures it. But a small insurgency is nothing like a small conventional war / inter-state war. This is my biggest beef with "small wars journal" is that it creates a perception that small wars are inherently different from large ones and also inherently the same. I see that as a false division.

    But the reason I even came to this thread is that Hy and McCormick are coming out here with an old friend from the NPS team for a few days, and I look forward to some great conversations.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Just Released

    The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq.
    by Heather Gregg, Hy Rothstein, and John Arquilla

    All royalties go to the Wounded Warrior Foundation.

    Professors from the DA Department, along with some others, have just published a book on Iraq called The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq. The book includes chapters on Iraq’s culture, training security forces, the adversary’s use of the internet, measures of effectiveness, politics, terrorism financing, and ethics and legal issues in the war. The book also draws on a variety of methods for understanding the war, including case studies, mathematical modeling, and system dynamic modeling.
    - Professor Gregg, email correspondance

    From Amazon,

    The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia.

    The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the “surge” in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.

    Heather S. Gregg is an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School’s department of defense analysis. Dr. Gregg is a contributing author of the RAND reports Beyond Al Qaeda (2006) and After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (2008).

    Hy S. Rothstein is a senior lecturer of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. He served in the U.S. Army as a Special Forces officer for more than twenty-six years. He is the author of Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2006).

    John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, with David Ronfeldt (RAND, 2002), and Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (National Book Network, 2008).

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