Londonstani reports collection

[omarali50]

Nice job by Londonstani. I happened to see this today and had just written some email comments on an op-ed by Dr. Manzur Ejaz (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...4-3-2010_pg3_3), they are sort of relevant here, so I am posting...I look forward to your comments.

I agree with Dr. sahib and I think that Pakistan's army also knows much of this. Where they may still be mistaken (and we dont know because they continue to avoid transparency like the plague; another sign that their modernism is not as modern as they themselves believe) is in thinking that they can control their old proxies. I think (and this is a bit of a convoluted argument, so please bear with me):

1. The army is a more modern institution than others in Pakistan, but not as modern as they themselves imagine. They will have a hard time controlling both their old proxies and the new forces unleashed by ongoing development in Pakistan.

2. Their fatal flaw is institutional and it is aggravated by negative selection at an individual level. Institutionally, their interests are not always the same as the interests of the majority of the Pakistani people. Their own short term economic interest is in making money as a "rent an army" operation. THEY like to imagine that they are more like the PLA in China, a vast economic enterprise engaged in "nation building", closely intertwined with the ruling elite, historically respected by the people as a revolutionary army. The last two obviously dont apply to the Pak army (but not surprisingly, they dont seem to notice), but even their multiple economic holdings are not close to being the PLA of Pakistan. Most of their economic holdings are economically unsound and are actually subsidized by taxpayers or by foreign aid ("rent an army" operations). This pushes their policy making in a "rent an army" direction even when they imagine otherwise.

3. The individual negative selection is less important but not without consequence. I invite you to take a close look at any group photo of senior army officers of today. Better yet, meet them in their clubs and golf courses. I rest my case.

4. The army seems to believe that they are "winning"� in Afghanistan. If this is victory, then one shudders to think what defeat would look like. The narrative on the internet is that America is pulling out and Pak army are the gatekeepers and they will make the Americans pay throught their nose and bloody indians will get a black eye and whatnot. I think the only part of this theory that is correct is that America may pay them for the next 2-3 years. If India is foolish enough to get into a proxy war with them in Afghanistan, then India will bleed too, but if sardarji is smart enough to keep his head and work at a lower key, then Pakistan will end up with a marginally friendly regime in Afghanistan and a continuing civil war at home as well as in Afghanistan, with attendant costs for Pakistan.

5. Indian hawks (who are at least as dumb as Pakistani ones) will whine and cry about strategic setbacks and whatnot, but if they dont get into a shooting war with Pakistan, they will become a mid-level power in a few years and the hawks will make better money too, so the bitterness will be less painful with time....the old 19th century paradigm of "strategic interests" will be quietly buried somewhere in kalapaani.

6. I don't know what Kiyani sahib is thinking (he certainly seems smarter than his buffoonish predecessor) but the army fans on the internet seem to have convinced themselves that Pakistan has successfully moved from nineties style salafist jihadism to a more india-centric, modern Pakistani nationalism (Zaid Hamid lite) that is compatible with American aid, yet fully energised against any attempt to reverse military domination of Pakistani policy. I guess when they meet their friends it looks like EVERYONE in Pakistan is with them on this ridiculous journey. But it looks to me like this new concoction has no future at all. Nineties jihadism was wedded to salafist Islam, which is a real ideology, a religious movement with a 1400 year old history. This mashup of 8th grade islamiyat, pakistan studies and conspiracy theories is the emptiest of empty shells. There is no there there...Army fans will be repeatedly disappointed by the Pakistani "public", who will vote in "looters", indulge in "indiscipline", get distracted by "provincialism", produce far too many criminals and will generally behave much like any overpopulated third world country in transition, instead of holding fast to "Unity. Faith, Discipline and the rule of the blessed army".....

[davidbfpo]

A thoughtful comment article, which could fit a number of threads. Hat tip to Abu M and the comment is on Afpak Channel:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...erate_majority

His penultimate paragraph:

For decades internal and external actors have been exploiting religious fervor in Pakistan for political gain. That feeling has morphed, evolved, and developed a life of its own. The future of Pakistan will be decided by the outlook adopted by its people. And as of yet, that outlook is still being formed. Right now, despite the best efforts of extremists, the majority of Pakistanis see the core principles of their faith revolving around peaceful coexistence, social justice and community service. If the public sees Barelvis and Deobandi leaders marching their communities to war, the groups will threaten their own legitimacy. On the other hand, if extremists succeed in redefining what is considered "Islamic" and convincing ordinary Pakistanis that differing views of religion are worth fighting and killing over, the consequences will be devastating for Pakistan, and disastrous for the world.

He adds this on what the West can do:

A few months ago, I read Hilary Synnott's International Institute for Strategic Studies report Transforming Pakistan. I thought at the time that Sir Hilary's suggestion that the international community basically take it on itself to transform Pakistan was unrealistic and an even bigger disaster waiting to happen. However, I'm beginning to think that a major game change is needed and the only question remains who the real domestic partners should be. The best option, and the most willing potential allies, are the general public. The question is how to approach them and how to tool the options avaiable to the international community so that they actually work effectively.

The above comment comes from the article and there is a poor discussion on:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-pakistan.html

[subrosa]

londonstani says:

but politics makes democratically elected leaders unwilling to upset influential groups. After the bombings, a Deobandi gathering that included a former leading member of the sectarian militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi issued a statement threatening to make the provincial Punjab government pay in the polls if it acted against their interests.

Iftikhar Hussain a provincial minister and an outspoken critic of the taliban had to pay with his son's life plus eight others at the funeral. I guess this is another reason why the leaders dont want to upset the militants.
if they can make the leaders pay in the polls and kill thier families...makes me wonder who is really in control there?
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...r_kills_36.php

hopefully londonstani's article will help develop the will to reach out to the general public there. the million dollar question is 'how to approach'. that should be a thread of its own!

[fnord]

First of all, I cant believe that the last 9 years have failed to come up with an o-plan for how to engage the Pakistani populace. At this point, I fear it may be too late, since the oppos have 8 years in advance prep of hearts and minds. A couple of ideas, though:
* Use the film and media industrial might of the west. Finance bollywood style romances where the brave lad (who is a member of the frontier corps)has to rescue the beautiful girl from the bad mujahedin, aided by the good mujahedin of course, while being opposed by the bad army people and being helped by the good army people.
* Use the soft power of computation and get a freaking low budget high-yield education program going. At the moment, the madrassas are the sole alternative to education for lots and lots of folks, give em an alternative.
* Engage the muslim part of the coalition of the willing. It may be too late now for Afghan, but where o where is the western financed muslim peace corps? WHy havent we focused much more on five-10 years plans to build sustainable infrastructures (that includes human resources)? To me, that is the great mindboggling question of the 2001-2005 period when Afghanistan was relatively quiet, why wasnt there an equal amount of effort put into educating midlevel buerocracy as there was into building security forces?
* Reexamine the concepts of aid. Currently way way way to much is redirected back into western contractors pockets. Microfinance, Unix computers, easy irrigation, these are things that are needed on base level. Thats how you build trust.

But I fear its too late.

[omarali50]

I think you are focusing on the details, but you have to get the big picture before you can do the details. Pakistan's army (and its really the army that still runs policy in this arena) has certain notions about its own strategic needs. These notions are first and foremost India-centric. Once you accept certain "strategic concepts" that are regularly taught in military academies, then this obsession even makes some kind of sense. But in another country one might have had think tanks and civilian politicians with other priorities and greater vision watching over the generals. That adult oversight is lacking in Pakistan. Instead, the generals live in a world where they are the only people who really know the score on strategy and "national interest" and everyone else is a fool or a tool. Left to their own devices, they will ALWAYS look for ways to carry on their zero-sum game with India. For whatever reasons (incompetence? oversmart theorizing? Stockholm syndrome? short-sighted self interest? corruption?) the US lets this stupid game continue and tries its carrots and sticks around it. That is not going to work. Plain speaking would probably work better, but I guess the US establishment has its own habits of thought and plain speaking to third world countries is not one of them....not even when they actually dont need "unobtainium" from under the gooks' sacred tree.....

[davidbfpo]

Londonstani now has his own blog, which explains his mission as:

As Londonstani comes from a media and foreign affairs background, this blog tends to lean towards getting things done by trying to understand people and speaking to them. (As opposed to shooting them, which is expensive - and not very nice.)

Link:http://www.londonstani.com/