Results 1 to 20 of 60

Thread: Applying the lessons of late 19th/early 20th century asymmetrical warfare

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member Kevin23's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Washington DC
    Posts
    224

    Question Applying the lessons of late 19th/early 20th century asymmetrical warfare

    I was thinking earlier in the week looking at the current engagments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the way these conflicts are being controversially compared to Vietnam both in the public sphere and in other areas like the policy one at least in the US. However, I feel late 19th/early 20th Century conflicts like the Boer Wars that occured in South Africa, the Philippine–American War, or even some aspects of the First World War would offer comparisons and lessons also due to many of the dynamics of those conflicts and the way they were fought in some ways by all sides involved.

    So I was wondering if these wars hold lessons that can be applied to modern day small wars and if so what are they?

  2. #2
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Kevin23 View Post
    I feel late 19th/early 20th Century conflicts like the Boer Wars that occured in South Africa, the Philippine–American War, or even some aspects of the First World War would offer comparisons and lessons also due to many of the dynamics of those conflicts and the way they were fought in some ways by all sides involved.

    So I was wondering if these wars hold lessons that can be applied to modern day small wars and if so what are they?
    Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

    What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  3. #3
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2007
    Location
    Hungary
    Posts
    69

    Default Postbipolar world vs the golden age of colonialism

    I think the title says it all. Think about how national liberation wars (say 1946-1975), Declaration of human rights /1948/, Weapons of mass destruction, the holocaust, and globalisítion etc. has changed our views on warfare, on combatants and non-combatants on casualties and so on.

    Edit
    One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

    IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.
    Last edited by UrsaMaior; 11-05-2009 at 10:14 AM. Reason: Extendsion
    Nihil sub sole novum.

  4. #4
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by UrsaMaior View Post
    Edit
    One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

    IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.
    It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  5. #5
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
    Posts
    3,137

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.
    In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

    During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.

  6. #6
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

    During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.
    I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle. What I was pointing out was that the "white man's invincibility" had been a myth for some years prior to World War II and that there were small wars prior to the Boer War. Artificially starting the "small wars clock" at that point risks missing everything that came before, as does focusing the examination on European colonial possessions in the Pacific region.

    There's nothing wrong, obviously, with giving those conflicts careful and thoughtful study. But there are other regions and periods that would repay examination.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  7. #7
    Council Member Kevin23's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Washington DC
    Posts
    224

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

    What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.
    I couldn't agree more,

    As I think conflicts like the Boer Wars hold lessons for COIN both in terms of how to defeat an insurgency and how not to defeat an insurgency.

  8. #8
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default Time changes the observations / history

    Kevin23,

    You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

    Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8499.

    davidbfpo
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-07-2009 at 12:00 AM. Reason: Add link

  9. #9
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

    My view is here
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  10. #10
    Council Member Kevin23's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Washington DC
    Posts
    224

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

    My view is here
    Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

  11. #11
    Council Member Kevin23's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Washington DC
    Posts
    224

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Kevin23,

    You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

    Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8499.

    davidbfpo

    Sorry for the late reply Davidbfpo,

    I really wasn't planning any extensive research paper or anything else on this subject at current time, as I mainly started this thread as topic of discussion. However to answer your post, haven't really had a chance to read anything by Pakenham or about the Boer War recently. Although I did read the illustrated edition of his book on the Boer War a very long time ago. Also I have read Martin Meredith's book on the war, Diamond's Gold, and War. So overall throughout the years I've always thought as the Boer War as mainly a guerillia war and I have seen it presented in that way when reading history.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •