tarbaby
I share the frustration of the other participants. it is difficult to agree on a common vocabulary & definitions, to ensure we clearly communicate the precise ideas we want to discuss, without ambiguity. Adding new buzzwords to our vocabulary further complicates matters.
Since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, humans have banded together to secure the needs & wants of one community against the needs & wants of other communuties. Some of these bands evolve into sophisticated cultures & societies, with robust economic, political & military institutions. Some remain relatively unsophisticated, or allow their sophistication to evolve in different directions.
When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers.
I agree with the earlier commenters that we have much to learn from history. I encourage my children - and other students - to learn from what worked, first, and then to learn from what did not work. After allowing them a few minutes to think about those overly simplified concepts, I remind them that the hard part is figuring out why something did or did not work.
I suspect that we may learn as much about how to succeed in attaining a worthy goal by studying the techniques and practices used to pursue a goal we would not approve, as we could by studying for example, archaic techniques used to pursue less controversial goals.
I think we should draw rational distinctions between different war environments, bearing in mind that all such classifications are at least partly artificial. Sometimes geographic factors are important in analyzing the nature of a conflict. Economic factors, and their impact on social factors, are almost always at the heart of the nature of the conflict. I think anyone who studies human conflict can identify scores of differentiating factors that could be used to classify conflicts. I also think the same serious students of conflict can identify several recurrent themes that cut across any classifications we might devise.
We can rationally differentiate according to the strenght of each belligerent, as well as their relative strength. The political status of the parties may be relevant. Religious, ideological and ethnic/nationalist factors may also shed light.
That's not to say the classification is worthless; to the contrary, I think it helps us break down the individual cases into their component parts, but also allows us to bring those parts back up in a different context, so we can better understand which factors affect each other, & how they do so.
Each conflict cited in this discussion thread should offer valuable lessons to us. The question is whether we can find them & apply them.
What were the participants trying to accomplish? Did they rationally weigh the costs & benefits of pursuing their goal? What course did they pursue to attain the goal? What barriers did they encounter? How did they adapt? Did they attain the stated goal? Did they regret the price they paid?
I can't speak for other scholars on this point, but I try to separate my personal feelings about colonialism & imperialism from my examination of the history. It is hard to avoid tainting analysis with emotional or moral judgments. I am trying to remind myself that the moral analysis can be done after the facts are studied and the utility of the actions are analyzed.
It strikes me as possible (and undesirable) to reject out of hand a morally and ethically defensible technique that was employed to achieve a policy goal I regard as immoral. Without diminishing my moral standing to criticize the abhorrent policy goal, I should try to remain open-minded enough to recognize a technique that appears to be effective, and which could be put to use pursuing a more worthy goal.
Of course, the more moral baggage associated with an event in history, the more difficult it is for us to achieve this elusive objectivity. At the same time, we don't want to slide down the other slope & pretend that morality & ethics have no light to shed on our studies.
The more I learn, the more I see that I need to learn. I have been learning much over the past few months as I read the thoughtful insights of the contributors to these discussions. I expect to keep learning, as long as I live. Thanks for contributing to my learning.
So given a morally justifiable end, you can employ "effective" means? This is extremely context dependant, but I do agree that it is the purpose to which force in employed that should largely (not exclusively) define its political merit. However almost every NGO in the world rejects that view.Originally Posted by Hugh Davis
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
All human endeavours are highly context specific. I was trying not to wander too far off the reservation with a philosophical treatise, but sometimes, one's own thoughts can seem overly fascinating.
To more directly address your comment & question, I think it is important to weigh the morality of both goals and techniques. Ideally, we would hope to have a clearly moral goal to pursue, and a toolbox full of clearly moral techniques to choose from as we pursue that goal.
I think it would be overly cautious to reject a course of action with no inherent moral fault, just because it appears to have been "tainted" by another's use of that technique to pursue a less acceptable goal.
Colonialism is a good example of what I have in mind. Please read in any appropriate caveats; like most human activities, colonialism was fueled by mixed motives. However, I think it's fair to say that modern society, both East & West, are uncomfortable with the colonial heritage. There are sound moral arguments to be made against the exploitative nature of colonialism.
Since I haven't walked in the shoes of those who colonized the less developed continents, I won't try to weigh the selfish factors against the generous factors that may have motivated them. I simply note that times have changed, and the older colonial model is not acceptable today, especially when it involves subjugation of both the people and the wealth of the colony. That goal is not acceptable today, and you can use the terms "ethics" and "morality" to describe that fact.
However, I have observed that some colonies developed habits of representative government, respect for the rule of law, respect for individual liberties, and other habits & institutions that helped them form relatively stable governments as they became independent. Naturally, the citizens of these former colonies merit our respect for governing themselves effectively.
My curiosity, however, causes me to wonder what actions by colonial governments encouraged or discouraged this development. There may be lessons here to learn as we seek to help other unstable societies build the institutions & habits that will allow their citizens to enjoy stability and liberty.
I can imagine an otherwise intelligent person saying that we must not copy the policies & procedures of the British Raj, because the goal of exploiting India's wealth was clearly wrong, and therefore, any activity that contributed to that goal is inherently wrong, so we should not use those policies or procedures, even to accomplish a wholly different goal.
I will now confess that I know much less than I want to know about colonial administration. There is at least one other thread extant on this topic, & I'm learning from it. Since I know less than I need to know, I can't be very specific about which practices could be adapted to the modern nation-building environment.
In the point you questioned, I was alluding to the possibility of using the experience of the India Office & the Foreign & Colonial Office to inform the efforts of modern statesmen to assist residents of unstable countries in developing stable institutions. My concern was that the "taint" of colonialism would keep us from asking whether there is a specific moral concern about whichever specific procedures we are examining. If the (hypothetical) procedure is not inherently wrong, it makes sense to me to use it to further the goal of assisting a nation in building a stable state capable of protecting the lives, liberty and property of its people.
Thanks for commenting. Questions make us think more clearly. If it didn't lead me to write more clearly, I apologize. I should have been asleep before I started writing.
Could you come with a specific reference to Tarbaby effect?When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers.
By William F. OwenSo given a morally justifiable end, you can employ "effective" means? This is extremely context dependant, but I do agree that it is the purpose to which force in employed that should largely (not exclusively) define its political merit. However almost every NGO in the world rejects that view.
This is the perception the military has of the NGO. NGO position is less and less clear and orthodox on that particular point. Many would like to find a Leviathan to protect them (first) and the populations (when they are secured). The real question being which political power is found legitimate by NGOs to be respected as a legitimate user of force. I was once discussing the very same issue with a friend from MSF. He came with this comment: “we (MSF) love the rebels. We do not like the official armies of any countries but we love the rebels.”
This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority. But if this is what you see on the ground, this is far from being what you see in the HQ. In all HQ of the world, NGO are doing what governments are telling them. NGO are quite a traditional actor into war. They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.
As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.
Not sure what you mean by "as in Israel", but whose legitimacy, when and where?They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.
EG:After Israel evicted the Jordanians from the West Bank in 1967, they became the "occupying power." Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Why do you want to take actions against them?As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.
NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.
The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.
By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys. All you have to do is making sure that you control their funds sources and then NGO have an open position against you but do the job for you. But coordination of aid and harmonised approach is may be the most difficult to achieve.
I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.
That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.
Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.
Are they really that stupid and simplistic?By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken. Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer. I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.
I’ll start by the easiest. No, they are not that simplistic once you have reached a certain level. But basically, in average 75% western expatriated relief worker are like that. Occupation always had and has bad publicity. By definition you are illegitimate as you are imposing a form of regulation by the use of force. You have to have in mind that they just believe they will impose the Humanitarian order on the world. Governments are not perceived as a partner or a power. They are perceived as threat. A government using force is then by definition a threat to Humanity.Are they really that stupid and simplistic?
Well… there always had and will always be. The first ones were not the enemy. So we have to just agree this enters into intelligence management.I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.
As an example I will use a US NGO in Lebanon, in cities under Hezbollah administration. They use to fund huge projects implemented by Hezbollah NGOs and administration. Who was doing masked military activities?
The difficulty of using NGO as a weapon is basically found in the fact you cannot destroy your enemy and even less its effects. Social services delivered by the enemy to its population, whatever is the political back ground, will always have better publicity than yours. So you have to turn it in your advantage. It’s by the funds you can do it.
It applies to all NGO. It is not because the NGO is the best friend of your enemy it is not the best friend of a military power. Being protected by the Geneva Convention is an advantage for all and an obligation for all parts of the conflict. You cannot kill or arm NGO workers, properties and even less the medical facilities, vehicles and staff: basic constraints for all. All do not decide to apply it, OK, but this is not the point.That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.
Your approach of NGO management is too direct. The bargain has to be apparently invisible. NGO will not do what you want for protection. Protecting them is your obligation. What you look at is having NGO doing what you want as part of their general activities. The dichotomy military and civilian has to be respected. (NGO are contesting your moral legitimacy in who is regulating war.) So you have to show that it is you who integrates their network.
The hearts and minds fallacy does not apply to conflicts settled in time for generations. It will be difficult to win the heart and the mind of an Israeli and a Palestinian. But I separate hearts and minds as a technical expression and the real object of counter insurgencies: social services distribution to support loyalist military activity.Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.
This is as important than to know what the population thinks. In recent conflicts, as Iraq, what has been undermining all is the delay of reinstallation of basic social services and order. The longer you wait before addressing those simple issues, the larger you open the door to insurgency and, if you’re lucky, to civil war between all the factions who are trying to contest you the power vacuum. Civilian will go for the one who will protect them in a large understanding of protection.
Occupation is not limited to hold. Hold is a transition phase which has to integrate the roots of build. In my opinion, hold and build are mixed. Separating them is what leads to insurgencies.
In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names.
Camps are another issue by the way. They have a different legal status than an occupied land. They also fall under a different organization of political power. Would recommend Michel Agier On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (http://www.amazon.fr/Margins-World-R...8632871&sr=1-1) and his new book but I do not know if it is available in English: gerer les indesirables des camps de refgier au gouvernement humanitaire. (Managing the unwelcomed, from refugees camps to humanitarian government).
I was taught to call it METT-TC.
From M-A Lagrange
Americans are pretty poor as colonists and running an empire. We're too nice. In Iraq and A'stan, the endstate is not to have a 51st and 52nd state. In truth, we'll be lucky to have neutral partners. I've been skimming the int'l contracts for both states. All the resources and money are going to China, Russia, and others. I have yet to see one major contract for an American company.In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names.
The true irony is that we may be paying for others freedom while assisting our economic competitors. So Strange.
So? Why do I care what the other side thing? I am forcing my will upon them. My survival is more important than theirs.
-again, so what? Speaks to the political aim of the conflict.Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer.
Sure, but again so what?I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.
What looks good on day one doesn't look good 3 years later. You can't tell the future and violence is instrumental to what it is used against, not things that have not yet occurred, or may be flow down effects.
If folks new their wives would divorce them they wouldn't get married.
Last edited by William F. Owen; 11-19-2009 at 03:08 PM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Says who?
Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, that approach is likely to earn you a lot of enemies and alienate any friends you have. That's fine if you have the capacity to control everyone around you, all by yourself, all the time, forever. Those of finite capacity might want to consider the possibility that their ability to control may eventually erode to the point where that kind of control is no longer possible. That's especially true of those who need external support and who require the regular consent of their own populace.
I know you're not looking at DoD contracting there.I have yet to see one major contract for an American company.
As far as mineral and oil exploitation think that is because both Iraq and Afghanistan represent risk profiles far outside that for most Western corporations. The Chinese, OTOH, are known for their willingness to go to marginal places on marginal contracts, often with thin to nonexistent profit margins in the Western sense.
Iraq, for all the progress, remains far more violent and politically unstable than Nigeria, for instance.
Like I said, NGO need challenging partners with whom them feel they are in control. Saying guys you do what you have been ordered to do just does not work. And it is a good thing. Nowadays we are conducting war among the people not war on a land populated with people. There is much to learn from NGO on how to conduct operations among the people.Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.
And please, look at history. Part from Rome (with various success), when did an occupation have good press? Every time someone from outside comes to occupy a land, you can be sure the population will fight to quick the strangers out. This works everywhere, anytime and all the time…
It is one of the few things that never change in war.
May be the Halliburton contracts at the early beginning of Iraq war were too much.The true irony is that we may be paying for others freedom while assisting our economic competitors. So Strange.
Also, colonization was first based on economical relations. Colonial wars were primally used to reinforce dominant positions. Cf Portugese in West Congo, French in West Africa... We first made trade then invaded the place. May be that is the key.
One of the calculations of Bush administration was to boost economy through war economy (Invading Iraq). 29 economic crises were solved by WW2. The main difference being the body count (dead do not look for employment).
Value of Late 19th/Early 20th-Century Small Wars
A lot of professional historians have said that the proper model for understanding at least US actions in the current messes is the Phil. insurrection, but that is even an overdrawn historical parallel IMHO.
The real problem with trying to "use" history for these issues is the cherry picking that goes on. Looking at any "small war" in history can lead one to find the Eureka! moment: "We should do X because Y did it and they won in Z." One of the great tropes is that history repeats itself. People repeat themselves, often to inimical effect. Remember, history not an exercise in lessons learned and case studies like the military's pathetic attempts at PME suggest (remember, PME is to education what air guitar is to music).
I just had a student in the Norwich MA in Mil Hist program write his end-of-program (we don't call it a thesis because it is not) on why the US military continues to conflate the terms UW, FID, revolutionary, guerrilla, COIN, LIC, IW, spec ops, etc. His argument fell partly on the point that the people responsible for writing the doctrine for those operations do not have the proper training in history. Instead, they cherry pick and think reading some stuff on the web will do the trick. Alas, it ain't so.
IMO, Doctrine writers tend not to write Doctrine. They write sales documents for concepts.
Doctrine writers and also Military Theorists, tend to be very bad at military history. Indeed we keep confusing "military historians" with "military theorists." Selective use of sources and simplistic narratives as to events are a huge problem.
My beef with most military history is it's failure to provide insight, and instead to provide narrative. When have almost no "Operational historians" bar the likes of Paddy Griffiths.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What professional historian has said that, and where? Quite a bizarre contention, really.
"Philippine Insurrection" is in the first place a peculiar and ahistoric construct. Filipinos call it the Philippine-American War, probably more realistic. It was a conquest, not an insurrection, and despite some familiarity with it I can't see anything even vaguely resembling a useful parallel to the current conflicts. Certainly many of the methods employed would be neither acceptable nor useful today: can you imagine an American commander in Helmand or Kandahar pulling a Howlin' Jake Smith and ordering his men to kill every Afghan male over the age of 11? The times they have a'changed.
Brian Linn for one.
Doctrine is indeed a political football. Most of it is not worth the paper it is printed on.
Are you a member of SMH? I think you'll find that operational historians are a dying breed because they don't get at the important issues of history. A few places like CMH and CSI write operational histories, but they are really bad. Again, more just reports and lessons learned, but without the proper historic and historiographic context, they become useless. There are a lot of really outstanding military historians out there writing some really good stuff, but on the whole, folks in the military don't listen to them because of the anti-intellectual bias of the military. The good stuff is out there, but it takes a long time to master it.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks