Muslim Brotherhood

[Strickland]

Tom, thanks for the quick reply. You referenced just about everything that came to mine mind as well. They have been on-again - off-again within the Egyptian political landscape, to include securing 88 parliamentary seats as independents recently. They have drawn considered criticism from most of the al-Qa'ida theorists/spiritual guides, and thus could be a useful model in the Middle East.

As you stated, Hafez Asad destroyed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, and thus the Brotherhood is not fond of the continued Alawite rule. This too could be useful to the US.

Though Hamas has serious baggage concerning its use of suicide bombings, they have shown in the past a propensity for humanitarian assistance and social projects within the PA. Again, I am not forgiving or over-looking any of their actions; however, given the back and forth between the Palestinians and the Israelis, I can easily understand some of the violence.

Finally, the Brotherhood had considerable influence in Sudan, and was instrumental in working out a deal to keep Turabi under house arrest.

I am of the impression that it is time to look "out-side the box," look for potential Muslim allies that have mass appeal, and yet at the same time, disrupt al Qa'ida. Wouldn't this be a good way to potentially further divide Sunni Muslims?

After reading much that was written by several of Al Qa'ida's theorists, they admit that the are vulnerable to US proxy forces - regardless if it they are social, military, or political.

[Steve Blair]

Both the wiki entry and the FAS information on the Muslim Brotherhood points towards them being fairly fundamentalist in their take on Islam, although perhaps not to the degree of al-Qa'ida. Perhaps al-Qa'ida views them more as a threat to their recruiting pool than anything else, or something to keep destabilized in case they should get more organized. The wiki entry is especially interesting. Looks like they've been around for a good while, and seem to be able to "reproduce" themselves in a way similar to al-Qa'ida.

Information aside, I'm not sure exactly how you'd "use" a group like this. Depending on which faction you work with, some may be more willing to meet US interests halfway. It would involve some unpleasent pressure on some of our less acceptable 'allies' in the Middle East (such as the Saudis), but the return might be worth the risk.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm

[Jedburgh]

MB or not, "solution" or not, the key point to keep in mind is that many of the opposition groups to the less-than-democratic regimes in the region are Islamist in nature. If we truly support the emergence of democracy in the region, we are going to end up with more Islamist-tinged governments rather than less. It is in our best interests to learn how to work with these groups as they emerge - if we refuse to, we end up tarred as democracy-hypocrites.

As far as Islamists in government, the relatively mild version in the Turkish ruling AK party is probably a best-case example - the current difficulties with HAMAS are close to being a worst case. Hizbollah in Lebanon, although far from being the ruling party, do have a voice in Parliament and an influence in policy. Given electoral trends and the current operational environment, we can't afford to completely cut off communications with any of them.

[Tom Odom]

I am impressed.....

First an interesting thread on a subject few know much about

Second all respondees looked at the issue through analytical eyes

My own take on MB and others are they are indeed the targets we need most to influence, dialogue, and accomodate/compromise with.

I say that because they are there and they are gaining ground. Extremists groups of any ilk ususally have a more centrist core that they themselves spun off of at some stage. And the reverse is equaly true, extremist movements overtime either explode/implode or move back toward a central axis.

The issue is one of targeting/effects: we seek a moderate Islam. Do we target the extremists with IO? I submit that is largely a waste of time and effort. Do we target the Muslim majority? Yes and then no. Yes we do but the group is so large and diverse, messages have to be generalized. My answer is we target the groups like the MB who have stepped into the extremist camp and stepped back from time to time. They are already politicized; they have been (and still have the capacity) militarized; they are the bridge between the extremists and the majority.

Best
Tom

[Jedburgh]

In the context of the current discussion, this older (Jul 05) paper from CEIP is still a good read:

The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists

...U.S. and European officials understandably worry that Islamists might jettison democratic transition if and when they gain significant power. While understandable, these fears ignore the diversity of the Islamist spectrum. More importantly, policy makers must recognize the more immediate point that democracy cannot come to Arab societies without the participation of movements that command huge popular support. Rather than resisting Islamists, Western governments should develop policies to positively engage the moderates among them...

[J.C.]

It's my opinion that the Muslim Brotherhood is just using Mao's precepts to gain further ground in Egypt. Mao stated that he believed in a three phase war: first organization and subversion ops, second terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and finally the progression to a conventional army. While this may not perfectly descride the brotherhood, they have been moving between phase one and two as Mao said may be nesscary, depending on the situation. Thus, more pressure they have inverted and worked on portraying them selves as a political alternative, less pressure they have tried to destabilize the Egyptian regimes. Therefore, i don't belive we can work with such groups, as try to take away their base of support by trying to effect substatial political reforms that get to the heart of the problems in the Middle East. One of the biggest factors is econmic liberalization. Oil Regimes and dictatorships around the region have no economic progress to put forth to the poeple allowing them to look on religion and ponder on the corruption in their regions. If we can open their economies and then apply some political reforms, i think we can look past supporting quazi fundimentalist groups.

[Jedburgh]

Therefore, i don't belive we can work with such groups, as try to take away their base of support by trying to effect substatial political reforms that get to the heart of the problems in the Middle East.

We can't afford not to work with the Islamist opposition. As the "substantial political reforms" take place, which will include free elections, these groups will either end up in power or, at a minimum, with a significant presence in the country's parliament.

One of the biggest factors is econmic liberalization. Oil Regimes and dictatorships around the region have no economic progress to put forth to the poeple allowing them to look on religion and ponder on the corruption in their regions. If we can open their economies and then apply some political reforms, i think we can look past supporting quazi fundimentalist groups.

Your point here isn't quite clear. The continuing corruption in most of those countries is a huge factor in the support for the Islamist movements. Also, economic liberalization isn't always linked with political reform and enjoying the benefits of free trade won't necessarily result in the people dropping support to Islamist political movements. As previously stated, in the current environment, political openings will most likely result in their being filled with Islamist representatives of varying shades.