Muslim Brotherhood

[AmericanPride]

I'm writing a short paper (10-20 pages) on an insurgency of my choice. I've decided to argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is an international insurgency that threatens US interests in the Middle East.

1. The MB has a revisionist agenda that seeks to overturn the current political order in the ME (a system that favors the US presently IMO). Its factions in Palestine (Hamas), Egypt, and to a lesser degree in Sudan and Syria undermine political stability through subversion and, at times, violence.

2. The 'mass base' (I don't like this term personally, as I believe its too broad) supports the MB because of widespread disenfranchisement in Palestine, Egypt, and Syria. Continued US favor of the regimes in Israel and Egypt reinforces anti-US sentiment in the general population.

3. Consequently, democratic reforms will only empower the MB (as it did Hamas in Palestine). The subsequent refusal of the US to recognize the democratic results also undermines US credibility. Arab states in general face similar problems when pressured to liberalize (i.e. Egypt and Syria in the closing two decades of the 20th century); the instability caused by liberalization compels the states to become increasingly authoritarian, fueling further dissatisfaction. The electoral victory of Hamas represents the end of Arab nationalism and the triumph of religious radicalism.

4. Egypt in particular is key to political stability. With the largest population, it is the most vulnerable to popular passions and also can potentially exist as the largest threat. While the "moderate" Mubarak regime remains in place, Egypt ensures regional stability by forming a bridge between other Arab regimes and Israel; blocking the formation of any organized alliance against Israel (and subsequently the US). Similarly for Syria, but to a much lesser degree.

5. Political instability in the ME threatens US economic security (the foundation of US interests in the region). Because of Saudi Arabia's internal weakness (political patronage based on oil profits, distrust of the National Guard, large youth population with few opportunities, the strong Wahhabi factions, and the burden of having the "Two Holy Cities), the Kingdom cannot act openly in favor of the US while the US remains committed to Israel. And it sometimes must abandon the US (for the same reason the Shah's Iran did following the Yom Kippur War). Should another regional war occur, whether as a deliberate choice in policy or because of a series of unintended consequences (i.e. cross-border raids), Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf kingdoms will abandon the US.

6. However, this political order cannot be sustained indefinitely. As the regimes continue repressions and expend resources on patronage, the costs of stability becoming increasingly higher and the MB (and factions associated with it) become entrenched a steadily radicalizing population.

7. To prevent this from occurring, the US should a) abandon pressuring Arab regimes into democratization and instead favor liberalization, b) invest in the industrialization of Arab states as a means of establishing internal stability, c) co-opt Syria into the current political order and the War on Terrorism, and d) compel Israel to accept the Arab peace proposal (specifically the return to the pre-'67 borders).

Thoughts?

[MikeF]

I'd suggest reading Albert Bergesen's The Sayyid Qutb Reader.

Dr. Bergesen gave a seminar on the evolution of radical islamic jihad to NPS last year. I found it quite helpful.

Good luck.

v/r

Mike

[AmericanPride]

Thanks for the suggestion Mike. As a side note, Qutb attended the same university in the States I did. I found his recorded descriptions of his experiences there amusing.

[MikeF]

I'd recommend limiting your scope particularly for a short paper. It will be easier and more academically relevant. As all grad students are constantly reminded, we are not considered experts so we must limit generalizations so they are not construed as opinions.

While Qutb certainly had some relationship issues in the United States derived from unresolved mommy problems or sexual repression (Freud would have a field day with that case study), the tipping point from his evolution from disgruntled citizen to revolutionary scholar appears to have happened during his time in Egyptian prison. His observations of muslim on muslim violence and torture created such grievances and rage that he refefined his lens of interpreting Islam. Initially, the muslim brotherhood capitalized on his writings to justify taking armed action against a non-muslim state. Later, Al Qaeda would evolve his writings to justify martyrdom.

Bergesen compares this Islamic Revolution and Qutb's work to the output of martyrdom with the Prodestant Reformation and Max Weber's Prodestant Work Ethic as an output.

The Qutb case is but one example you could write on, but I would suggest that you limit your scope.

Plus, you'll become a mini-expert in training on Al Qaeda's early roots.

v/r

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Not a specialist subject for me, but the MB have played a role in confronting extremists in London; searching SWJ with Bob Lambert shows a link to a UK-based publication strongly linked to MB.

Secondly there are several older threads on MB and many where MB appears. On a quick check there are many links and arguments there - I assume you have time to scroll through.

The role of the MB in the UK came momentarily to the fore last summer with Islam Expo, a cultural event with a political agenda and was interesting to watch. Islam Expo's side seminar on political islam was fascinating and maybe worth examining. Here is a UK minister's comment: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/ma...slim-islamexpo and another: http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrori...icle/islamexpo


davidbfpo

[Rex Brynen]

One has to be nuanced on the Muslim Brotherhood—many/most of them are, in Islamist terms, relative moderates, and the (largest) Egyptian branch long ago abandoned violence as a means of bringing about regime change (favoring instead social activities peaceful political participation). The same is true of the MB in Jordan, who also participate in the electoral process. Indeed, both the Egyptian MB and the Jordanian MB/IAF continue to play by the constitutional rules, even though both governments take various non-democratic measures against them.

As davidbfpo correctly notes, the UK MB were instrumental in taking over and deradicalizing London's notorious Finsbury Park mosque, in not-so-secret cooperation with the Metropolitan Police.

The MB, however, are no fans of US foreign policy. I think this is the real dilemma: not how Washington deals with small, radical anti-democratic anti-American Islamist groups—the al-Qa'idas of this world, as important as they are—but how it deals with genuinely popular, semi-democratic, less radical groups that oppose US policies or interests.

[AmericanPride]

Rex,

That is why I consider the MB, in general, as a shade of gray of insurgency. Yes -- the Egyptian faction (as well as the Jordanian, Somalian and Tunisian factions) have more or less abdicated violence. But because of the organization's revisionist agenda that aims to redraw the region's political order driven in large part by a (largely accurate) perception of Western interference and a general failure of the Arab states to reach modernity, I think its activities amount to subversion disguised in democracy. I think 'radicalism' is not of particular concern -- most groups of whatever origin or agenda resort to violence or coercion. I think the larger concern is of revisionism and revolution, which we of course oppose in the region, as do the entrenched elites of the conservative/traditionalist/reactionary regimes. Radicalism IMO is partly a product of alienated revisionism and as you correctly point out, it's a serious dilemma (i.e. Hamas). (On a side note, this makes me wonder whether Saddam's Iraq could/should have been 'rehabilitated' into the international community following 9/11 and partly why I think Syria should be; but we'll see how the democratic process plays out in Iraq). "Nothing is settled that is not settled right." The question is not if (again) there will be another Arab 'revolt' against the powers that be -- but when and how. The monarchists of the early 20th century failed. The nationalists and the socialists failed. Are the religionists faring any better? And who will replace them should they also fail? Is there anything more dangerous than the integration of political action and religious belief?

[bluegreencody]

2. The 'mass base' (I don't like this term personally, as I believe its too broad) supports the MB because of widespread disenfranchisement in Palestine, Egypt, and Syria. Continued US favor of the regimes in Israel and Egypt reinforces anti-US sentiment in the general population.

I just got back from visiting Syria and conducting research for my master's thesis. I was there for a month. I had some great conversations, especially with a bunch of different young folk from different backgrounds. I even was able to breach their thoughts on the Asad government and the Muslim Brotherhood. While not claiming a complete knowledge of the thoughts of everyone in Syria, the overriding opinion I heard on the M.B. was, no matter what people thought of their political agenda, the problem with them is they commit violence within Syria. They kill their own. If for no other reason, the violent acts committed within their own country by this group was enough to turn everyone I talked to away from them. So I don't think the "mass base" does support the M.B. in Syria. This is not to say that some people don't envision an Arab Union or an Islamic Union as a solution to the imbalance with Israel and the rest of the area, but going through the M.B. is not something that is seen as favorable.
And disenfranchisement (about participation in politics or something like that?) is not a big deal for people because (and this was also universal) the current government keeps the population (individuals and their families) safe against aggressions (bombs) from Israel (which are made and financed by the US). It's that simple.
Also, I think it would be helpful to frame differences between the M.B. in these different countries and areas (you should include Iraq too-one of the Sunni political parties is said to be a spinoff, sorta like Hamas). I think the M.B. in Egypt is a world apart from Hamas in Palestine, partly because of history and partly because of real-time circumstances.
The anti-US sentiment is against the US government, not the people of the US. And yes, the tilted bias towards Israel by the US is the direct reason for this feeling. They call the US "the mother of Israel".

[AmericanPride]

bluegreencody,

I chose to include the Syrian faction of the MB because of its insurgency in the 1970s (driven by a combination of religious, ethnic, and political aims) that eventually led to the complete dismantling of radical religious organizations in Syria. Whatever the future prospects of the Syrian faction, the Assad regime has demonstrated success in repressing radical Islamic movements. I think a strong argument could be made that because of Assad's status as an Alwai minority in a Sunni-majority country, that his government is a 'natural' ally in the War on Terrorism, just as it was in the first Gulf War.

As for the different MB factions, I completely agree. My intention is to argue that the Egyptian MB faction is in opposition to US interests because of its anti-Western and revisionist agenda; and because of its status as an underground party that ultimately intends to redraw the political system in Egypt, it is an insurgency faction using subversion as its primary instrument. It draws upon the support of student, labor, and business associations that are not included in Egypt's system of patronage, and recently won through indirect means a number of seats in Egypt's legislature. The threat IMO is the resurgence of anti-Israelism in Egyptian policy in the form of radical Islam -- not because it threatens Israel itself, but because it undermines regional political stability and ultimately American economic security. As for the Iraqi faction, I haven't read much into yet, nor have I read through the predicted effects of the recent election. However, if the trends prove accurate, it seems that democratization is a developing strategy of these organizations to leverage against US interests by exploiting popular resentment of US policy.