Legal not police
What is this?
These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.
I take it to mean a legal system with a responsive police force. As the gatekeepers to legal system the police are the only portion of that system that the law abiding citizen will ever see. Wild west hanging judges or Judge Dreads or thought police are far more practical than a legal system sans enforcers.
Property Rights
In the regulatory and legal communities, there is a concept of a "bundle of rights" which is the background predicate for much of our interactions within our societies.
We typically think of property rights as the unimpeded ownership or right of use of a property. But land tenure and holding patterns vary dramatically. In Iraq, most citizens live in a town or city, but have some form of ownership or use right in a plot of land outside the town.
During the 2008 Drought, for example, many areas of Northern Iraq were intensively plowed, but not planted. Satellite images indicated a lot of "cultivation" which led the Ag Folks in DC to erroneously believe that bumper crops would be forthcoming. What was actually going on was a very old land tenure system where folks had a use right in land provided that they actively "used" the land. So many of these folks went out to till the land to demonstrate use under their tenure agreements, but had no rational reason to plant seeds in a drought. Many of you in Iraq last year sucked the dust from the record dust storms which were, in part, the result of the tilling needed to preserve their continuing "property right" interest in the land.
Usually, too, we assume rights---quiet enjoyment; police won't kick down your door without a Court writ and show of cause; a permit issuer at the County will not demand a bribe as acondition of issuing a permit; the government will place taxes, once collected, in dedicated tax accounts for uses related to the purpose of the tax; that a mortgage or deed transfer cannot be recorded against a property you own without your consent.
None of this has anything to do with police, but everything to do with a reasonably functional society and economy. The USG focus on Rule of Law often overlooks the most important non-police elements which create resistance to reconstruction, post-conflict stabilization.
I read today that Iraq has finally passed an Investment Law which gives rights to foreign investors to defend claims, interests, ownership rights in things they may invest in in Iraq.
Bear in mind, however, that even with that law, there remain claims outstanding from decades of past practices in Iraq. Sadaam's government forcing Turkmen to sell land for a pittance which was later given to military officers, etc... Even the Jews that were forced out of Baghdad in the 1950s still have potential claims wandering out in cyberspace about real properties and businesses in Iraq.
Very complicated indeed. Especially in the places at issue.
Steve
Civil vs criminal law
What I speak of (and probably also MAJ Albrich) is the need for a civil legal system (property rights, contract rights, family & inheritance law, and dispute resolution of the same) to allow operation of a functioning economic system.
We take much of that for granted in our organized society. We get the morning newspaper from the box at the end of our sidewalk ("our's" because the property lines are established by deed and plat; the newspaper because the paper carrier has been invited onto our property to deliver it; contract made and performed because we subscribed to the newspaper).
In our society, the vast bulk of legal events are part of the civil legal system, which operates fairly seamlessly without need for lawyers and courts.
In the Astan of 40 years ago, the civil legal system on a local village level was a triangular arrangement of village elders (shura or jirga - language dependent), the local mullah and the local "big man" (malik, district officer or local warlord). In the chaos of two generations of armed conflict, the traditional tribal legal system disintegrated in many areas, along with whatever educational system existed.
As nature abhors a vacuum, so does law. So, various legal systems developed: those of the Taliban, regional warlords and drug lords. Now, we do not generally look at these as "legal systems" (often not that much in writing, but rules nonetheless). The villagers probably would have preferred their age-old traditional local institutions; but, in chaos, power and law flow from the barrel with the largest bore. In effect, the villagers have to select the best kind of insecurity that will allow their economic survival, which is often at the subsistence level or below (credits: Marc Legrange).
Now, the police power obviously has something to do with all of this - if the police power carries the largest bore cannon, and if it is going to remain at the village level to enforce its own brand of security or insecurity. Add to that, the development of locally-based security forces as a necessity.
The question then becomes whether the police power is going to impose its own brand of law (civil and criminal), as well as its ideas of economic and educational development; or whether it will seek to restore, as much as possible, the once stable traditional legal institutions; and to assist that economic and educational development needed to raise the villagers above the subsistence level (which to them would be "security") with minimum manipulation of their normal lifestyle (credits: Jim Gant).
STP is right on point with his Iraqi examples. Astan is a much more primitive case; and the less sophistication imposed, so much the better.
Regards
Mike
Regulatory systems
JMM:
True. True.
But in Iraq, the civilian side spent far too much time on writing US federal things like national banking and stock market laws years before they were really ripe and needed.
Instead, the majority of our daily lives are defined by small scale regulations and complex webs of "agreed" standards (sometimes enforceable).
Personally, I spend a tremendous amount of time in my private consulting practice on regulatory and finance/budget compliance issues. And its these little, yet standardized practices and regulations, that are what keeps our society functioning without having to have a lawyer in everyone's speed dial.
Whether styled as formal or informal systems, they are the Rules of Law that we commonly understand.
In Afghanistan, it seems logical that the systems JMM described really are the current functional norms, but as he notes, these are not the systems that governed things before. They are the aberations resulting from war, and stable replacement systems have not yet been established or applied.
What good is a properly recorded deed if you can't occupy "your" house?
H/T to Bill...
PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal
Historians have often used a 1966 Army report nicknamed PROVN
either to cast aspersions on the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam
between 1964 and 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, or to
praise his successor, General Creighton Abrams. This interpretation is
simplistic and inaccurate. Although the report criticized aspects of the
war under Westmoreland, its target was really the U.S. and Vietnamese
governments. Moreover, PROVN’s conclusions were less radical
and its remedies less novel than observers have tended to admit. A
fresh look at PROVN reveals significant continuities in thought between
Westmoreland, the report, and Abrams.If the importance of security was well understood by the Army, so, too, was the notion that political and socioeconomic reforms were also necessary. The U.S. Army had a long tradition of making institutional reform a part of its counterinsurgency, nation-building, and constabulary activities, and it had readily accepted Walt W. Rostow's thesis that socioeconomic change was a key weapon in the fight against the spread of communism in the third world.21
Sapere Aude
H/T to Slapout
Rand Monograph R0462, Rebellion and Authority, An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts by: Nathan Constantin Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr.
Economic reasoning applied to an analysis of rebellion and authority yields some new conclusions about both. Fundamentally, the struggle for popular support is not exclusively or primarily a "political" contest as these terms are usually understood. People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population. One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point. (Also published by Markham Publishing Company, 1970.)
Sapere Aude
We have ignored the wisdom in this post for years, and I don't recall our COIN/FID doctrine adequately addressing this. To conduct effective COIN you must employ an effective (situation specfic) population control measures and methods to mobilize (counter organize) the populace, and "eliminate" negative influences (don't compete with them, this isn't a legal political contest) instead of blindly building schools, roads, and spreading messages of good cheer, all the while leaving the political warfare victory to the enemy.People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.
The caveat is equally important:
One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point.
And happy holidays to you...
In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.
Private schools flourish in Hawaii, even though families take on substantial debt (along with the associated risks), because parts of the public school system are unable to provide their charges the skills necessary to compete in and among a global workforce. The cost/benefit equation used by parents in Hawaii includes a time variable which is greater than 12 months.
In Iraq how many packs of kids did we both see roaming the streets and seeing and participating in things that kids should not see or do? Will these kids be constructively competing with our kids in the global workforce or will our kids be seeing them on future battlefields?
In short, focusing upon only the violence or school variables does not solve the multivariate cost/benefit equation associated with war.
Rand Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations By: Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry M. Sollinger, Kayla M. Williams
This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-20-2009 at 06:43 PM.
Sapere Aude
Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
Thanks...
Slap,
I appreciated the study. It was an interesting read and provides a number of ideas to consider...my pdf library grows ever larger.
Sapere Aude
Got that one right
Slapout sums it up neatly.
Whether it's Colombia, Sinaloa, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon. The motive is acquisition of power, and that power rests on finances/economics, discriminate use of force, and acquiesence by the population to the rules and benefits adminstered by the insurgent or criminal. The unworthy government that RAND would have us beware of, too often looks similar to the black hats when viewed from the village level.
Many billions later, we seem to be arguing which of the three legs is themost important.Unfortunately, the insurgent/criminal seems able to stand on only one leg if he has to.
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