Economics and Irregular Warfare

[Surferbeetle]

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

Slap,

I appreciated the study. It was an interesting read and provides a number of ideas to consider...my pdf library grows ever larger.

[Surferbeetle]

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

Mike,

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.
2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.
3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.
4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

Let’s also briefly touch upon an organizing and operating principle of Civil Affairs-bubbas.

According to the story, some travelers come to a village, carrying nothing more than an empty pot. Upon their arrival, the villagers are unwilling to share any of their food stores with the hungry travelers. The travelers fill the pot with water, drop a large stone in it, and place it over a fire in the village square. One of the villagers becomes curious and asks what they are doing. The travelers answer that they are making "stone soup", which tastes wonderful, although it still needs a little bit of garnish to improve the flavor, which they are missing. The villager doesn't mind parting with just a little bit of flour to help them out, so it gets added to the soup. Another villager walks by, inquiring about the pot, and the travelers again mention their stone soup which hasn't reached its full potential yet. The villager hands them a little bit of seasoning to help them out. More and more villagers walk by, each adding another ingredient. Finally, a delicious and nourishing pot of soup is enjoyed by all.

My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.

I agree.

No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos.

Gaaahhhh!!!! I would need chains to ride my motorcycle...

[Surferbeetle]

In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intervention points when accurately defined.

The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them)…

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

…they [an insurgency] need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive.

Agreed.

Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close).

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

So, what do we do…

1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
5. Do nothing.

Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?

[slapout9]

The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

[jmm99]

Hi Steve,

You've managed to bring in the techie factor (which I omitted since I was focusing on my current areas of interest) as well as pointing out that there is a spectrum of efforts dependent on the situational environment:

from Steve

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.

2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.

3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.

4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

No disagreement as to any of this, which depends on how primitive or advanced the systems are - and on capabilities (scarce resources) that are available.

If you are so lucky as to have an intact civil administration (as in Malaya), the task (besides providing security) is to enhance what is already there - as well as the colonial power (UK) being willing to provide a nationalistic Narrative (Malayan independence taking into account the three major ethnic groups, Malay, Chinese and Indian) acceptable to the vast majority of the People.

If you have a society that is more urban and modernized - as well as used to centralized control - such as Iraq, more conventional methods (more similar to what we would use here at home) can be successfully applied. Both you and Steve the Planner have pointed that out.

With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

---------------------
Real Stone Soup

Great story. Giap's PUFL teams did just that, but the soup resulting was political. That is, the first step was to infiltrate the community (preferably with former residents) and determine what the gripes were - and what little non-muscle things could be done. After developing the local Narrartive (which had nothing to do with Communism), the teams would then subvert the community and radicalize it against the local government factors and symbols. Of course, that meant killing off unpopular landlords, local officials and teachers, etc.; but only after the local community was more or less ready for those more drastic measures. From our standpoint, it was a Devil's Soup.

Regards

Mike

[MikeF]

Hi Steve,

The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

Thanks for the links. This thread is becoming a treasure trove for good reading. I'll get to them as time allows.

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

I need to clarify that statement (and it's a direct quote from Dr. Gordon McCormick not my original thought). In the beginning of the insurgency, the insurgent IS invisible, and the one comparative advantage they have throughout the struggle is an information advantage. That advantage may not last long if the host nation is effective. So, one of the key task for a counter-insurgent is to find the enemy. The easiest/most accurate way is gaining the information from the populace.

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

I partially disagree. The current small wars may not be linear, but the enemy controls pockets of territory. In a big city, it may simply be the "bad" neighborhoods where the police don't venture.

Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?

Agreed, and my first three COAs could be derivatives of Oil spots depending on how the ground commander viewed the situation. I'd probably recommend this approach, and the areas chosen must be considered based on conditions.

From Slapout:

That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

Exactly, and brilliant post by the way. In a small war, adaptation is a competition for information for the host nation and mobilization for the insurgent. Whoever adapts fastest wins.

From JMM:

With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

Mike, I have no doubt that you and Steve could adapt and thrive.

Best,

Mike

[jmm99]

I happened on the following 2008 theses, which seem to bear on aspects of what we are discussing - especially how insurgencies and counter-insurgencies differ dependent on the environment and adaptations to it:

Michael R. Wilcheck, Risen from the Ashes: Phoenix and the Struggle against the Viet Cong Shadow Government.

The Past in the Future: Phoenix Applications for the Present and Tomorrow

It has been said that those who do not learn from history are destined to repeat it. In studying Phoenix, the author believes that its story holds several important lessons that still remain applicable in today‟s world. There is no formula for fighting an insurgency that can be universally applied, nor will one ever exist. The very nature of an insurgency is unique to a specific time and place and specific to a people and their culture. Thus, when conducting counterinsurgency in foreign countries, it is essential that policymakers be well educated on the country where it is taking place. As was the case in Vietnam, a lack of understanding between Western-educated policy makers and a non-Western culture on which those policies are thrust can hinder counterinsurgency efforts from being as effective as they could be.
....
Robert Wall stated, “Phoenix represented the strategy that could have won the war.” Yet, it did not win the war. Although one may argue that Wall‟s statement may have greatly oversimplified the reasons for South Vietnam‟s eventual defeat, it is important that the United States learn from Phoenix so that America does not once again repeat Wall‟s words substituting another program in another insurgency. By learning from Phoenix and applying the universal lessons made evident through it, America can take positive steps to ensure an effective strategy does not once again fail.

Edward A. Brady, Urban and Rural Insurgencies: A Comparative Analysis.

Chapter 4
Conclusions

A victory is not [just] the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. It is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. - David Galula

The four historical examples studied in this paper display many of the traits commonly associated with insurgent warfare. Winning requires a political solution, not simply a military one. These struggles are protracted in nature. The ultimate goal of the insurgency is replacing the existing government. And both the insurgents and counterinsurgents battled for legitimacy throughout the various conflicts. Both the Anti-Huk campaign and the Battle of Algiers can be viewed as government victories. While important, France’s political defeat in Algeria came about by factors beyond the scope of this study. The Afghan insurgency is at a stalemate, which favors the insurgency. The Baghdad insurgency was tipping steeply toward an insurgent victory during the period studied. Based on this bag of mixed results, we will now review the most essential aspects of the four insurgencies here studied, to determine the similarities and differences of the underlying dynamics of urban and rural insurgencies.
....
This thesis historically analyzed two rural insurgencies and two urban insurgencies to determine the underlying similarities and differences between the two types of insurgencies. A systematic analysis of these four cases revealed two similar dynamics and two divergent dynamics. The first similarity is that insurgents must be able to hide in order to expand in the beginning and middle stages of an insurgency. The second similarity is that the ability to hide and grow depends on the relative capabilities between the insurgents and counterinsurgents to operate in insurgent base areas. The divergent dynamics are that the criticality of popular support to the insurgent and the density of high-impact targets for insurgents to strike vary between urban and rural insurgency.

Implications

Although the underlying dynamics of rural and urban insurgencies are very similar, there are also some important differences. These differences do not require diverse conceptual approaches. They may, however, require modifications in technique that current doctrine fails to address adequately. Therefore, the insights developed in this thesis should be carefully considered by doctrine writers to validate, refute, or amend existing COIN doctrines.

Best

Mike