What I find most interesting about these posts, with the possible exception of Slapout's last post is the discussion of economic development separate from the COIN effort.

This is the fallacy with the lines of operations approach to military operations and USG strategy in general. Instead of developing and executing a strategy (not talking strategic level, but rather clear operational objectives and integrated plans for achieving those objectives instead of everyone doing their own line of operation independently, what I call lines to no where).

If you're waging a COIN effort, then is it wise to support economic development blindly and haphazardly, or better to integrate economic development as part of the over all COIN strategy?

We can use economic development as one form of influence to shape specific populations.

Use economic development to influence a populace if at all possible. Identify a project of value (the people will tell you what it is, you don't determine it), ensure you can deliver, then tell them what the cost is (no IED attacks upon coalition forces for 2 weeks and we'll start on it (you better deliver), and as long as no IED attacks are the norm we'll continue to work on it.
This is only one example. I think we need to take a step back and relook how we better integrate economic development with the COIN strategy. Perhaps this being done in Afghanistan, but from what I'm reading it is not apparent.

If they have essential services restored, what else do we need to do? Why are we doing it? Are we giving them a free lunch, or are we getting a desired result? What effect is it really having?