Economics and Irregular Warfare

[Tom Odom]

MM12,

Congrats on your first post. You will get a better response if you first introduce yourself and explain your interests to provide context to your questions.

Thanks

Tom

[vertnyc]

I'm the Brigade Economic Development Officer for Task Force Stryker in Southern Afghanistan and I've done Zero Economic Development. I was sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

We are here now in Afghanistan and I spend most of my time focused on stabilization, which isn't taught in any of our officer courses or NCOES.

The COIN Academy in Camp Julien just had their inaugural Stability course in early November.

Stabilization, Development and Economics are linear processes in my mind. If the area does not have persistent security and the population's grievances are not addressed, then don't even worry about Development or "Economics."

I hate when USAID from Kabul comes down and talks about GDP. What does GDP have to do with anything in a remote village in Southern Afghanistan where they think the Russians are back?

Assuming that we get good at stabilization and start looking at development- that is a dangerous road for the military to take because we do not have the program management skills necessary for big development. If you mean development in terms of building a small well then perhaps we do...but I'd argue that we cannot even really build a well then QA/QC it.

Also building wells are stupid because it lowers the water table but that's a diffferent story.

The only other uses that my training has helped with is making sure CERP and/or other projects do not cause inflation in the economy or a rise in commodity prices like gravel and other construction material.

Anyways- fiscal discipline on the part of the military isn't good enough as other instruments of national power have programs which have budgets that I get the feeling "have to be expended" by a certain time. Which is bad. And it's really bad if you concentrate in only two Provinces and spend $240+ Million in the next 10 months.

[Hacksaw]

Kind of a loaded question since our officers come from three commissioning sources... without a doubt the USMA Grads for thorough understanding of Micro, Macro and International Economics (SOSH Rules )... seriously USMA grads do get at least a semester of economics and when I left the three highest degree granting programs were 1. Econ, 2. Intl Relations, 3. American Politics... all in the Dept of Social Sciences... ergo most (of at least the MAJ and below) USMA grads do have more than an introductory education in econ...

Perhaps without realizing it... your whole last post showed a level of appreciation for the economic impact of operations -- a good thing...

However, if the question is whether our CPT-COL Commanders understand the impact they are making at the municipal level I'd shrug and say some yes some probably no... for some as you say it is still somewhere down the priority list that they haven't gotten to because they've as yet est. conditions necessary to think about micro development...

So was your post out of frustration with the green tabs in the BCT??? Kind of a you sent me for 6 mths to UW then ignore everything I have to say???

If so, have you addressed them with the BCT CDR? Do you have a seat at the table with the planners are you interacting with the plans shop of your higher hqs???

Best of Luck, Live well and row

[MM12]

Well to introduce myself, I am a CPT in the US Army. I have some fellow friends in Afghanistan and Iraq who are commanders, BN S3A, or BN/BDE S4s. I have heard from them including my personal experience the diffculties of having to develop a local community. It seems the Joint and highest echelons of the US Army leadership anticipate (based upon current doctrine) that our officers have to develop the local communities in their AOR, but have not provided them the know how in either the schools or manuals.

I'm concerned about the long term effect this may have especially in countries that are not developed such as Afghanistan. Imagine a company or battalion commander who has significant amount of CERP funds and all of a sudden is investing these funds in a tiny community, the impact is major in a positive sense but also negative too. Its a double edged sword.

Security will always be the most important line of operation, but economics is always going to be second most important (or at least it should be with the framework of COIN). If the military wholeheartedly adds irregular warfare to the spectrum of operations, it needs to find ways to educate its officers and prepare them for not only the security challenges, but the cultural challenges which includes economics as well. Each society views property differently as they do with capital, wealth and many other economic terms....these are all related to COIN, stablization, reconstruction, etc. We and the force need to be aware of this and understand the dynamics of economics to be successful.

If a community relies on the US to provide financial resources, can the local, provincial or national governments support them if the US leaves? If not, then all that was done was for nothing.

Thanks for the replies and hope to hear some more....

[Surferbeetle]

SWOT

VRINE

Balanced Scorecard

Peter Drucker

Harvard Business Review

Value Chain Analysis

From USAID: CASHMERE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS AFGHANISTAN

The USAID-funded Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP) is committed to create broad-based, market-led agriculture development with the aim to provide economic opportunities for rural Afghans. The cashmere value chain is one of the selected value chains on which ASAP will concentrate. This report provides an overview and analysis of the Cashmere Value Chain, linking the global context to the national context, with the aim of determining Afghanistan’s competitiveness and identifying main leverage points and key strategies to improve Afghanistan’s competitiveness and promote development in a pro-poor manner. It will provide the basis for ASAP’s interventions in the Cashmere Value Chain, and will lay the foundation for ASAP’s cooperation with other agencies active in the sector.

From Roots of Peace: Baseline Survey Report on Villages for Value Chain Business in Afghanistan

Agricultural growth and development is deeply intertwined with economic progress. Afghan agriculture possesses the basis and resources for many value chain businesses like cultivation of potatoes, vegetables, oil crops, animal products, carpet weaving and other major crops (i.e. fruits, nuts, other horticultural products, spices, medicinal herbs, forestry, livestock and fisheries) that can be the basis for a large number of agro-based industries and commercial activities. Investment in electricity generation, small and medium scale dams and reservoirs, local roads, agro-training and extension activities, large scale introduction of modern practices in value chains, irrigation, research and development, agricultural and ecological education and training need to be introduced into the country.

[Schmedlap]

Just a few things I'll throw out there...

Economic development should not fall upon the shoulders of a company or battalion that could unexpectedly receive orders to operate in a new AOR at any given time, either by redrawing boundaries or relocating. It should be handled by higher level units that have more direct communication with higher level political operatives and more direct channels to other agencies within our government - which allows them to tap into greater and more diverse funding sources.

CERP is a tool for short-term projects to gain short-term advantages for small units and it is also a damage control instrument. It is not, nor should it be, a tool for economic development. If any unit is under the impression that they are disbursing CERP funds as part of a long-term stimulus program, then they either misunderstood their commander's intent or their commander gave them some bad information.

[Surferbeetle]

...having a discussion concerning economics and irregular warfare with your local CA-bubba and/or PRT-bubba. It should help to dispel some common misconceptions about what is possible...

CERP

CALL Handbook 09-27

GTA 90-01-017

USAID

Local Governance Program

Provincial Economic Growth Project/Tijara

National Capacity Development/Tatweer

CERP is a tool for short-term projects to gain short-term advantages for small units and it is also a damage control instrument. It is not, nor should it be, a tool for economic development. If any unit is under the impression that they are disbursing CERP funds as part of a long-term stimulus program, then they either misunderstood their commander's intent or their commander gave them some bad information.

Schmedlap,

Please clarify your point...opinion or fact, and cite your references.

Thanks,

Steve

[Bill Moore]

1. If you haven't read the Ugly American read it, if you have read it again.

2. Talk to the locals again and again and really seek to understand how their economy functions and what their desires are.

3. Don't preach U.S. free markets, complex economic theories, or promise projects that are more than several months in the making (such a new dam for power production). You'll lose credibiility.

4. Manage expectations, and ensure that any economic quality of life improvements are well known throughout the target audience. You must create the perception of progress.

5. Find an economic development mentor who really understands development in developing nations. They probably don't need laptops and building a school won't put food on the table anytime soon. Identify where you can make real differences, "possible" examples include:

a. Bringing in small business/trade instructors to train the women on a craft that will allow them to make money for the family.

b. Send individuals off to trade school, and help them establish their business when they return (mini loans to stand up their business)

c. Bring in experts (agriculture, other as applicable) to share knowledge on how to improve upon what they're doing already.

6. Use economic development to influence a populace if at all possible. Identify a project of value (the people will tell you what it is, you don't determine it), ensure you can deliver, then tell them what the cost is (no IED attacks upon coalition forces for 2 weeks and we'll start on it (you better deliver), and as long as no IED attacks are the norm we'll continue to work on it.

Best of luck to you.

[Dayuhan]

I have heard from them including my personal experience the diffculties of having to develop a local community. It seems the Joint and highest echelons of the US Army leadership anticipate (based upon current doctrine) that our officers have to develop the local communities in their AOR, but have not provided them the know how in either the schools or manuals.

Purely an opinion, but an opinion from one's who's spent a few decades around development projects, and seen a few successes and a lot more failures.

You can't develop someone else's community. Nobody can. You can help the community to develop itself... if you do it very carefully.

There is almost always some sort of economic activity going on in a human environment. As security is established this activity is likely to accelerate. Assisting the economic activity that grows naturally out of an environment is much more effective than trying to introduce some totally new activity that you or some funding agency happens to be enthusiastic about.

Slinging money around often does more harm than good.

One piece of advice I've given to many in the development world, though few listen:

If you see people behaving in a way that makes no sense at all to you, don't assume that they are irrational or stupid. Assume that there is some factor in the picture that you don't see.

My gut reaction to the whole idea is that asking military men to do development work makes about as much sense as asking development workers to fight a war, or asking an engineer to do surgery.

[M-A Lagrange]

Stabilization, Development and Economics are linear processes in my mind. If the area does not have persistent security and the population's grievances are not addressed, then don't even worry about Development or "Economics."

From vertnyc

Stabilization, development and economic are all but linear. In fact there are very little linearity in passing from a stabilization (non regulated economical environment) to development and even less from development to economic development. The linearity understanding is issued from Rostow theory in which we all start in stone age to end up in ultra capitalist liberal market. But time has shown that it does not work this way.
In developing countries or in recovery economy, the stabilization phase is the initial moment we would like to impose an initial take off. But this is mainly restricted by the comparative advantages the place has to offer (production, work cost, market access…). So in rural economy with low level of technology (not mechanized mainly) the first level for the populations is to accumulate enough to generate savings. What is called going out of the circle of poverty. This first step is realized by several means, one of them being neighbors' resources pillages. This very first step is not to be mistaken with the initial recovery step in which populations are trying to recover what they had previously. Marxist theorist call that the mercantile stage. Liberal will call it precapitalist or pre market stage. The reality is much unclear and both are mixed.
At this stage the artificial introduction of huge quantities of money may have a kick off effect. This is what is described in so many manuals: high intensity man power work as cash for work… It does work with very specific conditions.
First you need a minimum security. This is the F@*#ing rule nb 1. No way to get out of it. If you do not have it then you expose the populations and they turn against you.
Second, effects have to be immediate. Telling someone he will earn good money next harvest just doesn't work. People need to be paid at the end of the week. This will allow them first to increase their household revenues and then generate savings.
Third: include as much as possible everyone and let the elders or local traditional authorities solve out the question of who get employed or not. It will end up like this. So just start with it. You may discover that some insurgents are being employed. Well that is not that bad: you are more careful when it comes to attack the bank that feeds you. But also, make sure that every villages around has the same access to the programs. Nothing is worst than a village benefiting from all efforts and the surrounding ones having nothing. Because them you are not capable to provide rule nb 1.

2. Talk to the locals again and again and really seek to understand how their economy functions and what their desires are.

From Bill moore

Yes, talk and talk again. People will not tell you what they want, they will tell you what they think you may give them.
As a basic rule have in mind that people will never express their real needs. They will only express what they know you can provide. If they say a school, they might in fact express the fact they want food for the kids. But as they know you will provide school, they ask for a school so they can have school feeding program. Got my point?
One good way to know what the people want is to talk with women. But it HAS TO BE a woman talking to a woman (even in US). This just because they will not say the same things than the men. You may find out the reality behind the smog.
But cultural habits are the strongest: you cannot give to the women without first giving to the men.

Finally, do not try too much to orientate and teach the people how to set up a business. Most of them had this many times before, in Afgha, in refugees camps, in displaced camps…
Let their imagination work. But small loans are welcomed.

The limit will always be market opening capacity. Traders will come to buy locally and then export if you're competitive. But the bias is they will try to keep the production cost as low as possible. Some may propose to organize producers… Be careful: this is opening the development problem Pandora box. Let the people get organized by them selves.

Finally, do not try to provide a better life to everyone at the same time. Target individuals. Especially in Muslim context, private enterprise is much welcomed and the community has its own mechanisms.

For readings, have some basic as Robert Chambers to understand rural rationalities. Farmers seem crazy but they are all but irrationals.

Hope this helps.

[vertnyc]

From vertnyc

Stabilization, development and economic are all but linear. In fact there are very little linearity in passing from a stabilization (non regulated economical environment) to development and even less from development to economic development. The linearity understanding is issued from Rostow theory in which we all start in stone age to end up in ultra capitalist liberal market. But time has shown that it does not work this way.
In developing countries or in recovery economy, the stabilization phase is the initial moment we would like to impose an initial take off. But this is mainly restricted by the comparative advantages the place has to offer (production, work cost, market access…). So in rural economy with low level of technology (not mechanized mainly) the first level for the populations is to accumulate enough to generate savings. What is called going out of the circle of poverty. This first step is realized by several means, one of them being neighbors' resources pillages. This very first step is not to be mistaken with the initial recovery step in which populations are trying to recover what they had previously. Marxist theorist call that the mercantile stage. Liberal will call it precapitalist or pre market stage. The reality is much unclear and both are mixed.
At this stage the artificial introduction of huge quantities of money may have a kick off effect. This is what is described in so many manuals: high intensity man power work as cash for work… It does work with very specific conditions.
First you need a minimum security. This is the F@*#ing rule nb 1. No way to get out of it. If you do not have it then you expose the populations and they turn against you.
Second, effects have to be immediate. Telling someone he will earn good money next harvest just doesn't work. People need to be paid at the end of the week. This will allow them first to increase their household revenues and then generate savings.
Third: include as much as possible everyone and let the elders or local traditional authorities solve out the question of who get employed or not. It will end up like this. So just start with it. You may discover that some insurgents are being employed. Well that is not that bad: you are more careful when it comes to attack the bank that feeds you. But also, make sure that every villages around has the same access to the programs. Nothing is worst than a village benefiting from all efforts and the surrounding ones having nothing. Because them you are not capable to provide rule nb 1.

Concur with persistent security first...without that we cannot have either stability, development, or economics. Also concur with #2 and #3- we are doing those.

But I do have some issues with the stability, development, and economics explanation. Why do you think Afghan villagers want to accumulate savings? Also, what are your definitions of stability, development, and economics?

I didn't notice the definitions there aside from promoting labor-intensive cash for work programs, which I support.

[vertnyc]

So was your post out of frustration with the green tabs in the BCT??? Kind of a you sent me for 6 mths to UW then ignore everything I have to say???

If so, have you addressed them with the BCT CDR? Do you have a seat at the table with the planners are you interacting with the plans shop of your higher hqs???

My post isn't really out of frustration- I will always appreciate the opportunity for training or education regardless if I get to use it or not- I just happen to be using that particular skill set in an indirect way...

Most of the planning sessions believe it or not occur outside of the Brigade, at least in terms of economic development. Which is a good thing in my mind, because it's wrong to put that burden on the military. But I'm invited to those and those usually go just fine.

I've heard of theories of putting stability / non-lethal activities as a S3 function. In actuality, not much integration with the S3 shop.

[Elric]

I'm the Brigade Economic Development Officer for Task Force Stryker in Southern Afghanistan and I've done Zero Economic Development. I was sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

Anyways- fiscal discipline on the part of the military isn't good enough as other instruments of national power have programs which have budgets that I get the feeling "have to be expended" by a certain time. Which is bad. And it's really bad if you concentrate in only two Provinces and spend $240+ Million in the next 10 months.

Congratulations on your assignment... I was up the road near Herat in 08-09 doing HA/CA. You have the luxury (?) of US maneuver forces in your AO to check the CERP project sites. You are near or in Kandahar with ready access to cash.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/wo...m.html?_r=1&hp
Afghan Enclave Seen as Model to Rebuild, and Rebuff Taliban

A nice, easy way to ultimate victory Have you considered the National Solidarity Plan (NSP), Provincial Development Plan (PDP), the District councils, and the Community Development Councils? I worked with the US Envoy to Herat province and the USAID folks.

For my druthers, I'd rather hand off CERP for big projects to USAID (they have local staff) and return to the Emergency Response part of CERP.

[J Wolfsberger]

I suspect, based on my own MBA experience and some of the postings, that the education, guidance, planning, etc. for economic reconstruction/development has all been based on US experience. That is, it applies to a well developed economy in an industrial (or post industrial) state of development, with well developed judicial infrastructure to apply and enforce a well developed body of business law.

Absolutely none of which applies to Afghanistan. In short, it is taking a macro-economic approach in a country where the closest thing to a macro-economy is the heroin trade.

So, for what it’s worth, here’s my recommendation, based on what I understand the real situation to be on the ground in rural areas.

1. What do these villagers produce? Of that, what do they consume locally, and what do they trade with other villages, towns or cities?
2. What do they consume? How much of that is produced locally, and how much comes from other villages, towns or cities?
3. How do they exchange value? How much of this local trade is based on currency, and what currency is it? How much local economic activity is based on barter?
4. What do or could the locals produce that could go to a larger market? What do they need in the way of additional infrastructure to produce it?
5. Are there any micro-loan programs in place to finance starting or increasing production of goods for local consumption or trade? Why not?

In other words, the approach,. for now, needs to be entirely on increasing/supporting localized micro-economic activity.

These are just of the top of my head, and I could come up with more given more time. The bottom line is that the type of development plans likely to be produced by the usual suspects will be (probably have been) wildly inappropriate to the reality on the ground where it counts: rural Afghanistan.

MM12, vertnyc, I’ve had some specialized training in the area going back to my own adventure in self employment (). I may have some information or pointers I could transmit. PM me if you’re interested.

[vertnyc]

Concur with western training tailored for something way more developed than Afghanistan. Please do send me any good info.

In response to the questions:

1. What do these villagers produce? Of that, what do they consume locally, and what do they trade with other villages, towns or cities?
.

In 1 district, villagers produce only poppy. However they do not own the land. Land owners live in Kandahar City. In another district, villagers grow tobacco and wheat, tobacco to be sold in Pakistan. Wheat for consumption. Haven't really seen intra-village trade, but most goods go to KC or through Pakistan to Chaman.

2. What do they consume? How much of that is produced locally, and how much comes from other villages, towns or cities?
.

They consume what they grow. Insufficient data for other question. Which is really a point I'd like to highlight that it is the lack of data such as this which makes decisions hard.

3. How do they exchange value? How much of this local trade is based on currency, and what currency is it? How much local economic activity is based on barter?
.

Haven't seen anything based on barter yet, near KC, they use Afghani. Some contractors take dollars. Near the border, 50% they use rupees or whatever the currency Pakistan uses, and 50% afghani.

4. What do or could the locals produce that could go to a larger market? What do they need in the way of additional infrastructure to produce it?
.

In Arghandab, pomegranates. They need everything on the value chain for pomegranates in terms of infrastructure.

5. Are there any micro-loan programs in place to finance starting or increasing production of goods for local consumption or trade? Why not?
.

USAID has a program called WOCCU. CERP has $500 micro grants. We are not allowed to give micro grants at this point of time due to some people in the unit not liking that idea.

[Elric]

The CDCs of the NSP are intact and useful on a case to case basis. So far, not much movement in our districts. A little more activity for DDAs, but no concrete results. Trying to explore ASOP but I heard there is an artificial turf war between ASOP/NSP. NSP "didn't work" in Helmand, so ASOP went. NSP works in some parts of Kandahar...but no ASOP here...yet.

USAID is trying to get CERP to pay for their projects so I guess we do live in an upside down world.

Agree on case by case basis. The Herat governor was working on getting the PDC to create a realistic PDP. The participants had been asking for things of less utility than were suitable for the PDP. In the committee's defense, a big issue was the GIRoA funding for the NSP. If you don't expect the money to show up, why plan?

Welcome to alphabet soup. My pipe dream was to "partner" with the PDC or DDA (or even CDCs) in order to fill the supportable items on the PDP/District Dvelopment Plan (if there is such a thing). Sort of the US stepping in to fill specific items off the NSP that the GIRoA didn't fund. The twist is the specific items fit with the effort to support the GIRoA (or whatever term you would like). This technique of aligning with the PDP/DDP sure helps with getting involvement from the GIRoA folks. If the CDCs are well thought of, aligning to that plan may be useful, as the CDCs are supposedly more inclusive than the village leadership. Are the CDCs a way to get the villagers some self-governing experience?

Are the DoS and USAID folks helping with involving local government with your efforts? As an aside, Kabul did not like microgrants as being "susceptible to corruption". What do they thing Afghanistan is, the 1950s with Beaver Cleaver?

Still does not address Terms of Use that the end user will get, as we cannot guarantee that whatever we build will be used according to the contract. Having the GIRoA as the maintainer of a completed project is dependent on what needs to be done. Karzai wanted a district hospital down in Shindand, looking at the plans from Kabul, I noticed two 40T fuel tanks for the generators (power lines from Herat don't run far south). If we build a nice hospital that has no power due to GIRoA not funding the fuel it needs, was it a good thing to even start construction?

Interesting event out in eastern Ghor province, I think the Lithuanian PRT funded the building materials for a school in Laal (?) district. The tribe built it, and it was theirs, no fooling. Probably cinderblock and a poured cement pad.

We did a province wide buy of wheat seed, fertilizer, and fruit tree saplings for Herat province ($1.09M) using the province's Co-Op framework. I had the Herat Ag Chief work the amounts, come up with the distribution plan, and develop the SoW for the contract. What I wish we had was an economic ad visor to help us develop a sustained plan to develop agriculture (nice summary earlier). What were the impacts of cornering the wheat seed market, how was the harvested seed to be used (on-farm or marketed), how was it to be transported to market on the (rather pitiful) roads....

[vertnyc]

Have you considered the National Solidarity Plan (NSP), Provincial Development Plan (PDP), the District councils, and the Community Development Councils? I worked with the US Envoy to Herat province and the USAID folks.

For my druthers, I'd rather hand off CERP for big projects to USAID (they have local staff) and return to the Emergency Response part of CERP.

The CDCs of the NSP are intact and useful on a case to case basis. So far, not much movement in our districts. A little more activity for DDAs, but no concrete results. Trying to explore ASOP but I heard there is an artificial turf war between ASOP/NSP. NSP "didn't work" in Helmand, so ASOP went. NSP works in some parts of Kandahar...but no ASOP here...yet.

USAID is trying to get CERP to pay for their projects so I guess we do live in an upside down world.

[marct]

Being the somewhat pedantic person I can be at times , I think it is important to point out that the English word "economics" comes from the Greek oekos nomos or, transliterated, "household management". I would also second M-A Lagrange's suggestion about reading Bourdieu; the particular reference in English is Distinction: A Social critique of the Judgement of Taste.

While Bourdieu has some good ideas, he can be tricky to read and apply (especially in translation). Personally, I prefer Bronislaw Malinowski, from whom Bourdieu "borrowed" extensively. I would recommend Dynamics of culture change and Towards a scientific theory of culture; both are fairly easy to read and have some fairly simple, yet power, analytic methodologies in them.

Cheers,

Marc

[Cavguy]

Wish I had more time to write.

This is what I have concluded about economic development from my personal experiences and two years at the COIN center, which doesn't all agree with theory. The key is to realize that all aid "takes a side" as you alter the power balances between communities, governments, families, and tribes. That well you just built may fundamentally alter a centuries old power dynamic.

You'll never get to the bottom of the 2d and 3d order effects in a society you are not a part of. Therefore, it is my opinion that $$ employed by tactical commanders must be transactional. Our temptation is to do good works. As some others have indicated, that's nice but not what a tactical commander should be doing. He should use it to gain influence with targeted groups and individuals critical to defeating the insurgency in that AO. The key part is that for such assistance you MUST get something tangible in return. That can take many forms - security force recruits, safe passage, governance participation, etc. But don't ever do a project HOPING it will "buy" goodwill. Analyze your AO, determine what populations or people you find most critical, and use your limited funds accordingly.

If you click on my sig and read about my experiences, you will see that money was employed tactically at those who were cooperating by providing security, information, and cooperation. Bottom line, good behavior rewarded, bad behavior - no $$ to your AO.

A good example was in Ramadi - instead of just doing good works and providing security with our forces, BG MacFarland made it transactional. In exchange for protection and aid they provided police recruits - half guarded the local area, and half were used elsewhere in the city as we needed. We also received guarantees of safe passage. Read the articles linked in my sig for more. Granted, this example was from Iraq, but I think that is one of the few non-location specific messages out of Ramadi. As Kilcullen says, giving the locals something without a return only gains their contempt, not cooperation. Some may sneer at it as bribery, but that's what CERP really is for anyway, no? Disguised as civil works, but at its essence a bribe to keep the population content? I guarantee it costs much less than an MRAP, Stryker, or the SGLI/medical care of dead soldiers. It may even have positive long term effects on the region and nation, if done right.

Bonus win if you can employ the $$ through local or national security forces. It doesn't matter so much what the Afghans think of you, only what they think of their own government.

Just random Sat night musings. I'll be more coherent tomorrow.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Cavguy,

If you click on my sig and read about my experiences, you will see that money was employed tactically at those who were cooperating by providing security, information, and cooperation. Bottom line, good behavior rewarded, bad behavior - no $$ to your AO.

Although you're just touching the issue, you are looking at from the right perspective.

Posted sy Slapout,

IMO the real 800 pound Guerrilla in A'stan is the Economy. Without a stable Economy no country can survive.......Including the USA.

The insurgency is based on a lot of things, but very little has to do with the economy. What is really different with the economy today (other than the occupiers Russian and U.S. who provide a temporary foreign economy) than say 1975? There are several countries with very weak economies that continue to survive year after year. My argument is you're supporting a major effort that isn't solving the problem that we need to solve. Putting it simply, even if our efforts to establish a better economy are effective, the insurgency would still exist.

We can use economic development at the micro level to influence behavior if we're skillful enough (read not politically correct), but I quote Kilcullen from his book "Accidental Guerrillas" on p67,

Governance and development, tied to a security and information strategy that gives the population incenttives to support the government, are thus extremely powerful COIN tools

break

There is also a belief, unfounded in reality, that deveopmental assistance generates gratitude, or "hope", in the population and encourages them to support the government. Field experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, has shown that insurgent intimidation easily overcomes any residual gratitude effect, while historical studies have shown that in civil wars and insurgencies, popular support tends to accrue to locally powerful actors rather than those actors the population sees as more congenial: the more organized, locally present, and better armed a group is, the more likely they'll be able to enforce a consisttent system of rules and sanctions, giving the population the order and predictability it craves in the deeply threatening , uncertain environment of insurgency.

We (the coalition) should be most powerful force in that village making the rules, not diverting efforts building the economy unless it is relevant to influencing the population. After we suppress the insurgency, then we can do some real economic development for the long term win like we did in Germany and Japan.