Should we destroy Al Qaeda?

[MikeF]

In a recent Foreign Policy article, Gustavo de las Casas contends Destroying al Qaeda is not an option, yet. This discussion is found in different threads throughout SWC, and Mr. Casas makes a compelling case to keep them around.

The old al Qaeda is no more. At least 40 percent of its leadership circa 2001 has either been killed or captured. New faces have fared no better; since July 2008, 11 of the organization's 20 most wanted have been put out of commission. And middle management is almost gone, many of them victims of Predator strikes. What remains is probably a hollow organization, represented by a core of insulated figureheads, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, surrounded by eager cadres of jihadist newcomers. Before long, the West may just hold a barrel to al Qaeda's collective forehead. Should it press the trigger?

Gut instinct and righteousness scream "yes!" But a better answer might be "not yet." The world would be wise to keep al Qaeda alive, paradoxically enough, for security reasons. Like it or not, keeping a battered al Qaeda intact (if weak) is the world's best hope of funneling Islamist fanatics into one social network -- where they stand the best chance of being spotted, tracked, and contained. The alternative, destroying the terrorist group, would risk fragmenting al Qaeda into thousands of cells, and these will be much harder to follow and impossible to eradicate. It's the counterterrorist's dilemma, and the only real choice is the least unsavory: Al Qaeda must live.

I really enjoyed his article, but I'm still not swayed. My rebuttal goes back to the fundamentals of insurgency theory relying mainly on Mao's protracted war. Insurgencies and terrorist groups need several things:

1. Ideology- something to validate their worldview and actions
2. People- technical bomb experts, grunts, suicide bombers, etc
3. Guns
4. Money

If AQ fractures, then funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline thus diminishing the capabilities of follow-on organizations. Moreover, competition amoungst groups would cause additional infighting and diminished capabilities.

That's my take. Any thoughts?

Mike

[slapout9]

MikeF,This is actually an old LE technique used against organized crime. They put John Gotti away for life but lhis son was kept out(except for a couple of short sentences) as a lightning rod to draw what ever is left of the support network to a known entity so they can be monitored and neutralized. Has an upside and a downside. Best thing is to destroy AQ and seize any finacial assets available IMO.

[Schmedlap]

I really enjoyed his article, but I'm still not swayed. My rebuttal goes back to the fundamentals of insurgency theory relying mainly on Mao's protracted war. Insurgencies and terrorist groups need several things:

1. Ideology- something to validate their worldview and actions
2. People- technical bomb experts, grunts, suicide bombers, etc
3. Guns
4. Money

If AQ fractures, then funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline thus diminishing the capabilities of follow-on organizations. Moreover, competition amoungst groups would cause additional infighting and diminished capabilities.

That's my take. Any thoughts?

I disagree that "funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline." Rather, I think they will just do what the author asserts - they will shift to another social network that we have less knowledge about.

In regard to competition among groups and infighting, I think that is another reason to keep AQ. If they are around, the new kids on the block will seek to knock of AQ. It is easier to glean intelligence of a group that is fighting against a network that you know (we might be able to gain intel from AQ - we'd be the enemy of their enemy). In fact, we did exactly that on occasion in Iraq.

Also, at this point AQ is a well-known organization with a negative history that we can use to discredit all similar organizations. If they are destroyed, then we are starting at square one.

[Bill Moore]

If AQ fractures,

While the author made some interesting observations(although none of them are new), I find two major problems with his argument:

1. Not every terrorist organization is linked to AQ: We are too quick to link every terrorist attack by a Sunni group to AQ, when in fact there are already several terrorist organizations apart from AQ that at most only agree with some of AQ's philosophy. This is the new normal regardless of whether AQ as an organization lives or dies.

2. AQ already completed its mission: AQ provided an umbrella ideology and strategy and initiated a mass movement with the 9/11 attacks, so AQ no longer needs to exist for the movement to continue. While AQ may still fund certain activities and attacks globally, the evidence indicates that various militant groups are raising their own funds (donations, criminal activity etc.), acquiring their own weapons, planning their own attacks based on the movement "inspired" by AQ. Technical know how is now widely dispersed and available to those who really want to know how to conduct a terrorist attack.

If AQ went away tomorrow, the Pakistan Taliban, Afghan Taliban, LeT, Hamas, and tens of other militant organizations would be still be around. If we can kill the remains of AQ (and I'm not as convinced as the author that they're hurting as much as he believes), then we should do so now.

[JJackson]

I don’t believe it matters one way or the other, the removal of individuals is fairly irrelevant. I do not believe you can solve a terrorism problem by killing terrorists. It does not matter if we are talking about the IRA, the Red Brigade, Hamas or AQ they all have a grievance and are the violent tail on a larger community who feel they have a point and, even if they do not fight, they provide encouragement, money, safe houses etc. Why are they fighting, do they have a legitimate point? If you want to reduce the problem they are causing do something about their problem. If less of their community think the cause they are fighting for is just then the numbers who are willing to contribute funds will go down, it will be less acceptable in the community to have your son become a fighter and more acceptable to provide intelligence on terrorist movements and plans. You can not completely remove the problem but you can make it more manageable. The flow of funds from catholic groups in the US to those trying to unite N.I. and Eire has largely dried up as it is no longer view as acceptable not because the objective was achieved.

[Presley Cannady]

Sadly, I can't be as generous as Bill. De la Casas's entire line of argument is woefully disappointing, including his base observations. The author might as well view al Qaeda as a hydra with infinite, stinging heads, tear his loincloth and wale in despair--not a particularly credible, let alone helpful point of view. I mean seriously, by his reasoning any organization with a high rate of turnover and connection to a movement--say the Vice Lords, or the Orange County Mall, or the Congressional Page Service--is effectively and perniciously immortal. If this is what passes for observation and theory in strategic studies today, I weep for the field.

We know swamps can be drained of syndicates, gangs, failing businesses and even the occasional federal bureaucracy. We know whether or not it's practical to do so depends is a cost question. Seems to me serious thought on this subject will accept that the fact first and answer the question second.

I'll post my specific complaints later, particularly regarding de la Casa's "application" of network theory.

[MikeF]

Interesting, insightful commentary from all. I'll attempt to address Schmedlap's statement.

I disagree that "funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline." Rather, I think they will just do what the author asserts - they will shift to another social network that we have less knowledge about.

During the 1980s, the AQ/Taliban provided an outlet for "the call of jihad" for disenfranchised or adventurous Muslims to fight the Russians. They had advertisement and recruitment, transportation, funding (ironically from us), training camps, indoctrination, and employment. Most importantly, they had an established ideological backing.

During the 1990's, AQ/Taliban extended that fight into Kashmir and eventually began targeting the far-enemy.

From 2003-2008, AQ put out the call for Jihad in Iraq.

Now, that call is back to A'stan, Pakistan, etc.

While dispersed in social networks, this infrastructure and support networks are manpower and resource intensive. If we destroy them, then it will take a long time to recover.

An example of this could be SWJ. This site is well recognized as the place to go to study small wars. If someone publishes in another site or printed publication, it will normally be cc'd here. If SWJ was shut down tomorrow and the entire database deleted, individuals could venture to other sites, but the collective mojo would be lost for awhile until another site picked up the slack. At that point, LE could shut down that site.

I guess I'm just saying that we should take away AQ's mojo .

[slapout9]

I guess I'm just saying that we should take away AQ's mojo .

Exactamundo, when they figure out they (AQ) are not 10 feet tall and the price to pay will be death and bankruptcy, you will see a big change. Until then they will keep right on doing what they are doing.

[JJackson]

A few days ago Phoenix80 linked to a New Yorker article a little of which is below. I suspect this is fairly typical of small groups around the world in that AQ leadership has never heard of them or funded them or received any funding from them. They are just doing their own thing with a nod to the brand name.

Abu Mohammed claimed to represent four armed groups that have joined a jihadi coalition. (There is such an alliance, called the Popular Resistance Committees.) “When I speak, I speak for all of them,” he told me. “We consider Osama bin Laden our spiritual father.” His group follows the same ideology as Al Qaeda, but there is no direct connection. “The siege around Gaza has disconnected us from the outside world,” he said. “None of us can travel.” In Gaza, he estimated, there were about four hundred armed fighters in cells like his, down from as many as fifteen hundred before the Hamas takeover. When Fatah ran the Strip, it was easier for subversives to operate, he said, but now “Hamas is in full control, and their power is very tight.” Hamas, he explained, wanted to dictate when violence occurred in Gaza, and tried to keep the Al Qaeda sympathizers penned in.

This link is to a Marc Lynch post on his FP blog and relates to the Fort Hood shootings. He is arguing that AQ would like nothing better than an over reaction that alienated the broader Muslim community as it will just provide a more fertile environment in which to operate.

[bellz]

I have many reservations with the author's proposal...and many with the assumptions he builds his argument upon.

Before long, the West may just hold a barrel to al Qaeda's collective forehead. Should it press the trigger?

- How exactly would this happen? Is there any reason to believe that there even is a "collective forehead" to hold a barrel to or is it thousands of foreheads?

Like it or not, keeping a battered al Qaeda intact (if weak) is the world's best hope of funneling Islamist fanatics into one social network -- where they stand the best chance of being spotted, tracked, and contained. The alternative, destroying the terrorist group, would risk fragmenting al Qaeda into thousands of cells, and these will be much harder to follow and impossible to eradicate.

- al Qaeda does not have a monopoly over Islamist fanaticism and they do not operate in one social network - al Qaeda is already generally an umbrella term for thousands of fragmented and chaotic cells that are largely without central leadership or being provided resources from a centralized organization...

The alternative to destroying al Qaeda is to keep it weak -- but alive. The West would need to refrain from attacking all its central parts, choosing to monitor and watch them instead. Al Qaeda would continue to attract Islamist militants into its clustered network, where the fight against terrorism is at least manageable.

- I wouldn't call all the attacks and threats perpetrated by al Qaeda around the world before and after 9/11 a problem that is "at least manageable"

- I would LOVE to hear how "monitoring and watching" al Qaeda could be politically justified by anyone in the law enforcement, military or intelligence community if a major attack occurred under our noses because our intelligence was not as good as the author believes.

Is our intelligence so good that we know which mid level operatives are inept and which are effective? Isn't the way to know that by letting each one of them conduct an operation that would kill people and judge their effectiveness after the fact?

al Qaeda recruits could be shadowed through their training and eventual deployment. New operatives could then be neutralized once they move "downstream" -- away from the network. This timing prevents scattering the higher echelons of al Qaeda, while still eliminating the direct security threat.

This is an incredibly bad idea - lets allow unknown and numerous terrorist recruits become more indoctrinated, receive training, be assigned missions and allocated resources by the most dangerous terrorist leaders on the planet as we watch them and then hope we CAN "neutralize" them once they move "downstream". I hope they don't fall off the radar.

I feel the author is just trying to be thought provoking for the sake of it - not offering any practical solutions whatsoever.