Should we destroy Al Qaeda?

[bellz]

I have many reservations with the author's proposal...and many with the assumptions he builds his argument upon.

Before long, the West may just hold a barrel to al Qaeda's collective forehead. Should it press the trigger?

- How exactly would this happen? Is there any reason to believe that there even is a "collective forehead" to hold a barrel to or is it thousands of foreheads?

Like it or not, keeping a battered al Qaeda intact (if weak) is the world's best hope of funneling Islamist fanatics into one social network -- where they stand the best chance of being spotted, tracked, and contained. The alternative, destroying the terrorist group, would risk fragmenting al Qaeda into thousands of cells, and these will be much harder to follow and impossible to eradicate.

- al Qaeda does not have a monopoly over Islamist fanaticism and they do not operate in one social network - al Qaeda is already generally an umbrella term for thousands of fragmented and chaotic cells that are largely without central leadership or being provided resources from a centralized organization...

The alternative to destroying al Qaeda is to keep it weak -- but alive. The West would need to refrain from attacking all its central parts, choosing to monitor and watch them instead. Al Qaeda would continue to attract Islamist militants into its clustered network, where the fight against terrorism is at least manageable.

- I wouldn't call all the attacks and threats perpetrated by al Qaeda around the world before and after 9/11 a problem that is "at least manageable"

- I would LOVE to hear how "monitoring and watching" al Qaeda could be politically justified by anyone in the law enforcement, military or intelligence community if a major attack occurred under our noses because our intelligence was not as good as the author believes.

Is our intelligence so good that we know which mid level operatives are inept and which are effective? Isn't the way to know that by letting each one of them conduct an operation that would kill people and judge their effectiveness after the fact?

al Qaeda recruits could be shadowed through their training and eventual deployment. New operatives could then be neutralized once they move "downstream" -- away from the network. This timing prevents scattering the higher echelons of al Qaeda, while still eliminating the direct security threat.

This is an incredibly bad idea - lets allow unknown and numerous terrorist recruits become more indoctrinated, receive training, be assigned missions and allocated resources by the most dangerous terrorist leaders on the planet as we watch them and then hope we CAN "neutralize" them once they move "downstream". I hope they don't fall off the radar.

I feel the author is just trying to be thought provoking for the sake of it - not offering any practical solutions whatsoever.

[davidbfpo]

Slap (No.8) stated:

Exactamundo, when they figure out they (AQ) are not 10 feet tall and the price to pay will be death and bankruptcy, you will see a big change. Until then they will keep right on doing what they are doing.

I have asked in meetings where have all the jihadists gone? I mean the often cited tens of thousands who went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and to a lesser extent those who went to places like Bosnia and Kashmir. Yes, many are maybe dead, some integrated locally - often cited in the FATA, others returned home or to other places.

No-one seems to have a complete answer and I wonder if they have given up the Jihad.

So Slap perhaps AQ has already been affected? Death and bankrupt ideas methinks. (Apologies if I'm repeating myself here).

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Citing Mike F's initial post:

Mr. Casas makes a compelling case to keep them around.

All I can say a provocative article and far from realistic. Does he seriously think that the information that may become intelligence exists to undertake such close-in observation? We maybe good at restraining the flow of recruits, we are less good at money and other ingredients in the AQ mix. Yes attacks have been thwarted, others have succeeded.

In the UK I ask what would the UK have been like in July 2005, if the 7/7 bombs had gone off and the bombers escaped? Add in the 21/7 attacks too.

In the USA I am sure readers can imagine an equivalent scene. IIRC the CT adviser, Richard Clarke wrote an article a few years ago on future successful attacks and their impact (lost the link).

No, Mr Casas stay in your "groove".

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A review by an academic expert of a book The Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender (by an AQ author; NT Google):http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=24121

The book is the latest development in what can be called a second wave of modern Islamist de-radicalization.

The new body of literature, which is composed of more than 30 books, mainly deconstructs the eight major arguments of jihadism: al-hakimmiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-riddah (apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-jihad/qital (fighting) for the Islamic state, jihad al-daf‘ (defensive jihad), ahkam al-diyar (rules of conduct in the “abode of Islam” and the “abode of infidelity”), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of confrontation, and the “neo-crusader” arguments.

(Concludes}Most post-jihadist literature does not take a clear stance on democracy. But accepting the “other,” moderating rhetoric and behavior, and participating in electoral politics may be the only viable options for these groups if they want to remain politically significant. In other words, if jihadism heralded the inevitability of armed confrontation, post-jihadism might well entail the inevitable acceptance of democratization.

The review author has written on Ending Jihadism: the transformation of Armed Islamist Groups:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=23805

Will copy this to the 'What are you reading' thread.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

So Slap perhaps AQ has already been affected? Death and bankrupt ideas methinks. (Apologies if I'm repeating myself here).

davidbfpo

Yes David they have been hurt but we need to Kill Bill he is the Mojo, he started all this mess and he should have always been Target#1. Time to finish the job.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nl8La...eature=related

[davidbfpo]

An old thread I know, but after scanning an appropriate place to add this. Hat tip to CLS mailing, although I do read Leah Farrell's blogsite.

In the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs, Leah Farrall, a former Senior Counterterrorism Intelligence analyst with the Australian Federal Police, writes that “al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks.” Farrall argues that “[t]oday, [al Qaeda] has more members, greater geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it lacked ten years ago....[A]ccounts [of al Qaeda’s decline] treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them.”

Temporarily available on author's website:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com...l-qaeda-works/

Main link, alas behind a pay-wall:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...al-qaeda-works

Catching up on reading and the article is on the list to do.

[Bob's World]

Smart action in support of the oppressed populaces where these insurgent organizations have bought into the AQ franchise could co-opt or neutralize these groups that have a primary focus that is nationalist.

We do ourselves a disservice when we paint them all with a broad AQ brush merely because they have bought into the AQ message that breaking the support of western powers is an essential task in achieving change at home.

I think one thing we need to all keep in mind is that "Ideas cannot be contained, and Liberty cannot be denied."

Our current target fixation on the FATA buys into a belief that AQ can somehow be contained or defeated there. Even President Obama's guidance for Afghanistan (that the ISAF mission statement really does not match up well with, btw) focuses on this infeasible end “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

The most enduring way to render AQ moot is to rob them of their base of moderate support. The way to do that is to take on the challenge of helping the moderate majority address their reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home, and the reasonable perceptions that those governments are more connected to Western powers than to their own populaces.

This does not mean a massive campaign of UW in the classic sense; but it does mean that CT heavy efforts against everyone wearing an AQ T-shirt are as likely to make the problem worse as better; and that massive nation building that seems bent on adding yet one more despot to our list of supported official malign actors is not going to get us where we need to be.

This is a foreign policy problem, not a military problem; and this demands a foreign policy solution rather than a military one as well. Certainly the military has a role, but is should be much tailored and refined from the current one, and subjugated to a supporting position.

[Dayuhan]

Smart action in support of the oppressed populaces where these insurgent organizations have bought into the AQ franchise could co-opt or neutralize these groups that have a primary focus that is nationalist.

What specific groups are we discussing here?

I think one thing we need to all keep in mind is that "Ideas cannot be contained, and Liberty cannot be denied."

True enough, but how is this related to AQ? Aq certainly isn't fighting for liberty, nor are they broadly perceived to be fighting for liberty.

The most enduring way to render AQ moot is to rob them of their base of moderate support. The way to do that is to take on the challenge of helping the moderate majority address their reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home, and the reasonable perceptions that those governments are more connected to Western powers than to their own populaces.

I've seen no credible evidence suggesting that moderate support for AQ derives from "reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home". AQ gets support because there's a huge amount of generic resentment toward foreign military intrusion in genereal and western meddling specifically in the Muslim world, and any Muslim group that sticks it to the western meddlers is going to gain a great deal of affection and support. AQ's attempts to rally support against Muslim governments have generally gone nowhere, not because those governmets are loved but because AQ is not seen as a viable alternative. AQ has only ever really succeeded with the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative. They've tried others, but without much success.

If we want to reduce AQ, we need to focus not on everything they say, but on countering the narratives that have actually worked for them.

[Bob's World]

"What specific groups are we discussing here?"

Every group that has an "AQ" added as a prefix is made up on nationalist insurgents that have bought into the AQ message and franchise. These groups in turn have roots that reach into the perceptions of poor governance and western manipulation within the respective populaces they emerge from. Help those populaces address their reasonable concerns, target and manage those perceptions, and one begins to disempower the AQ agents conducting UW, and also the more radical members of the nationalist groups who are more committed to their personal goals than the overall good to the populace.

"True enough, but how is this related to AQ? AQ certainly isn't fighting for liberty, nor are they broadly perceived to be fighting for liberty."

By whose perception? AQ has a regional agenda, which is why they are a non-state UW headquarters rather than an insurgent organization. Sure, they specifically want to depose the Saudi family and specifically want to humble the US, but all of that also contributes to a larger goal of leading and leveraging the distinct quests for liberty among a wide range of oppressed Muslim populaces across the Arab world. Now, if AQ ends up in some sort of leadership role over all of these liberated states in a union that somehow does conform to traditional "Caliphates" of eras past, then no, I do not think there will be much "liberty" in that for the affected populaces. But if that is the case, then AQ loses their non-state sanctuary, they become the counterinsurgent rather than the UW instigator, and become very vulnerable to both outside state action as well as internal insurgent action. But I do believe that a regional liberty from western influence and western supported oppression is very much a part of their platform.

"I've seen no credible evidence"

For years Saudi-based charities, who draw contributions from across the populace base, have supported this movement. Every liberty-seeking movement is typically such, where the vast majority of the base of support is largely passive and beneath the surface. One can only assess the size of that base by other indicators.

The current rash of popular uprising in the face of certain consequence is such an indicator.