Unity of Effort...what unity of effort?

[031-Bacon,RG]

MikeF provides a quote indicating that Eikenberry resisted McCrystal's clandestine ops efforts due to risk and the possibility of civilian casualties, and JohnT reminds us that SmallWarfare requires unity of civil and military command. I find it incomprehensible that we are still debating the strategy and structure of our efforts in Afghanistan after eight years in-theatre.

IMHO, the tempo of clandestine ops will need to be increased to better find and fix the Taliban; once we control the location and timing of our contacts, they've lost. Also, such ops would not be riskier than the IED exposure to convoys of troops driving around the country in search and destroy style missions - sure, such efforts look good on the news, but if you really want to drive a wedge between our PRT efforts and the populace you probably couldn't find a better tactic. Versus a broader net of SpecForce eyes on the terrain and populace, the marginal control of towns and roads we currently maintain only serves to canalize our movements, exposing our troops to IEDs and ROE guesswork in built-up areas.

[omarali50]

I am obviously not an expert, what is the historical record on presidents making decisions in wartime? This looks to an outsider like far too long to make such a fundamental decision. What is he waiting for? There is no rabbit in the hat and no magician on the stage. By now, he should know what he is dealing with (or THINK he knows what he is dealing with) and make a decision. He is the president, he doesnt have the option of saying "I will just wait till I hear something better"....or am i reading this totally wrong?

[Steve the Planner]

In the ag post, Davidfpo reference an Abu M post about Missouri Guard efforts.

The same site had the following, which describes Area Code 202 people trying to undermine Eikenberry's future relationship with Karzai by releasing the cable. How byzantine?

http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...under-bus.html