What If We Fail in Afghanistan?

[davidbfpo]

As always Steve Coll is worth reading and in this article lays out four situations:

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast: The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids; Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan; Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War and Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States.

From:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more

I have scanned previous threads, but cannot readily find one that has looked at futurology.

[omarali50]

I wrote this rambling post in reply to something else, but it seems more relevant here..

We can take the very reasonable view that some responses to terrorism (Afghan war, Iraq war? not sure if that even counts as a "response to terrorism", but whatever) have actually led to even more terrorism and that these are not the best responses. Maybe we should be removing "root causes" (Israel? Oil?). Maybe we should be arresting people and bringing them to court and dealing with nations that harbor such criminals by imposing X or Y UN backed sanctions. Still, its hard to see how you can get out of Afghanistan, after having gone in, without that being a major defeat with serious consequences (not to have gone in at all may have been a good idea, but that toothpaste has long since been pushed out of the tube).

Afghanistan is a god-forsaken cross roads with little appeal, but there IS a strategic reason for making Afghanistan work and that reason is Pakistan. Pakistan is the center of the loosely networked Islamist fanatics that have launched major terrorist operations in many different parts of the world. The most spectacular being the 9-11 attack. Pakistan is practically the only way a worldwide jihadist effort can ever be something bigger than a particularly bothersome irritant. IF defeat in Afghanistan leads to jihadi-sponsoring Pakistan, then its a serious matter.

One reason for confusion on this issue that I have noticed is that some people are saying "pakistan is an ally now, so that job is done, why bother about afghanistan". Well, if this were totally true, then definitely, leave afghanistan to the afghans. The country is just Somalia X 3 with better organized contestants (northern alliance and taliban being the main ones) and if the world can live with Somalia (not sure about that, but lets assume we can) then the world can live with the taliban and northern alliance fighting on in afghanistan. In any case, its a headache for regional powers, not for the US and Europe. But is that statement about Pakistan really true and is it permanently true?

I think it is not. I think the Pakistani army still has a lot of people who think they can use the taliban to project power westwards and the jihadis as proxies against India and if they gain the upper hand, then Pakistan will be jihad central, not just locally, but with distant consequences. IF the US and NATO leave without securing Afghanistan (and I have said before that securing is a very loose term with very flexible meaning, but NOT infinitely flexible) then the Pakistani army is likely to revert to its Jihadist position. Not overnight, not even as part of some clever plan, but just as the path of least resistance.

I also think there is a real salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan. But I personally dont think THAT justifies hundreds of billions in money and thousands of casualties. Because I dont think they are that big a threat IF the Pakistani and Saudi states were both determined to stay away from these people. They would then be little more than Baader-Meinhof and company. OK, substantially more than Baader Meinhoff, mainly because so many of them have already been trained and organized into cells and because salafi Islam is a bigger movement than radical Marxism ever was, but I still think that in the bigger scheme of things these kind of movements have no future. NO country is as penetrated by Salafi ideology as Saudi Arabia, yet when push comes to shove, the Saudi state can and does act against them. Not just recently, but as long ago as 1930 (battle of Sibillia).

Pakistan is not as well organized a state as modern Saudi Arabia, but even in Pakistan these people will eventually lose IF the state is determined to act against them. IF the Pakistani army sees that going back to the good old days of using taliban and jihadi proxies are not really an option anymore, then there will be an almightly mess in Pakistan for a few years, but I have no doubt about who would win. The state would win. The real reason there is any doubt is because the jihadist factions of the army can still convince their fellow officers to keep some "good taliban" and "good jihadis" in reserve for the day when America leaves (and Obama's prolonged decision dance has not helped in this matter).

I am not saying the US HAS to stay. Its possible that there is some strategy that allows leaving Afghanistan while making sure Pakistan does not backtrack. But that will have to be specifically planned and cannot be taken as a given just because "now they are our allies". IF that can be done...IF things are so arranged that leaving afghanistan does not lead to triumphant victory celebrations in Pakistan, then by all means, leave. Can that be done?

Btw, I dont think offering the Pak army "help with resolving issues with India" is as brilliant an idea as its sometimes projeted. India can help or hinder this process to some extent, but it is not the crucial link. If the nexus with the salafists is broken (as it can be, if America is smart about it) then Pakistan and India can manage affairs without war and terrorism and that will be enough. No more is needed in the medium term. Trade and other links will change the equation over time. No grand deal has to be made in the interim and putting one on the table just gives the jihadi element in the Pak army another chance to push their agenda and delay things.

sorry for repetitions and disorganized thoughts. this was written in between real work. Got to run..

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, but the Strategic dissonance here - subject in general - is overflowing the bucket of sh*t.

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop Poppy Production, why has it increased?

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by omarali50

I also think there is a real Salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan.

I think this is undeniable, but perhaps only in the short run. Over time the extremists will probably prove incapable of governing, and then their victory will turn into a political defeat that can be exploited.

WILF questions:

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

Many Western countries clearly agree there are reasons to send their forces to Afghanistanfor security interests (local, regionally and globally) for certain and possibly economic interests (Pakistan stability) that again effect the West's security.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop poppy production, why has it increased?

These are two separate questions, and yes eventually Somalia's role as a safe haven will need to be addressed, but it will be easier to do so if we're successful in Afghanistan in first. We don't need to do both simultaneously.

The poppy production isn't the reason we went into A-stan, and while it is not irrelevant, it doesn't define victory against the Taliban and AQ.

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

We may not need anything in A-stan, but the enemy does, and that means it is important to us. It is in our interests to deny him that.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

There would be no shame at all if we had not already stated we wouldn't leave until we stabilized the region. Leaving = a credibility gap.

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

Because we didn't employ the full might of our military, we tried a several different approaches that were all under-resourced.

[omarali50]

The issue is not Afghanistan. By itself, its just a bigger and more dangerous Somalia, not a threat to world peace. The issues are:

1. what happens to the salafist insurgency if NATO suffers a defeat. Does it get bigger, etc.

2. What happens to Pakistan (which is clearly a different matter, unlike Somalia and Afghanistan, its a country connected to the world, with some tech capabilities and actual nuclear weapons and a large diaspora and so on).

3. What happens to Saudi Arabia.

Of course, we can still go back and debate why the US invaded Afghanistan in the first place? IF it was to "deny alqaeda a safe haven" then they did not do a great job, since the salafists just moved to Pakistan, where they have continued to plot and gather recruits and so on. If they are not a huge threat now, why were they a huge threat then? IF it was to show the salafists what happens when you mess with the big chief, then that lesson is not going to be learned when they actually defeat the great satan. If it was to send a message to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (both of whom had more to do with the salafist network than poor Afghanistan) then again the issue seems to have grown muddled over time. IF it was to blow some steam and make the rubble bounce so that New York firemen would feel better, then does the feelgood feeling last after the choppers take off from the roof with Karzai hanging from a rope ladder?

But I agree, maybe time to admit mistakes and leave. As mildly leftist American liberal, I would be totally OK with that, except that I am from Pakistan and have a not-so-secret vested interest in avoiding the mayhem that I think will follow a US defeat. I dont even have a high opinion of the US ability to meddle in that area ("our man musharraf") but I am thinking "lesser of two evils" and I am not even sure of that anymore.

Anyway, what do you think will happen if the US admits a mistake and leaves? How will the withdrawal be handled? who will be left behind? What will happen to them? Will Pakistan and India start a proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the Saudis get bogged down in Yemen or will they double down by paying the ISI to blow up stuff in Iran and get into deeper trouble all around? Does the region need a supervisor? and who might that be?

[slapout9]

Anyway, what do you think will happen if the US admits a mistake and leaves? How will the withdrawal be handled? who will be left behind? What will happen to them? Will Pakistan and India start a proxy war in Afghanistan? Will the Saudis get bogged down in Yemen or will they double down by paying the ISI to blow up stuff in Iran and get into deeper trouble all around? Does the region need a supervisor? and who might that be?

Leaving A'stan dosen't mean we have to leave the area. Maybe there is some merit to General Kruluk's plan to go with offshore balancing.

[tequila]

a.) How does any Western Nation actually benefit from being in A'Stan? Let's say to prevent safe havens for AQ.

Denial of an Islamist al-Qaeda victory, for one. The overall stability of Pakistan, for another.

b.) What about Somalia. Great safe haven for AQ, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. If we want to stop Poppy Production, why has it increased?

Southern Somalia is a haven for certain elements of AQ but not AQ central, the IO high command which has extensive and longstanding ties in the tribal regions. The tribal areas of Pakistan are far more threatening because of those longstanding ties, but defeat in Afghanistan is related to the tribal areas in that they would severely aggravate the problems of Pakistan.

c.) There is NOTHING we need in A'Stan. If A'Stan is actually important then the US should be deploying 50,000 more troops and the UK another 11,000. Basically all NATO nations should be prepared to commit 20-30% of their available ground forces and the US should fund and support that effort.

I would argue otherwise, but simply because the NATO nations disagree about this and the level of effort required doesn't mean that A'stan should be abandoned.

I see no shame in the US and NATO saying "We'll give up, because without an effective Afghan Government, we are simply not prepared to pay the cost."

I don't know about shame, but the spectacle of a NATO retreat and abandonment of Afghanistan would be a significant IO boost to al-Qaeda which would translate into increased fundraising, recruitment, and political will to al-Qaeda and its associated movements. It would also significantly destabilize Pakistan.

There are times when a timely withdrawal can deflate a localized insurgency, as occurred when the Soviet withdrawal led to a prolonged period of reduced recruitment and infighting amongst the mujahidin. However, when one of the primary beneficiaries of a U.S. withdrawal is represented by al-Qaeda, a transnational group dedicated to attacking the U.S. and its allies in a way that none of the mujahidin groups were dedicated to attacking the Soviet bloc, I'd argue that withdrawal under fire would result in a definite negative to U.S. national security even given the savings in treasure and lives.

This leaves the exam question of why the US and NATO could not defeat a 2nd/3rd rate Irregular force, with no ATGMs or MANPADS.

Because the US and NATO could not permanently destroy with the resources on hand insurgent forces protected by large areas of ungoverned space, a safe and robust rear area, and a cowed/supportive Pashtun and Nuristani population.

[William F. Owen]

Denial of an Islamist al-Qaeda victory, for one. The overall stability of Pakistan, for another.

So a Taliban regime in Kabul threatens Pakistan? OK, if we take that as a given, why does no one ever say it? - and how do we know?

I would argue otherwise, but simply because the NATO nations disagree about this and the level of effort required doesn't mean that A'stan should be abandoned.

I do not think A'Stan should be abandoned either, IF we commit the level of resources, that say it is vital to national security interests of the West. If the reason for staying is just pride and risking broken promises, that's not good enough. The US has broken many, many promises before and it's hurt it very little.

It would also significantly destabilize Pakistan.

Really? I remember folks saying a withdrawal from Vietnam would de-stabilise Thailand and Malaysia. That was simply not true.

Because the US and NATO could not permanently destroy with the resources on hand insurgent forces protected by large areas of ungoverned space, a safe and robust rear area, and a cowed/supportive Pashtun and Nuristani population.

Hmmm... seems there is a lesson there. So essentially, if the US and NATO do not commit the resources, there can be no solution, and there is only a mostly military solution in that inflicting massive harm in the insurgency is required.

Gentleman. I am not suggesting a VN style cut and run, but the obvious requirement is a vast increase in resources. That is only justified IF A'Stan is vital. That case being made, the discussion can sensibly move onto the how and why of defeating a poorly equipped and trained irregular force.