What is presence patrolling?

[Ken White]

You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.

That's true and is why training is important. Also, some clever people insist that most all US patrols have an Afghan presence (ANA, ANP or other, including some interpreters who have more comabt experience than a very large number of people) to do nuance detection. Works pretty well...

Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.

Speaking of nuances, do you know that it's not happening or is that yet more unnecessary innuendo on your part?

[Infanteer]

What exactly were you reconnoitering?

Everything - different patrols would have specific tasks, but daily patrols would help keep a an eye on things and, better, dominate the ground. No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home.

As well, the US reference you found is, in my opinion, incorrect and outdated - overt presence patrols were always conducted in areas where contact with the enemy could take place. This is why we treated every patrol as an advance to contact.

You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.

Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.

I don't know what your "been there, done that" constitutes, but your appeals to authority never seem to reflect how things work on the ground. You'd be surprised - pattern of life takes a little while to get used to, but after a month or so soldiers, especially ones with multiple tours, usually figure out what constitutes a combat indicator. The fact that most patrols are conducted with the ANSF only makes this easier - when the ANA start getting antsy, it's usually game on.

[Chris jM]

Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols and when I gave orders for the patrol, I included any area, route or point objectives. The task was to conduct an area/route/point recce.

Why label a type of patrol by the posture, the means your using to achieve your goal, rather than the goal, objective or ends of the patrol itself? The posture could change - maybe you see something and want to observe it covertly, for example. Does your 'presence patrol' then fail because your presence is no longer overt?

I don't think this is needless or nugatory semantics I'm pulling you up on. I do think the label of 'presence' in front of patrolling is (as I stated prior) misaligned with expressing an effective commander's intent necessary for mission command and a very easy shield for mediocrity and poor ideas to hide behind.

[Chris jM]

otherwise tasked (raid, ambush, snatch, meeting, etc.) always a reconnaissance patrol. It is in fact a reconnaissance and presence patrol or operation as well even if a 'combat' mission is the stated purpose. Information gathering plus area (area, not spot...) knowledge and dominance are combat constants, or should be. That applies in conventional and irregular warfare.

Conversely, a reconnaissance patrol is not universally a presence patrol -- but it is simply that as often or more than not.

Imperfect definitions, evidently. While I agree with your later quote (excluded) that 'training is everything...' I don't think that your first point, that any of your above points excuse or justify the poor 'presence patrolling' philosophy.

Doctrine claims we have two types of patrols: Fighting/Combat and Reconnaissance. This isn't a very intuitive type of categorization as a fighting patrol can be a reconnaissance patrol.

I think we'd be better off looking at two types of patrols - overt and covert. Both are fundamentally different approaches, with equipment and TTPs changing between the two types. However these types of patrols are only the means to an end. Evidentially you cannot patrol to 'be covert' or 'be overt', but rather to achieve an effect.

This might make me appear confused and that I am arguing against anyone conducting a presence patrol initially, then saying that we should replace the fighting/recce patrol with the overt(another word for presence)/covert category. What I'm trying to point out is that overt presence is a means to an end. Achieving your process isn't necessarily going to be productive or helpful - applying your process to achieve a goal may be. Re-aligning how we classify our two main methods of patrolling tasks would assist in this delineation.

[Ken White]

I don't think that your first point, that any of your above points excuse or justify the poor 'presence patrolling' philosophy.

That it's poor that is. I don't think the philosophy is poor, though the verbiage used to posit the idea in some manuals is absolutely dangerous.

The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Those last, BTW, are the reason Armies exist. The COIN stupidity and IW are the realm of Paramilitary Police and US Special Forces / SAS like organizations respectively. So armies in real wars conduct combat patrols to complete designated missions and reconnaissance patrols to insure they do not get surprised or to gather specific information for future action (that's why I say the 'presence' patrol should usually be and often is a reconnaissance patrol; it's also to avoid surprises and gather information for future action...).

JMA made the very valid point that sending kids from London or New York City -- or Auckland -- bombing about in Afghanistan with little cultural awareness or language skill is pointless. He's absolutely correct. that's why we generally avoid doing it by ALWAYS going with local forces (preferably) or at a minimum interpreters who can provide the cultural and translation factor capability.

Doctrine claims we have two types of patrols: Fighting/Combat and Reconnaissance. This isn't a very intuitive type of categorization as a fighting patrol can be a reconnaissance patrol.

Not intuitive to you perhaps, most people don't seem to have a problem with it. Recall also that the terms spring from conventional war roots where the parameters are quite different from low intensity COIN and FID.

Fighting patrols do reconnaissance or should and reconnaissance patrols can and do fight. The categorization is predicated on the primary mission of the patrol. I have been on reconnaissance patrols that were looking for and found a fight, conversely, I've been on combat patrols that inadvertently had no fight but returned with much good info.

I think we'd be better off looking at two types of patrols - overt and covert. Both are fundamentally different approaches, with equipment and TTPs changing between the two types. However these types of patrols are only the means to an end. Evidentially you cannot patrol to 'be covert' or 'be overt', but rather to achieve an effect.

METT-TC. Whether the patrol is for fighting or just reconnaissance, overt or covert, in a major conventional conflict or an irregular war, METT-TC applies.

This might make me appear confused and that I am arguing against anyone conducting a presence patrol initially, then saying that we should replace the fighting/recce patrol with the overt(another word for presence)/covert category...

Uh, no, not confused, you just want a new name. Okay with me.

What I'm trying to point out is that overt presence is a means to an end.

Why, yes it is. It is also an opportunity to train and to gather information -- THAT is the purpose of the patrol and presence is simply a synergistic and beneficial effect.

Achieving your process isn't necessarily going to be productive or helpful - applying your process to achieve a goal may be.

I'm unsure I understand all I know about that statement. I have absolutely no idea how one 'achieves' a process. I can apply a process, I can achieve a goal; ideally I do the former to reach the latter.

If you mean using a reconnaissance patrol to gather information and at the same time establish presence, then I agree. If you mean using a combat patrol to accomplish an action or task and at the same time letting the opposition and the neighbors know you're there, then I agree. Beyond that, I'm confoosed... Recall, I'm old.

Re-aligning how we classify our two main methods of patrolling tasks would assist in this delineation.

You may be correct but I'm skeptical. I've seen too many 'covert' patrols get discovered (my LRS kid in Desert Storm got spotted by a six year old kid with Goats -- and a dog... ) and too many overt patrols accomplish little or nothing.

We now categorize patrols by intended function, combat or reconnaissance, that based on years of experience in major combat operations. You seem to want to categorize them by movement methodology. I'm not certain there's much benefit there. Probably not enough to rewrite most of the relevant manuals, doctrine and training materials in the west...

[Infanteer]

Why label a type of patrol by the posture, the means your using to achieve your goal, rather than the goal, objective or ends of the patrol itself? The posture could change - maybe you see something and want to observe it covertly, for example. Does your 'presence patrol' then fail because your presence is no longer overt?

I don't think this is needless or nugatory semantics I'm pulling you up on. I do think the label of 'presence' in front of patrolling is (as I stated prior) misaligned with expressing an effective commander's intent necessary for mission command and a very easy shield for mediocrity and poor ideas to hide behind.

....because....

The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Couldn't have said it much better. I don't get hung up on these terms too much. When I tell my NCOs that I wanted an area recce of the village of X with a presence in the village after evening prayers, it layed out my intent. I would conduct presence patrols because my mission was to "secure the population". The "presence", as Ken aptly described, defines both a reconnaissance part ("Hey, the local mullah told us this while we were in the village") and a combat part ("Anyone want a shot at the title?") It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".

[Ken White]

....because.... It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".

and that's really important...

In COIN or FID, initiating fighting contacts more often than your opponent is important but gathering and applying voluminous and current intel on the AO and the people is more important.

Proving you can come and go as you please is even more important.

[Kiwigrunt]

He he, I’m following this battle of semantics with interest. Just want to add that in Timor we referred to them as ‘blue hat’ and ‘green hat’ patrols. That’s not in any manual but everyone got the point.

[William F. Owen]

He he, I’m following this battle of semantics with interest. Just want to add that in Timor we referred to them as ‘blue hat’ and ‘green hat’ patrols. That’s not in any manual but everyone got the point.

Useful. Good point.

[JMA]

That's true and is why training is important. Also, some clever people insist that most all US patrols have an Afghan presence (ANA, ANP or other, including some interpreters who have more comabt experience than a very large number of people) to do nuance detection. Works pretty well...Speaking of nuances, do you know that it's not happening or is that yet more unnecessary innuendo on your part?

If you need to take a bunch of 'locals' along with the patrol to achieve the mission then the ISAF troops are more in a escort function with the 'locals' doing the real recce and/or communications patrols?

Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol. Further the weakness is that the interpretor is merely facilitating communication between the patrol leader and the local population. The patrol should in fact be escorting and supporting a one/two.three man team of Afghans (an intel team - call them what you may) who will be doing the talking and sussing out the situation in the village... and not some patrol leader from London, New York or wherever out in Afghanistan on a short tour.

[JMA]

Everything - different patrols would have specific tasks, but daily patrols would help keep a an eye on things and, better, dominate the ground. No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home.

Nobody is saying no patrolling that I have read.

What I am saying is that what the definition of presence patrols is and their use in Afghanistan as has been explained they are a waste of time and manpower and (as the man said) constitute merely 'trolling for RPGs'... or IEDs.

If you were tasked to figure out and implement a method of deployment to prevent or radically reduce the planting of IEDs within a given radius of your base then would you do it with presence patrols?

Given me an indication if you will on what percentage of patrols carried out by your unit were based on solid intel on the presence of Taliban and resulted in an aggressive action in a patrol form which resulted in kills?

That stat I suggest should be the point of departure. And will inform why there has been no alternative but to use presence patrols to keep the soldiers busy.

As well, the US reference you found is, in my opinion, incorrect and outdated - overt presence patrols were always conducted in areas where contact with the enemy could take place. This is why we treated every patrol as an advance to contact.

Well then lets have a new definition. Let someone in the field rewrite and submit the amended paragraphs now rather than wait for some desk jockey to get around to it sometime after the war.

I don't know what your "been there, done that" constitutes, but your appeals to authority never seem to reflect how things work on the ground. You'd be surprised - pattern of life takes a little while to get used to, but after a month or so soldiers, especially ones with multiple tours, usually figure out what constitutes a combat indicator. The fact that most patrols are conducted with the ANSF only makes this easier - when the ANA start getting antsy, it's usually game on.

You said at the outset "No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home." and provided no supporting data. Yes, and I too can't provide references and/or supporting data for every comment I make in every post here.

"Been there done that" means I understand (and sympathise) with your predicament. You are obviously trying to do your best with the tasks you have been given. I did the same, walking over miles and miles of Mozambique and Rhodesia looking for the needle in the proverbial haystack. Eventually I figured it out and said so. Your time will no doubt come and good luck to you on how they react

OK, so if the ANA can be relied upon to act like the "canary in the coal mine" then maybe that explains why their local smarts could (maybe should) be used more, yes? (I could tell you a story about local trackers here, but no time)

My guess is that most of them are quite happy to take uncle Sam's dollar or the Queen's shilling but are not quite ready to lay down their lives for Karzai. So seeing so much money is being used to buy off village chiefs and warlords why not pay some of these ANA a reward for intel leading to verified Taliban captures and kills?

[William F. Owen]

Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol.

Is this your opinion, or a fact? It is certainly almost the exact opposite of what what I understand having actually spoken with the men returned from theatre.

To whit: Presence Patrolling from your quote.

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.

So how is this relevant to a discussion of Afghanistan? Yes the US (and UK) have produced some dumb manuals. That does not mean that is the reality on the ground.

[JMA]

When I tell my NCOs that I wanted an area recce of the village of X with a presence in the village after evening prayers, it layed out my intent. I would conduct presence patrols because my mission was to "secure the population". The "presence", as Ken aptly described, defines both a reconnaissance part ("Hey, the local mullah told us this while we were in the village") and a combat part ("Anyone want a shot at the title?") It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".

Yes indeed we are now getting closer to the crux of the matter.

So the mission is to secure the population.

How do you achieve that with a one time pass of a village once a week/once a month having approached over open ground thus giving ample warning of approach and then departing across open ground thus giving the TB the hint as to when its safe to come out again? And having done this walk by will almost certainly not be back for a week or so. So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.

These presence patrols serve at best to only marginally "secure the population" and then only for the time troops are physically there. That is probably why the use of Protected Villages has been made in the past.

Covert approach by presence patrols seems difficult given the openness of the terrain in general except for small teams which would hardly constitute a show of force. It was mentioned earlier that such a patrol could lie-up covertly nearby then suddenly "appear" in the village. Not sure the surprise value would be worth the effort certainly as the Taliban do not seem to walk about carrying weapons openly unless they are about to make war.

Lets go back to the mission then. To secure the population.

Given the circumstances on the ground there must surely be an effective way of doing this other than wandering around and "trolling for RPGs"... and IEDs?

[Red Rat]

So the mission is to secure the population.

How do you achieve that with a one time pass of a village once a week/once a month having approached over open ground thus giving ample warning of approach and then departing across open ground thus giving the TB the hint as to when its safe to come out again? And having done this walk by will almost certainly not be back for a week or so. So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.

my understanding is that 'presence patrolling' per se (certainly in the British AO) is done frequently each day from locally sited FOBs. It is recognised that if you do not have a permanent presence on the ground then you cannot even begin to assert that you are securing the population.

RR

[William F. Owen]

So the mission is to secure the population.

Some may say that. How sensible does that seem to you?

So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.

Exactly. - which is why it is far smarter to question the strategy rather than the tactics.
The problem with the strategy maybe that it cannot be reasonably enabled by the tactics and limitation placed upon those tactics via the policy.

[jcustis]

Some may say that. How sensible does that seem to you?

Exactly. - which is why it is far smarter to question the strategy rather than the tactics.
The problem with the strategy maybe that it cannot be reasonably enabled by the tactics and limitation placed upon those tactics via the policy.

Sooooo...does this pull back the curtain on your emphasis on counter-insurgent activity? Because pop-centric COIN cannot succeed due to the current limitations on coalition forces?

[William F. Owen]

Sooooo...does this pull back the curtain on your emphasis on counter-insurgent activity? Because pop-centric COIN cannot succeed due to the current limitations on coalition forces?

Not aware there was a curtain! I thought I was pretty up front about it.
I actually think pop-centric COIN is just a dumb idea, regardless of the theatre force ratios.
IMO, in irregular warfare you should use armed force against what it can reasonably be applied against to further policy. IF you want to protect the Population, kill the bad guys. Otherwise leave the population the hell alone.

[Ken White]

If you need to take a bunch of 'locals' along with the patrol to achieve the mission then the ISAF troops are more in a escort function with the 'locals' doing the real recce and/or communications patrols?

If that's a question, then the answer is no. If it's one of your pat innuendo statements with a camouflaging interrogatory at the end, it's incorrect.

Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol.

Basis for that opinionated statement is? Number obtained from what source?

I suspect some of the guys in ISAF with four or more tours in Afghanistan -- and there are a bunch -- would strongly dispute that opinion.

Further the weakness is that the interpretor is merely facilitating communication between the patrol leader and the local population.

Obviously, you haven't worked in combat with an interpreter -- at least the way the US employs them. As I said, many of them have more combat experience than most, a few more than you and I combined and that experience is productively employed...

The patrol should in fact be escorting and supporting a one/two.three man team of Afghans (an intel team - call them what you may) who will be doing the talking and sussing out the situation in the village... and not some patrol leader from London, New York or wherever out in Afghanistan on a short tour.

Gee, you think? Amazing concept. Brilliant. Why didn't we think of that?

That's been happening for years -- and you seem blissfully unaware of that. As so many things...

[Pete]

I wasn't in the infantry so I have little to add to this thread, except to say that this stuff ain't exactly new. From Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army, 1911, Corrected to July 31, 1918:

389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployment on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented.
390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus may suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hosstile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning.
391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.
The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.
A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable.

A later paragraph states, "To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense."

The pocket-sized book this is copied from was published by the Government Printing Office, Washington DC, price 35 cents, and is in the public domain.

[Chris jM]

.I don't get hung up on these terms too much.

And you probably didn't need to. You could have changed the definitions to the ones I suggest and nothing on the ground would have changed - from what you have told me, it sounds like it was being done right from the word go.

However I am getting hung up on these terms as I've seen (hell, I've been part of the problem) presence patrols justifying inefficiencies bordering on stupidity. I'm loathe to make conclusions based on my experiences as I have not operated against a sophisticated OPFOR - the sharpened mango wars of the South East Pacific wasn't all that demanding - and I remain confident that, if the need drove my defence force, we would have picked our game up. It still doesn't satisfy me that 'presence' is a suitable term.

I myself have been guilty on using 'presence' as a crux for a lack of a tactical appreciation.

I accept that the label 'presence' isn't the root cause of poor patrolling. What it does do, in my opinion and in my experience, is shield incompetency and inefficiencies. Get rid of the presence label and some shortcomings would be revealed, allowing the real causes (training, proper campaign planning and the maintenance of mission command) to be properly rectified.