What is presence patrolling?

[Ken White]

Bill Moore:

We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity.

... the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).

Seems to me the first quoted statment is correct but since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve...

... The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests.

That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance. (LINK). I guess there are people who expect the world will be surrogates but I've never met any...

Pat Lang via Mike F:

" - For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents."

I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...

[MikeF]

Pat Lang via Mike F:[/B]I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...

Ken and Bill,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

Mike

[Steve Blair]

Ken and Bill,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

Mike

Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.

[MikeF]

Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.

Steve,

That's probably a good way to put it, and the gap is not that hard to combine IMO. For instance, during heavy manuevers when young PL's and CO's are practicing bounding, fire and manuever, and integrating CAS/AWT, we can incorporate more guerillas on the battlefield with IEDs.

We can also test JCustis' approach of extending past the patrol base with small units conducting steady-state operations with the CO orchestrating it all. If we go that route, I'd suggest that we bulk up the CO level HQ. This type of training/test would allow us to gain a better calculation on risk management before deploying to the field.

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Mike

[Steve Blair]

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Mike

Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

[MikeF]

Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

Additionally, for the environment, one would probably have a civilian to enemy ratio of 10:1 although that's manpower intensive.

The two best training opportunies that I've experienced in CONUS were the Hurricane Katrina relief in 2005 and a JRTC rotation in spring 2006.

Katrina forced the squadron to suspend close with and destroy for a bit to interact with people, help secure a city, provide humanitarian assistance, assess the damage, and coordinate for restoration of essential services.

In 2006 at JRTC, we received permission to covertly infiltrate into the box 24 hours prior to the start of operations b/c we were testing out the light RSTA concept. We spent 80% of the rotation outside the FOB, and our successes and limitations learned during that tour helped us translate that into a campaign plan and execution in Iraq.

Mike

[slapout9]

good article on this subject from John Robb's Global Guerrilla's.

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/...-armor-art.pdf

[jcustis]

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

the battalion commander might not always have control, but he always retains command, and if you could deploy his Jump CP and not let it just become some goofy PSD, he can still control considerable chunks of battlespace with the right equipment task organized to it. The Main CP retains the most control, because that is where it is "plugged in" to higher headquarters. We have gotten so burdened with data pathways that it seems very foreign to HHQ to have to pick up a handset to a satcom radio in order to have a chat. I mean that in all seriousness. Sure, it was just 4-5 yrs ago when satcom was a vital lifeline that was utilized a lot, but there has been a perceptible shift. Soooo...we'd have to take a couple of steps back, from the BDE to Regt level and have everyone power down a bit in order to make the "stay afield" bit work across a larger AO, but it's not like we're making water here.

[Bill Moore]

MikeF,

I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

I agree with many others that our COIN doctrine is probably flawed, since it frequently references COIN examples such as Algeria, Malaya and French Vietnam as examples, yet in all these cases these were nations defending their land, not providing aid to a foreign government. The French and British could establish the laws and enforce certain standards that we can’t in a true FID situation. Foreign assistance to a government with insurgency problems includes our support to Greece and El Salvador. Iraq and Afghanistan don’t come close to being an El Salvador or Greece. Do we have even have doctrine for a regime change? Where is the UN?

Posted by Ken reference head hunting:

since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve.

partially correct punch below the belt; however, as you well know from your days with the OSS during WWII and then with SF in Vietnam War that UW is only one of our SOF missions, and not one that SOCOM leadership embraced warmly during the early days of the conflict. Most folks are wiser now.

Posted by Ken,

That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance.

Your definition sounds like a simple flanking operation or other type of maneuver (that isn't a frontal assault). It is my impression that many are pushing SFA as "the" indirect approach. SFA is an important indirect means, but there is also the indirect approach, which implies you influence your enemy indirectly, perhaps by influencing the population in a village that has been providing him support to not support him. You can actually combine means and approach, but don't want to trip over mouse turds.

MikeF,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID).

That doesn't mean the Army shouldn't be flexible enough to provide security and support a wide range of other tasks has they have always done. You may not have time to train on everything, which is why educating our leaders is so critical. If the leadership is perceptive and capable of quickly grasping the situation on the ground and seeing what needs to be done, they can issue the appropriate orders and guidelines to the NCOs and junior officers to execute, and they'll get it done. Our guys and gals can do whatever you tell them to do, and IMO you will be hard pressed to identify any significant failures in OIF and OEF-A that were due to inadequate training at the junior level. Instead you have to look up the chain of command to start finding points of failure. Leadership is decisive.

[MikeF]

I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

Concur. I gave an overstated/simplified example. I am still a bit grumpy that Army has gone ten quarters without scoring a touchdown against Navy.

USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID). emphasis mine

An important distinction. I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

[slapout9]

I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

Didn't we used to do that with HIC,MIC,LIC? So a PHD in war is an officer that can HIC em,MIC em, and finally LIC em

[jcustis]

A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/m...s/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?

Lance Cpl. Luke McDonell, a rifleman with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, scans the tree line during a security halt while patrolling the area of Now Zad, Afghanistan, known as "The Greens," on December 9th, 2009. The Marines cleared the area as part of Operation Cobra's Anger, an operation aimed at removing the Taliban's stronghold of the area. McDonnell is a 28-year-old from Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.
HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan - Once an urban district and home to thousands, "The Greens," an area within the Now Zad region of Afghanistan quickly became a ghost town, when Taliban fighters procured the area from which to launch combat operations.

With the Taliban in control and the civilian population gone, the area's alleyways were quickly laced with improvised explosive devices, its orchard's filled with bunkers and fortified fighting positions, and its adobe homes stocked with weapons caches and enemy fighters.

While few coalition units have dared to enter The Greens, the Marines and sailors of Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, did exactly that Dec. 8-9 as part of Operation Cobra's Anger.

The Marines of Lima Co. moved swiftly to clear compounds, homes, alleyways and orchards, and it quickly became clear the Taliban had become complacent in the safety they believed The Greens provided them and were unprepared to deal with such an assault.

"We went in there for our first time and there wasn't anybody occupying the area, but we did find a lot IED making facilities, [homemade explosives], pressure plates and stuff like that," said Lance Cpl. Stewart Heim, 20, a rifleman with Lima Co. "It definitely showed us the Taliban were occupying [the Greens], and using it as a centralized place between towns."

Lima Co. also confiscated illegal drugs, Taliban propaganda and uncovered tunnel systems used by enemy fighters.

"We found their tunnel systems which pretty much run throughout the whole Greens," said Heim, a native of Staunton, Ill. "So we've definitely seen that they have the capability to survive us dropping bombs on them."

Lima Co. came to the area expecting their Taliban rivals to defend the ground they've controlled for many months. With the Marines rapidly chipping away at Taliban caches and exposing fighting positions, an attack by Taliban forces to save what supplies remained, seemed even more imminent.

"Walking through The Greens was kind of iffy. You didn't know where you wanted to step, where to step, where not to step. You never knew what to expect around a corner," said Lance Cpl. Michael R. Evans, 19, a combat engineer attached to Lima Co., 3/4. "You'd open up a door and might see a chicken or a dog and it would surprise you since you knew there was nothing out there."

Enemy fighters chose not to engage the Marines and instead left the dirty work for the many IED's positioned throughout the area.

While the IED's were numerous, the Marines' sharp eyes, training and metal detectors were able to locate all devices encountered before they could inflict casualties.

"We found them the way we should find them, instead of having someone stepping on them and having to be [medically evacuated]," said Evans, from McKenzie, Tenn.

The Marines continued to push farther into the area, destroying IED's along the way, gathering information and slowly but surely, breaking the Taliban's reign over the area.

After two days of defying Taliban threats and venturing farther and farther into the area, the Marines returned to friendly lines to refit and resupply.

While many alleyways in the area remain to be negotiated, the Marines set an example for Afghan national security forces and coalition forces to follow, and energized the mission to rid Now Zad of Taliban influence and return it to the Afghan people.

http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news...w.php&id=32271

NOW ZAD, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan conducted a major combat operation against insurgent forces in Now Zad, Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 3.

The Marines of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan, struck well-known enemy locations identified within and near the insurgent-infested Now Zad District center.

"Now Zad's District center is kind of a unique place in Afghanistan because there is no local civilian population," said 1st Lt. Mike H. Buonocore, the executive officer of Co. L.

"Company L was reinforced by engineers, aviation support from the aviation combat element, rocket artillery support from SPMAGTF-A's Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, Air Force and Navy aviation assets and Army rocket artillery support. During the combat operation, the Co. L Marines targeted positively identified enemy positions where insurgent attacks have originated from over the past several months. Other locations were identified with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

The two major components involved in the operation were a ground force and an aerial assault. Enemy targets were destroyed by combined fires from rocket artillery, aircraft, mortars and ground troops.

"The mission took some enemy forces out of the fight and showed them how much force we have with us and what we can use against them," said Cpl. Andrew C. Conte, a squad leader with the ground assault element. "It really cleared out some of the areas we were having troubles in."

The ground scheme of maneuver employed Co. L as the main effort by conducting a raid on a known enemy position, while other Marines held blocking positions to ensure insurgent reinforcements were denied freedom of movement and the opportunity to engage the Marine forces.

Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and Btry. D, 2/14's high mobility artillery rocket system set conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets.

"Once the bombs started dropping there wasn't too much movement," said Conte. "With all the ground forces out there and everything we had overhead, it was calm because we knew nothing was going to touch us."

Additional munitions were called in on other known enemy positions to ensure the raid force was successful. Upon initial disruption of the enemy locations, the assault element moved in and conducted thorough site exploitation.

"We were able to engage some enemy targets before they engaged us," said Cpl. Taylor E. Vogel, a forward observer with the 81 mm mortar platoon. "We were able to drop mortars on [enemy] fire teams that were moving in on [Marine] units. We definitely achieved what we wanted to. We destroyed the big targets that have been occupied by enemy forces."

Leading up to the operation, the Marines had proactively conducted combat operations in Now Zad's District center daily in order to shape the battlefield by moving insurgents into disposable positions. Marines took precaution by using leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of danger in the area, which helped create agreeable conditions that would result in little or no collateral damage.

"Throughout the winter in Afghanistan, you hear about the [insurgent] spring offensive," said Conte. "We caught them before they caught us in the spring offensive, and we set the tone of it with showing how much [firepower] we have and what we can use."

Insurgents attempted to counter the Marines' strike on Now Zad with improvised explosive devices, mortars, small-arms fire and two rockets that were fired overhead with no success. Unwavering, the Marines positively identified and pursued their targets.

"The operation was a tremendous success on all levels," said Buonocore. "The confirmed battle damage assessment is pretty significant. There were no civilian casualties, and nothing was hit that wasn't a target. We have achieved tremendous success here against the enemy."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...963946120.html

NOW ZAD, Afghanistan

In a war over hearts and minds, Now Zad has neither.

Abandoned by its residents, this mud-brick ghost town is a corner of Afghanistan that might be forever Flanders. There are no schools being painted, no roads paved, no clinics built. There is no Afghan army, no Afghan government at all. In Now Zad, there is just one company of U.S. Marines slugging it out across no man’s land with equally determined militants. From their entrenched lines, neither side is strong enough to prevail.

On patrol this month, Sgt. Tucker Strom, a 26-year-old squad leader from Tallahassee, Fla., lifted his head just high enough above a mud wall to glimpse the Taliban front line across 500 yards of neglected pomegranate orchards. “They’re right there,” Sgt. Strom told a newly arrived Marine. “This is what it turns into—us watching them, them watching us.”

[davidbfpo]

Posted by JCustis:

A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/m...s/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?

Jon,

It appears that you too (USA, USMC plus) are repeating what the UK has done since 2006 in Helmand "mowing the grass". Other items cite the UK fighting over the same piece of land six times.

I suppose if the people have fled then there is no population to protect.