What is presence patrolling?

[MikeF]

To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.

Here's another similarity between LE and small wars-

1. What is the actual reaction time of the cop or soldier to respond to a crime?

2. What is the local's perception of the reaction time?

In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes. When things were going well, we'd actually had a healthy competition between US and IA to see who could get there first. After we had regained a substantial presence in the town, the enemy began conducting attacks on the civilians to coerce or force silence. I think our reaction time allowed us to gain a little advantage on the enemy.

In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.

Mike

[slapout9]

In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes.

Mike

1-In my world 3 minutes was the standard,unless there was a good reason otherwise if it happened to many times you would/could face a disciplinary procedure. All the great COIN theorist constantly talk about Police Operations in there books.

2-911 is somewhat of a problem in my opinion because it goes back to how all this started...... Radio Dispatching of Patrol Cars to calls for service which is very Economical but it is not always that Effective. The old ways are sometimes better.


3-Presence patrolling dose not or should not alwats equal HIGH VISIBILITY patrolling many times your presence will be more effective when it is HIDDEN but constant. The military needs a plain clothes division

[MikeF]

The military needs a plain clothes division

No issues with that. It worked for T.E. Lawrence.

True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

Yes. You need both. A broader question, particularly going back to A'stan, is

When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

Mike

[slapout9]

When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

Mike

That is a good question. I would think there would come a tipping point where it is viewed as an Occupation as opposed to security. One thing that might be interesting to try is changing uniforms as the area becomes more secure. The MP's used to patrol downtown Fayetteville in Class A uniforms or Khakis when appropriate, NCO's would accompany them sometimes in Class A's called Courtesy Patrols. Point being as things become more secure maybe come out of Digital Alien Being suits.

[Bill Moore]

Mike

I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management

To a point, but you must consider these against your objectives, if you consider them independently it is impossible to determine if the cost is worth it.

Slapout,

True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).

You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.

The military needs a plain clothes division

It's good to see some unconventional thinking going on. The Brits did this in a couple of conflicts (they took casualties, but the results were probably worth it, although how do you really measure the worth of a man's life?). However, your best plain clothes operatives are going to be your host nation folks, and ideally they'll be police or specially trained covert operatives. By all means we should facilitate this, the enemy should not sleep well at night, and when they walk the street at day they should be suspicious of everyone and each other. We want to install a deep fear, which will make them more receptive to other messages later.

MikeF,

When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

This is the million dollar question. If Special Forces are being employed correctly, they'll be participating in these patrols with local nationals in the lead. The larger hammer forces will be in close proximity to respond if they end up kicking a hornets' nest. However, if the HN forces are distrusted, and it is in our national interests, then our troops may have to do this.

Every situation is different so the strategy must be adjusted to that particular situation based on a number of factors and our objectives.

[slapout9]

Slapout,



Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).
You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.

Hi Bill, I highlighted some important points. I never understood the network theory as the military applies it so thanks for explaining it. What I find really strange is when Warden's Ring theory was first taught to LE on how to counter a drug organization(gang) one of the points that was driven home was don't try that kind of operation, you have to attack HVI+his finances+his hideouts and transport net+his distribution net,etc. all at the same time or as close to it as possible. Otherwise they will just lay low and regroup and retaliate.


Second how you describe gaining popular support for Intelligence is a lot like retaking a high crime neighborhood. First they want tell you Sh....t but if you really show you are going to clean the place up and you are going to do it with respect to non criminal residents the Intel and cooperation will eventually come, but it can hard frustrating work to do it.

[MikeF]

You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences.

Bill,

I agreed with your entire last post, but I wanted to address "the message." In the long run, the question is who is patrolling? If the US floods an area in mass, then there is a perception that we are in charge, and the locals expect us to be in charge and solve problems. IMO, that's one of the big things we missed when we invaded Iraq. The Iraqis expected us to fill the security vacuum in the wake of Saddam's removal, and we expected them to fill it. On the operational level, military leaders tried to fix massive, complex problems (electric grid in Baghdad, flow of oil, reinventing an Army and Police force, re-establishing national governance). On the local level, company commanders assumed responsibility for governance, economics, and security.

Some will hand-wave my comment by stating it's a matter of expectation management, but IMO, that's discounting how the locals perceive us.

If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide.

I've summed this up with the phrase in small wars, sometimes less is more.

Thoughts?

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

Starting off the same ole tired caveat this is simply my opinion, and that opinions should always be open to persuasive arguments, otherwise they become dogma

Getting directly to your question, who is patrolling? Please look at the definition for Small Wars (from the SWJ homepage) above, and note the key adjectives inadequate and unsatisfactory. If the host nation security forces (assuming they exist) are inadequate and our government has determined (policy) it is in our national interests to pursue our objectives in country X militarily, then until the host nation forces are adequate and “willing” to carry on the fight, we may well have to do it (and are doing it). I’m not a big believer in getting involved in these types of conflicts unless it is absolutely necessary, so I think we have to assume that our government has made that determination (agree or disagree), so now we just need to do it.

Ideally less is more, but the fallacy behind that assumption is due to the over touted through, by and with mantra. The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests. We’re assuming that employing a FID like response is always the best response to every Small War situation and that may not be the case.

I agree with your comments on Iraq to a point, but for whatever reason we demobilized the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police were never a credible force under Saddam, so assuming that the Iraqi army would provide security in the first place, we still effectively took that option off the table.

If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide

.

I agree with your statement, and would add that I have also stated that we should consider narrowing our objectives in some cases to punitive operations to deter future attacks, instead of engaging what some may label as imperial hubris. There are times when it is appropriate to occupy and rebuild, and times when it isn’t feasible (or worth the costs). I think we too often confuse hope and positive thinking with good strategy.