Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? ). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

The conditions are the key here...Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.
Point taken, but I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management. I was a bit off with the indirect fire rule- mortars can suffice for initial contact. However, we're the US military. We should be able to respond with UAV, AWTs, and Casevac to support our guys on the ground. I don't think that's risk adverse. I think it's just using all the tools and toys that you have.

While the enemy will not likely win a 1:1 firefight with US forces, IEDs on dismounted soldiers sucks. We took a lot of casualties that way, and one thing that maintained morale was knowing that you would get supported.

Mike