What is presence patrolling?

[MikeF]

I don't want patrols to be bound by pinpoint tasks before they sally forth. They should be steady-state operations that can transition fluidly from a movement to contact, to an area reconnaissance, then a route reconnaissance, followed by a couple of contact patrols to visit the local chief of police, mayor, and cement plant, and then full circle as information is developed.

JCustis- steady-state operations is probably a better way to describe it. Patrol flexes based-off events on ground as understood by patrol leader.

If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB.

Interesting idea and with proper planning, it is definitely feasible in certain areas. One would have to take a hard look at how long the patrol can sustain without burn-out plus keep patrols within artillery range (or priority for CAS/AWT) and within CASEVAC range.

If they're going in covertly for recon (digging in), then I'd recommend a max duration of 72 hours. After that, brains are fried.

How long should tour length be in this scenario? I'd probably think 6-9 months.

Mike

[jcustis]

Interesting idea and with proper planning, it is definitely feasible in certain areas. One would have to take a hard look at how long the patrol can sustain without burn-out plus keep patrols within artillery range (or priority for CAS/AWT) and within CASEVAC range.

If they're going in covertly for recon (digging in), then I'd recommend a max duration of 72 hours. After that, brains are fried.

How long should tour length be in this scenario? I'd probably think 6-9 months.

This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? ). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

The conditions are the key here. I am currently thinking along Afghanistan lines, where things are sufficiently open that LOS is decent. If we are looking at an urban environment, the situation is so thoroughly different that even if combat outposts were inkspotted throughout the city, the force density still needs to be very high if we want to achieve the constant number of forces afield that slapout mentions.

We can do this, with the right approach, indefinitely. I've seen it done (albeit with mechanized scouts aboard LAVs), for essentially four months, with only two 4-day reset periods. Our trains were on the move constantly, pushing supplies and recovery downed vehicles back to the CSS node for repair. This was in northern Iraq, during a tough winter. Do troops get sick and injured? Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.

[davidbfpo]

From MikeF:

In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.

Major Marginal can best comment on response times for LE in Chicago; which IIRC can be up to three hours when CPD is busy. Here in the UK there are mandated targets for emergency calls, for LE, Fire and Ambulance - which can exert a profound impact.

In my experience a 911 call is not always an emergency, but as long as the caller gets feedback on when or whether LE / police will attend satisfaction is high. Those who get neither can be a "lost cause".

Communication is the important point and of couse what LE do when they arrive.

[MikeF]

This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? ). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

The conditions are the key here...Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.

Point taken, but I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management. I was a bit off with the indirect fire rule- mortars can suffice for initial contact. However, we're the US military. We should be able to respond with UAV, AWTs, and Casevac to support our guys on the ground. I don't think that's risk adverse. I think it's just using all the tools and toys that you have.

While the enemy will not likely win a 1:1 firefight with US forces, IEDs on dismounted soldiers sucks. We took a lot of casualties that way, and one thing that maintained morale was knowing that you would get supported.

Mike