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Thread: What is presence patrolling?

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.
    In the early months of 2005, my task force fell under 2 BCT and had the mission of securing a stretch of MSR Mobile that started about 15-20 kms west of the Thar-Thar canal bridge and east to just above Saqlawiyah (which was about 5 km NW of Fallujah).

    The primary task as to control the MSR and ensure freedom of maneuver along that line of communication. Unfortunately, that became the only taks for the most part. We wound up becoming a static outpost-based force, siting mini Fort Apaches within line of sight of each other, and very quickly realized that the BGs knew where the seams were. If we even blinked too much, an IED was getting dropped out of the bottom of a minivan cut open Flintsone style, or slipped out of the trunk of a car at the same time as a jack and tire iron. Those guys were very good at that degree of subterfuge.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.
    Here's another similarity between LE and small wars-

    1. What is the actual reaction time of the cop or soldier to respond to a crime?

    2. What is the local's perception of the reaction time?

    In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes. When things were going well, we'd actually had a healthy competition between US and IA to see who could get there first. After we had regained a substantial presence in the town, the enemy began conducting attacks on the civilians to coerce or force silence. I think our reaction time allowed us to gain a little advantage on the enemy.

    In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.

    Mike

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Interesting idea and with proper planning, it is definitely feasible in certain areas. One would have to take a hard look at how long the patrol can sustain without burn-out plus keep patrols within artillery range (or priority for CAS/AWT) and within CASEVAC range.

    If they're going in covertly for recon (digging in), then I'd recommend a max duration of 72 hours. After that, brains are fried.

    How long should tour length be in this scenario? I'd probably think 6-9 months.
    This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? ). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

    The conditions are the key here. I am currently thinking along Afghanistan lines, where things are sufficiently open that LOS is decent. If we are looking at an urban environment, the situation is so thoroughly different that even if combat outposts were inkspotted throughout the city, the force density still needs to be very high if we want to achieve the constant number of forces afield that slapout mentions.

    We can do this, with the right approach, indefinitely. I've seen it done (albeit with mechanized scouts aboard LAVs), for essentially four months, with only two 4-day reset periods. Our trains were on the move constantly, pushing supplies and recovery downed vehicles back to the CSS node for repair. This was in northern Iraq, during a tough winter. Do troops get sick and injured? Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Those guys were very good at that degree of subterfuge.
    That is why I say they act more like criminals, you ever see that police video on those TV shows where a professional car thief breaks into a car with the Police Officer 10 feet away drinking a cup of coffee


    As to your MSR problem, thats why I like the Guard Duty Manual it is a series of static post support by a series of Mobile posts in the same area. When I was on Guard duty at Ft. Bragg we often caught or interrupted more crimes then the MP's just by following that simple system, to enclude reliefs in order to stay sharp(bad news is you will be on post support details a lot) But in your case it should be supplemented/combined by/with the local population as soon as possible. You don't need Rocket Scientists for security.

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    Default Emergency response

    From MikeF:
    In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.
    Major Marginal can best comment on response times for LE in Chicago; which IIRC can be up to three hours when CPD is busy. Here in the UK there are mandated targets for emergency calls, for LE, Fire and Ambulance - which can exert a profound impact.

    In my experience a 911 call is not always an emergency, but as long as the caller gets feedback on when or whether LE / police will attend satisfaction is high. Those who get neither can be a "lost cause".

    Communication is the important point and of couse what LE do when they arrive.
    davidbfpo

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? ). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

    The conditions are the key here...Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.
    Point taken, but I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management. I was a bit off with the indirect fire rule- mortars can suffice for initial contact. However, we're the US military. We should be able to respond with UAV, AWTs, and Casevac to support our guys on the ground. I don't think that's risk adverse. I think it's just using all the tools and toys that you have.

    While the enemy will not likely win a 1:1 firefight with US forces, IEDs on dismounted soldiers sucks. We took a lot of casualties that way, and one thing that maintained morale was knowing that you would get supported.

    Mike

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default MSR problem

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    That is why I say they act more like criminals, you ever see that police video on those TV shows where a professional car thief breaks into a car with the Police Officer 10 feet away drinking a cup of coffee


    As to your MSR problem, thats why I like the Guard Duty Manual it is a series of static post support by a series of Mobile posts in the same area. When I was on Guard duty at Ft. Bragg we often caught or interrupted more crimes then the MP's just by following that simple system, to enclude reliefs in order to stay sharp(bad news is you will be on post support details a lot) But in your case it should be supplemented/combined by/with the local population as soon as possible. You don't need Rocket Scientists for security.
    My preferred COA is to find the bomb-maker and financiers. Attack the system b/c you'll never be able to secure all roads all the time.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes.

    Mike
    1-In my world 3 minutes was the standard,unless there was a good reason otherwise if it happened to many times you would/could face a disciplinary procedure. All the great COIN theorist constantly talk about Police Operations in there books.

    2-911 is somewhat of a problem in my opinion because it goes back to how all this started...... Radio Dispatching of Patrol Cars to calls for service which is very Economical but it is not always that Effective. The old ways are sometimes better.


    3-Presence patrolling dose not or should not alwats equal HIGH VISIBILITY patrolling many times your presence will be more effective when it is HIDDEN but constant. The military needs a plain clothes division

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    My preferred COA is to find the bomb-maker and financiers. Attack the system b/c you'll never be able to secure all roads all the time.
    True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    The military needs a plain clothes division
    No issues with that. It worked for T.E. Lawrence.

    True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.
    Yes. You need both. A broader question, particularly going back to A'stan, is

    When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

    Mike

  11. #51
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

    Mike
    That is a good question. I would think there would come a tipping point where it is viewed as an Occupation as opposed to security. One thing that might be interesting to try is changing uniforms as the area becomes more secure. The MP's used to patrol downtown Fayetteville in Class A uniforms or Khakis when appropriate, NCO's would accompany them sometimes in Class A's called Courtesy Patrols. Point being as things become more secure maybe come out of Digital Alien Being suits.

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    Mike
    I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management
    To a point, but you must consider these against your objectives, if you consider them independently it is impossible to determine if the cost is worth it.

    Slapout,

    True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.
    Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).

    You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.

    The military needs a plain clothes division
    It's good to see some unconventional thinking going on. The Brits did this in a couple of conflicts (they took casualties, but the results were probably worth it, although how do you really measure the worth of a man's life?). However, your best plain clothes operatives are going to be your host nation folks, and ideally they'll be police or specially trained covert operatives. By all means we should facilitate this, the enemy should not sleep well at night, and when they walk the street at day they should be suspicious of everyone and each other. We want to install a deep fear, which will make them more receptive to other messages later.

    MikeF,
    When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.
    This is the million dollar question. If Special Forces are being employed correctly, they'll be participating in these patrols with local nationals in the lead. The larger hammer forces will be in close proximity to respond if they end up kicking a hornets' nest. However, if the HN forces are distrusted, and it is in our national interests, then our troops may have to do this.

    Every situation is different so the strategy must be adjusted to that particular situation based on a number of factors and our objectives.

  13. #53
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Slapout,



    Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).
    You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.



    Hi Bill, I highlighted some important points. I never understood the network theory as the military applies it so thanks for explaining it. What I find really strange is when Warden's Ring theory was first taught to LE on how to counter a drug organization(gang) one of the points that was driven home was don't try that kind of operation, you have to attack HVI+his finances+his hideouts and transport net+his distribution net,etc. all at the same time or as close to it as possible. Otherwise they will just lay low and regroup and retaliate.


    Second how you describe gaining popular support for Intelligence is a lot like retaking a high crime neighborhood. First they want tell you Sh....t but if you really show you are going to clean the place up and you are going to do it with respect to non criminal residents the Intel and cooperation will eventually come, but it can hard frustrating work to do it.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences.
    Bill,

    I agreed with your entire last post, but I wanted to address "the message." In the long run, the question is who is patrolling? If the US floods an area in mass, then there is a perception that we are in charge, and the locals expect us to be in charge and solve problems. IMO, that's one of the big things we missed when we invaded Iraq. The Iraqis expected us to fill the security vacuum in the wake of Saddam's removal, and we expected them to fill it. On the operational level, military leaders tried to fix massive, complex problems (electric grid in Baghdad, flow of oil, reinventing an Army and Police force, re-establishing national governance). On the local level, company commanders assumed responsibility for governance, economics, and security.

    Some will hand-wave my comment by stating it's a matter of expectation management, but IMO, that's discounting how the locals perceive us.

    If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide.

    I've summed this up with the phrase in small wars, sometimes less is more.

    Thoughts?

    Mike

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    Mike,

    Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.
    Starting off the same ole tired caveat this is simply my opinion, and that opinions should always be open to persuasive arguments, otherwise they become dogma

    Getting directly to your question, who is patrolling? Please look at the definition for Small Wars (from the SWJ homepage) above, and note the key adjectives inadequate and unsatisfactory. If the host nation security forces (assuming they exist) are inadequate and our government has determined (policy) it is in our national interests to pursue our objectives in country X militarily, then until the host nation forces are adequate and “willing” to carry on the fight, we may well have to do it (and are doing it). I’m not a big believer in getting involved in these types of conflicts unless it is absolutely necessary, so I think we have to assume that our government has made that determination (agree or disagree), so now we just need to do it.

    Ideally less is more, but the fallacy behind that assumption is due to the over touted through, by and with mantra. The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests. We’re assuming that employing a FID like response is always the best response to every Small War situation and that may not be the case.

    I agree with your comments on Iraq to a point, but for whatever reason we demobilized the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police were never a credible force under Saddam, so assuming that the Iraqi army would provide security in the first place, we still effectively took that option off the table.

    If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide
    .

    I agree with your statement, and would add that I have also stated that we should consider narrowing our objectives in some cases to punitive operations to deter future attacks, instead of engaging what some may label as imperial hubris. There are times when it is appropriate to occupy and rebuild, and times when it isn’t feasible (or worth the costs). I think we too often confuse hope and positive thinking with good strategy.

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Mike,

    Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.
    Starting off the same ole tired caveat this is simply my opinion, and that opinions should always be open to persuasive arguments, otherwise they become dogma
    Bill, I understand the definitions and the theory. I'm trying to merge the theory with my practice. Neither Iraq nor A'stan meets the criteria. The US conducted REGIME CHANGE. We completely changed the major stakeholders. Academics will one day argue that these examples are interventions in the post-colonial age and repressions of people's rebellion of UN sanctioned govt's.

    In the easiest example, I'd ask you to watch Red Dawn and tell me what type of patrol the Russians could have conducted to win Patrick Swayze and crew hearts and minds. What message should the Russian paratroopers send?

    Pat Lang has summed it up better than me in this recent post. I'd recommend reading the whole thing.

    Our war in Iraq is now cited as an example of the success of the COIN theory and its methods. In fact nothing of the sort occurred in Iraq. Remember – COIN = political reform + economic development + counter-guerilla operations. We have not brought on political reform in Iraq. What we have done is re-arrange the “players” in such a way that the formerly downtrodden Shia Arabs are now the masters. This has in no way reduced the potential for inter-communal armed struggle. We did not defeat the insurgents in counter guerrilla operations. What we did was bring more troops into the Baghdad area to enforce the separation of the ethno-sectarian communities while at the same time using traditional methods of “divide and conquer” to split off enough insurgents to form an effective force to use against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq and others whom we disapproved of. This is not counterinsurgency!!!

    Conclusion

    COIN is a badly flawed instrument of statecraft: Why?

    - The locals ultimately own the country being fought over. If they do not want the “reforms” you desire, they will resist you as we have been resisted in Iraq and Afghanistan. McChrystal’s strategy paper severely criticized Karzai’s government. Will that disapproval harden into a decision to act to find a better government or will we simply undercut Afghan central government and become the actual government?

    - Such COIN wars are expensive, long drawn out affairs that are deeply debilitating for the foreign counterinsurgent power. Reserves of money, soldiers and national will are not endless. Ultimately, the body politic of the counterinsurgent foreign power turns against the war and then all that has occurred has been a waste.

    - COIN theory is predicated on the ability of the counterinsurgents to change the mentality of the “protected” (read controlled) population. The sad truth is that most people do not want to be deprived of their ancestral ways and will fight to protect them. “Hearts and Minds” is an empty propagandist’s phrase.

    - In the end the foreign counterinsurgent is embarked on a war that is not his own war. For him, the COIN war will always be a limited war, fought for a limited time with limited resources. For the insurgent, the war is total war. They have no where to escape to after a tour of duty. The psychological difference is massive.

    - For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents.
    Going back to the Red Dawn example, the only thing the Russians could have done is kill off Swayze and the rebellion.

    I gotta squat/hold on the rest of your responses to consider them for a day. You made some good points.

    Mike
    Last edited by MikeF; 12-15-2009 at 06:24 AM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Idle thoughts from an idle mind...

    Bill Moore:
    We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity.

    ... the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).
    Seems to me the first quoted statment is correct but since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve...
    ... The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests.
    That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance. (LINK). I guess there are people who expect the world will be surrogates but I've never met any...

    Pat Lang via Mike F:
    " - For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents."
    I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

    Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Pat Lang via Mike F:[/B]I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

    Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...
    Ken and Bill,

    Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Ken and Bill,

    Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

    Mike
    Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.
    Steve,

    That's probably a good way to put it, and the gap is not that hard to combine IMO. For instance, during heavy manuevers when young PL's and CO's are practicing bounding, fire and manuever, and integrating CAS/AWT, we can incorporate more guerillas on the battlefield with IEDs.

    We can also test JCustis' approach of extending past the patrol base with small units conducting steady-state operations with the CO orchestrating it all. If we go that route, I'd suggest that we bulk up the CO level HQ. This type of training/test would allow us to gain a better calculation on risk management before deploying to the field.

    I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

    Mike

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