What is presence patrolling?

[Steve Blair]

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Mike

Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

[Bill Moore]

MikeF,

I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

I agree with many others that our COIN doctrine is probably flawed, since it frequently references COIN examples such as Algeria, Malaya and French Vietnam as examples, yet in all these cases these were nations defending their land, not providing aid to a foreign government. The French and British could establish the laws and enforce certain standards that we can’t in a true FID situation. Foreign assistance to a government with insurgency problems includes our support to Greece and El Salvador. Iraq and Afghanistan don’t come close to being an El Salvador or Greece. Do we have even have doctrine for a regime change? Where is the UN?

Posted by Ken reference head hunting:

since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve.

partially correct punch below the belt; however, as you well know from your days with the OSS during WWII and then with SF in Vietnam War that UW is only one of our SOF missions, and not one that SOCOM leadership embraced warmly during the early days of the conflict. Most folks are wiser now.

Posted by Ken,

That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance.

Your definition sounds like a simple flanking operation or other type of maneuver (that isn't a frontal assault). It is my impression that many are pushing SFA as "the" indirect approach. SFA is an important indirect means, but there is also the indirect approach, which implies you influence your enemy indirectly, perhaps by influencing the population in a village that has been providing him support to not support him. You can actually combine means and approach, but don't want to trip over mouse turds.

MikeF,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID).

That doesn't mean the Army shouldn't be flexible enough to provide security and support a wide range of other tasks has they have always done. You may not have time to train on everything, which is why educating our leaders is so critical. If the leadership is perceptive and capable of quickly grasping the situation on the ground and seeing what needs to be done, they can issue the appropriate orders and guidelines to the NCOs and junior officers to execute, and they'll get it done. Our guys and gals can do whatever you tell them to do, and IMO you will be hard pressed to identify any significant failures in OIF and OEF-A that were due to inadequate training at the junior level. Instead you have to look up the chain of command to start finding points of failure. Leadership is decisive.

[MikeF]

Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

Additionally, for the environment, one would probably have a civilian to enemy ratio of 10:1 although that's manpower intensive.

The two best training opportunies that I've experienced in CONUS were the Hurricane Katrina relief in 2005 and a JRTC rotation in spring 2006.

Katrina forced the squadron to suspend close with and destroy for a bit to interact with people, help secure a city, provide humanitarian assistance, assess the damage, and coordinate for restoration of essential services.

In 2006 at JRTC, we received permission to covertly infiltrate into the box 24 hours prior to the start of operations b/c we were testing out the light RSTA concept. We spent 80% of the rotation outside the FOB, and our successes and limitations learned during that tour helped us translate that into a campaign plan and execution in Iraq.

Mike

[slapout9]

good article on this subject from John Robb's Global Guerrilla's.

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/...-armor-art.pdf

[Ken White]

MikeF:

Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

Every war is an anomaly. No two will be alike.

Train for the big stuff; it is easy to adapt down to the slower tempo and lower combat capability demand of small wars, it is not nearly as easy to adapt upwards.

Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Not tough at all. Easy to take a mobile element and make it static, not much training required; all you have to do is gear it down -- and that's pure leadership. OTOH, taking a static element and trying to make it mobile requires different equipment and training as well as even better leadership...

Bill Moore:

partially correct punch below the belt; however, as you well know from your days with the OSS during WWII and then with SF in Vietnam War that UW is only one of our SOF missions, and not one that SOCOM leadership embraced warmly during the early days of the conflict. Most folks are wiser now.

In order: Not partial, wholly; they told me never to fight fair ; agreed; agree -- but there are still some who are overly DA oriented...

It is my impression that many are pushing SFA as "the" indirect approach.

Agree but they're dumb enough to ignore.

Indirect approach / asymmetric warfare -- all same thing, get thar fustest with mostest, hit em where they ain't, punch below the belt,

[Pete]

If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB. That's what your combat trains are for, but after six years of FOB life, we've lost that skill to a great degree.

To what extent do guys here think that the FOB mentality is an inheritance from peace-keeping in the Balkans? These ideas of "Force Protection" somehow became mingled with tactics and became "the way we've always done it." It seems to me to be the absolute antithesis of infantry tactics to spend one's nights on an FOB and commute to war in vehicles using the same routes day after day.

[jcustis]

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

the battalion commander might not always have control, but he always retains command, and if you could deploy his Jump CP and not let it just become some goofy PSD, he can still control considerable chunks of battlespace with the right equipment task organized to it. The Main CP retains the most control, because that is where it is "plugged in" to higher headquarters. We have gotten so burdened with data pathways that it seems very foreign to HHQ to have to pick up a handset to a satcom radio in order to have a chat. I mean that in all seriousness. Sure, it was just 4-5 yrs ago when satcom was a vital lifeline that was utilized a lot, but there has been a perceptible shift. Soooo...we'd have to take a couple of steps back, from the BDE to Regt level and have everyone power down a bit in order to make the "stay afield" bit work across a larger AO, but it's not like we're making water here.

[MikeF]

I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

Concur. I gave an overstated/simplified example. I am still a bit grumpy that Army has gone ten quarters without scoring a touchdown against Navy.

USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID). emphasis mine

An important distinction. I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

[slapout9]

I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

Didn't we used to do that with HIC,MIC,LIC? So a PHD in war is an officer that can HIC em,MIC em, and finally LIC em

[jcustis]

A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/m...s/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?

Lance Cpl. Luke McDonell, a rifleman with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, scans the tree line during a security halt while patrolling the area of Now Zad, Afghanistan, known as "The Greens," on December 9th, 2009. The Marines cleared the area as part of Operation Cobra's Anger, an operation aimed at removing the Taliban's stronghold of the area. McDonnell is a 28-year-old from Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.
HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan - Once an urban district and home to thousands, "The Greens," an area within the Now Zad region of Afghanistan quickly became a ghost town, when Taliban fighters procured the area from which to launch combat operations.

With the Taliban in control and the civilian population gone, the area's alleyways were quickly laced with improvised explosive devices, its orchard's filled with bunkers and fortified fighting positions, and its adobe homes stocked with weapons caches and enemy fighters.

While few coalition units have dared to enter The Greens, the Marines and sailors of Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, did exactly that Dec. 8-9 as part of Operation Cobra's Anger.

The Marines of Lima Co. moved swiftly to clear compounds, homes, alleyways and orchards, and it quickly became clear the Taliban had become complacent in the safety they believed The Greens provided them and were unprepared to deal with such an assault.

"We went in there for our first time and there wasn't anybody occupying the area, but we did find a lot IED making facilities, [homemade explosives], pressure plates and stuff like that," said Lance Cpl. Stewart Heim, 20, a rifleman with Lima Co. "It definitely showed us the Taliban were occupying [the Greens], and using it as a centralized place between towns."

Lima Co. also confiscated illegal drugs, Taliban propaganda and uncovered tunnel systems used by enemy fighters.

"We found their tunnel systems which pretty much run throughout the whole Greens," said Heim, a native of Staunton, Ill. "So we've definitely seen that they have the capability to survive us dropping bombs on them."

Lima Co. came to the area expecting their Taliban rivals to defend the ground they've controlled for many months. With the Marines rapidly chipping away at Taliban caches and exposing fighting positions, an attack by Taliban forces to save what supplies remained, seemed even more imminent.

"Walking through The Greens was kind of iffy. You didn't know where you wanted to step, where to step, where not to step. You never knew what to expect around a corner," said Lance Cpl. Michael R. Evans, 19, a combat engineer attached to Lima Co., 3/4. "You'd open up a door and might see a chicken or a dog and it would surprise you since you knew there was nothing out there."

Enemy fighters chose not to engage the Marines and instead left the dirty work for the many IED's positioned throughout the area.

While the IED's were numerous, the Marines' sharp eyes, training and metal detectors were able to locate all devices encountered before they could inflict casualties.

"We found them the way we should find them, instead of having someone stepping on them and having to be [medically evacuated]," said Evans, from McKenzie, Tenn.

The Marines continued to push farther into the area, destroying IED's along the way, gathering information and slowly but surely, breaking the Taliban's reign over the area.

After two days of defying Taliban threats and venturing farther and farther into the area, the Marines returned to friendly lines to refit and resupply.

While many alleyways in the area remain to be negotiated, the Marines set an example for Afghan national security forces and coalition forces to follow, and energized the mission to rid Now Zad of Taliban influence and return it to the Afghan people.

http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news...w.php&id=32271

NOW ZAD, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan conducted a major combat operation against insurgent forces in Now Zad, Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 3.

The Marines of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan, struck well-known enemy locations identified within and near the insurgent-infested Now Zad District center.

"Now Zad's District center is kind of a unique place in Afghanistan because there is no local civilian population," said 1st Lt. Mike H. Buonocore, the executive officer of Co. L.

"Company L was reinforced by engineers, aviation support from the aviation combat element, rocket artillery support from SPMAGTF-A's Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, Air Force and Navy aviation assets and Army rocket artillery support. During the combat operation, the Co. L Marines targeted positively identified enemy positions where insurgent attacks have originated from over the past several months. Other locations were identified with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

The two major components involved in the operation were a ground force and an aerial assault. Enemy targets were destroyed by combined fires from rocket artillery, aircraft, mortars and ground troops.

"The mission took some enemy forces out of the fight and showed them how much force we have with us and what we can use against them," said Cpl. Andrew C. Conte, a squad leader with the ground assault element. "It really cleared out some of the areas we were having troubles in."

The ground scheme of maneuver employed Co. L as the main effort by conducting a raid on a known enemy position, while other Marines held blocking positions to ensure insurgent reinforcements were denied freedom of movement and the opportunity to engage the Marine forces.

Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and Btry. D, 2/14's high mobility artillery rocket system set conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets.

"Once the bombs started dropping there wasn't too much movement," said Conte. "With all the ground forces out there and everything we had overhead, it was calm because we knew nothing was going to touch us."

Additional munitions were called in on other known enemy positions to ensure the raid force was successful. Upon initial disruption of the enemy locations, the assault element moved in and conducted thorough site exploitation.

"We were able to engage some enemy targets before they engaged us," said Cpl. Taylor E. Vogel, a forward observer with the 81 mm mortar platoon. "We were able to drop mortars on [enemy] fire teams that were moving in on [Marine] units. We definitely achieved what we wanted to. We destroyed the big targets that have been occupied by enemy forces."

Leading up to the operation, the Marines had proactively conducted combat operations in Now Zad's District center daily in order to shape the battlefield by moving insurgents into disposable positions. Marines took precaution by using leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of danger in the area, which helped create agreeable conditions that would result in little or no collateral damage.

"Throughout the winter in Afghanistan, you hear about the [insurgent] spring offensive," said Conte. "We caught them before they caught us in the spring offensive, and we set the tone of it with showing how much [firepower] we have and what we can use."

Insurgents attempted to counter the Marines' strike on Now Zad with improvised explosive devices, mortars, small-arms fire and two rockets that were fired overhead with no success. Unwavering, the Marines positively identified and pursued their targets.

"The operation was a tremendous success on all levels," said Buonocore. "The confirmed battle damage assessment is pretty significant. There were no civilian casualties, and nothing was hit that wasn't a target. We have achieved tremendous success here against the enemy."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...963946120.html

NOW ZAD, Afghanistan

In a war over hearts and minds, Now Zad has neither.

Abandoned by its residents, this mud-brick ghost town is a corner of Afghanistan that might be forever Flanders. There are no schools being painted, no roads paved, no clinics built. There is no Afghan army, no Afghan government at all. In Now Zad, there is just one company of U.S. Marines slugging it out across no man’s land with equally determined militants. From their entrenched lines, neither side is strong enough to prevail.

On patrol this month, Sgt. Tucker Strom, a 26-year-old squad leader from Tallahassee, Fla., lifted his head just high enough above a mud wall to glimpse the Taliban front line across 500 yards of neglected pomegranate orchards. “They’re right there,” Sgt. Strom told a newly arrived Marine. “This is what it turns into—us watching them, them watching us.”

[davidbfpo]

Posted by JCustis:

A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/m...s/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?

Jon,

It appears that you too (USA, USMC plus) are repeating what the UK has done since 2006 in Helmand "mowing the grass". Other items cite the UK fighting over the same piece of land six times.

I suppose if the people have fled then there is no population to protect.

[William F. Owen]

Yes indeed this 'type' of patrol has appeared since my time. We had reservists, policemen and other odds and sods who escorted civilian specialists to visit villages etc, so perhaps it was an escort patrol of sorts. Not a task for any self respecting soldier... in any war.

Done by the British Army for well over 300 years.
It was never called a "presence" patrol, but patrolling in as part of security operations is normal military activity. It is nothing new. The Romans did it.

Now I do not doubt that today, some armies do it very badly. That is not a reason not to do it well, and in general terms there is usually an operational demand for it.

Actually escorting civilians requires considerable skill and training. The death of Paula Lloyd is worth studying in that regard, as are many other incidents.

[Infanteer]

I don't understand where the sentiment that "presence patrolling" is counter-productive to effective warfighting.

When we went out, all patrols were treated as an advance to contact and concepts such as good positions for fire and bounding overwatch (or, doctrinally, mutual support) were always employed. At night, for ambushes and OPs, good patrol discipline and deception were utilized as best possible. Orders were given and rehearsals and actions on were conducted.

In the conduct of the patrol, patrol discipline was maintained while the patrol's posture reflected the environment - sneaking around with camouflage and leopard crawling in the day would likely get one laughed at by the legion of kids that would descend on your "warfighting" patrol; generally, when the insurgents aren't active there are people everywhere in Southern Afghanistan. Most of the effective intelligence was gathered by being overt and talking to people as opposed to being covert and looking for AVF markings. Just because we do one doesn't mean we flush the other.

All our patrolling was exercised just how we learned it - fighting against templated Eastern Bloc foes in the prairies of Canada.

Anyways, sorry for the tangent, but I don't buy Fuchs point about counterproductive tactics in Afghanistan (unless leadership lets it) - but I do buy his theory of too much weight is no good.

[Chris jM]

I don't understand where the sentiment that "presence patrolling" is counter-productive to effective warfighting.

When we went out, all patrols were treated as an advance to contact and concepts such as good positions for fire and bounding overwatch (or, doctrinally, mutual support) were always employed. At night, for ambushes and OPs, good patrol discipline and deception were utilized as best possible. Orders were given and rehearsals and actions on were conducted...

By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area. That can allow for units to achieve their task without actually effecting the enemy, terrain or civil population. Presence is very important but it shouldn't be a task as such. Clear an area, screen an area, guard an area/ feature, interdict eny infiltration, conduct a meeting - these are all tasks that involve ones' presence as a prerequisite of success, granted, but the actual task should be focussed on achieving an effect. If you want to dominate a route by overtly sitting on a hill and watching who moves along it, good for you. But the mission shouldn't be 'sit somewhere and be seen' as presence patrolling implies.

I'm not saying your patrolling was ineffective - your unit was obviously professional enough to patrol effectively regardless of the lack of direction inherent to a presence patrol and commanders no doubt decided upon an effect they wanted to have upon the enemy/ civilians/ terrain. However 'presence' in my opinion is bad practice and incompetence can be defended under its guise.

Kiwigrunt - Agreed.

[William F. Owen]

By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.

OK, drifting well off topic here - time for a new one?

I agree. I have no idea where the idea came from, in terms of "just being there." It was and is always was part of the conduct of security operations, and, in terms of the UK, the primary mission of the patrol was never related to "being present."

Like many apparently simple military things, there are clearly many who do not get it. Myself and an extremely experienced British Army Major (11 tours in NI!) tried explaining this to the Royal Thai Army at their COIN seminar. By the questions that followed, some clearly didn't get it. Translation may have been as issue, but only partly. I have seen the same short fall with others.

[Infanteer]

By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.

Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols and when I gave orders for the patrol, I included any area, route or point objectives. The task was to conduct an area/route/point recce.

[Ken White]

otherwise tasked (raid, ambush, snatch, meeting, etc.) always a reconnaissance patrol. It is in fact a reconnaissance and presence patrol or operation as well even if a 'combat' mission is the stated purpose. Information gathering plus area (area, not spot...) knowledge and dominance are combat constants, or should be. That applies in conventional and irregular warfare.

Conversely, a reconnaissance patrol is not universally a presence patrol -- but it is simply that as often or more than not.

Add to that, 'everything is training is everything.' Training does not cease in combat, it should in fact intensify.

Take it a step further -- most irregular forces and many conventional forces will not attack people that look and act like they know what they're doing. Why take on a competent force when you can wait a bit and get another unit that wanders along in a chattering gaggle, is unaware of what goes on around them and is not prepared to fight as if they know how to do so...

[JMA]

Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols...

What exactly were you reconnoitering?

[JMA]

I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.

Based on the following definition of a presence patrol I agree: "a patrol conducted for the purpose of reminding people that there is a military presence in the area" (source)

Can't find anything online about Brit doctrine but found this on the US: "Presence patrols conduct a special form of reconnaissance, normally during stability or civil support operations."

From FM 3-21.8

Presence Patrols

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations. It has many purposes, but should always see and be seen, but seen in a specific manner determined by the commander. Its primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO. To do this, the patrol gathers critical (as determined by the commander) information, both specific and general. The patrol seeks out this information, and then observes and reports. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent.

9-137. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of the U.S. forces. Presence patrols are intended to clearly demonstrate the determination, competency, confidence, concern, and when appropriate, the overwhelming power of the force to all who observe it, including local and national media.

9-138. The commander always plans for the possibility that a presence patrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent. Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol where enemy contact is likely. Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operations such as peace operations, humanitarian and civic assistance, non-combatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending out a presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader.

9-139. To accomplish the “to be seen” part of its purpose, a presence patrol reconnoiters overtly. It takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are all part of that impression. When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it; not only for hard information, but also for the patrol leader's impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to see to modify the actions of subsequent patrols.

Emphasis mine.

It seems obvious that the presence patrol has been all "dressed up" to replace patrol activity which would be generated if there was any real intel flowing or there was the prerequisite skills level for small teams to locate the Taliban as a prelude to offensive action. The plot has been lost.

By all means send militias and auxiliary forces to escort government officials, census takers, veterinarians, water engineers etc etc but don't use "proper" soldiers for this time wasting activity unless you want to hide one or two men in with the militia to physically recce a route for later infiltration.

[JMA]

Maybe the last few posts should pop over to this thread. A lot has been discussed there.

You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.

Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.