What is presence patrolling?

[davidbfpo]

I opened this thread months ago, as the issue of presence patrolling appeared on another thread and as an "armchair" observer have kept out of the debate.

I am mindful that non-military posters, even those with historical experience are hampered in commenting upon practical presence patrolling for such reasons as OPSEC and relying on open sources.

This thread has once again focussed on the UK campaign in Afghanistan, when there is a separate thread. IMHO as a patient moderator that is where many of the recent posts belong. I have not moved these recent posts.

[Chris jM]

The term "presence patrols" teeters on the moronic, and it seems to appear in one obscure US manual.

This is the point I have been grasping for all along but still struggle to realise and articulate clearly. I have no problems with patrolling, nor with presence patrolling. I just have concerns with presence patrolling being raised as an objective to be attained or a task to be conducted.

It may be those things at some time in some places.
If you find yourself writing down Apache Close Air Support Frequency and have a JFAC tagging along, then I submit the words "stability" and "civil support" do not need to be used.
If you find yourself standing outside a shop in Antrim, while an RUC officers buys more cigarettes, then things will be slightly different again. Context, context and context.

Absolutely. However at some point we have to hang our hats on generalisations in order to create and enact solutions and an organisational response. Context is everything, agreed - we need to understand the problem as it stands and not fight 'the war we want to fight'. If applying the prism of COIN or SASO to parts of Afghanistan assist us in creating and enacting workable campaign plans then it's worthwhile.

To quote my wife, "You don't ride your donkey on the highway."

I don't want to get in an argument with Mrs Owen, but she obviously hasn't been to Afghanistan. There, they do indeed ride donkeys on their highways! And camels, and horses, and weird goat/sheep hybrid things come to think of it!

Nail on the head again Chris.

I suggest that the question be asked as to why this virtual peacekeeping activity - presence patrols has assumed such importance is that the ISAF forces are fresh out of ideas...

Essential background reading to see where things went wrong in Helmand to the point where now some monster called presence patrols has become the order of the day.

We may be in agreement in part, however I can't agree with your conclusions as a whole. Staying with the presence patrol issue:

I see presence patrolling as a correct course of action borne out of an improper/ imperfect understanding of the subject. Thus I see it as dangerous as, if we are doing the right thing for the wrong reason, we may try it elsewhere and get it wrong because we didn't understand why we did it in the first place. If we understand why we do it and why it works, we will have more success in future knowing when and where to employ the correct patrolling TTPs.

Your perspective, as I read it, is that presence patrolling is an incorrect course of action borne out of an incorrect understanding of the subject at hand.

[William F. Owen]

Context is everything, agreed - we need to understand the problem as it stands and not fight 'the war we want to fight'. If applying the prism of COIN or SASO to parts of Afghanistan assist us in creating and enacting workable campaign plans then it's worthwhile.

The problem then is training and doctrine, crippled by poor vocabulary and definitions. Get that sorted out and all else follows. The current problems are far more to do with "The Strategy" - than the "tactics." Patrol Operations have to ensure that the Strategy is delivered by the tactics.

I don't want to get in an argument with Mrs Owen, but she obviously hasn't been to Afghanistan. There, they do indeed ride donkeys on their highways! And camels, and horses, and weird goat/sheep hybrid things come to think of it!

Well aware. By "Highway" my wife means "motorway" or "Interstate." Having said that, I cannot actually ride a donkey, but she can.

[JMA]

It appears that there is no agreement on what a presence patrol is.

There is but one definition available, a US one, which does not seem to fit what is happening on the ground.

It may be more productive to discuss patrolling methodology and the success or otherwise in a new thread. This would, however, be counter productive if there is no stomach for robust discussion on the issue.

[Infanteer]

Okay - to start.

Patrol is going to do something without the intention of staying.

Anyone have anything more simple than that?

[William F. Owen]

Very happy to discuss generic "Patrol Operations," but we have better give it a pretty sensible context, or else it just becomes a collection of "tips and tricks."

[Rex Brynen]

This caught my eye, from the Rolling Stones piece on McChrystal:

One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.

Go to it, JMA

[JMA]

This caught my eye, from the Rolling Stones piece on McChrystal:

Go to it, JMA

Rex, this Rolling Stone article might just herald the end of McChrystal. Big news over here on in the UK (via satellite TV) and on CNN. On the carpet tomorrow I believe.

Just when we needed stability.

[William F. Owen]

One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.

Wow.... who knew doing stupid stuff was ... well stupid. Welcome to the flow down effects of wooly thinking.

[Infanteer]

One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.

To paraphrase - give a region to the enemy if he contests it.

This seems to take counter-insurgency junk theory to its limit. Military direction like this seems to rely on some sort of deus ex machina to solve the problem of militant irregulars.

I know COP JFM and the area very well. You can't leave the door there without moving into an area that would require defence using lethal force. Thus, to follow this directive, they would have to withdraw from the area.

[JMA]

To paraphrase - give a region to the enemy if he contests it.

This seems to take counter-insurgency junk theory to its limit. Military direction like this seems to rely on some sort of deus ex machina to solve the problem of militant irregulars.

Junk theory? I can't understand what the difficulty in understanding is. What phase of insurgency would you class Afghanistan? The strategy and tactics needed are to combat guerrilla warfare. Not rocket science if you have the resources, (manpower and funding).

I know COP JFM and the area very well. You can't leave the door there without moving into an area that would require defence using lethal force. Thus, to follow this directive, they would have to withdraw from the area.

Maybe that's the best option. I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified. So yes under these circumstances better to withdraw from the area.

Now take Helmand and figure out where the troops should be. Where is the vital ground (VG)? Which is the ground of tactical importance (GTI)? Question answered. Oh yes... and get rid of the poppies... all of the poppies!

[Ken White]

...Not rocket science if you have the resources, (manpower and funding).

are known and shared by the troops that are there and have been there. Unfortunately, they are severely constrained by Politicians and policy makers on those two major issues you cite as well as on the rules they must follow. That and the very significant terrain difference which you also tend to ignore lead to some odd conclusions on your part. For example:

I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified.

What's classified? I get several e-mails a day from a US DoD automated system that gives me the daily casualty reports. Anyone in the US can sign up for it, don't know about overseas. While the opponents have an obvious desire and need to conceal their losses and while truly accurate data on those losses is difficult to obtain, the news media have numerous tales, some specious but a thread is detectable -- they get pounded pretty heavily in most contacts.

Then there are these: LINK. LINK,and you can sort through these LINKS. It might aid the discussion if you were to do your own research and avoid asking leading questions in what appear to generally be an attempt to imply malfeasance or worse on the part of westerners in Afghanistan. If you believe 'we' shouldn't be there, then you and I can agree -- unfortunately, 'we' are there. That's reality. So is the fact that the combat effort there is severely constrained on political grounds. I don't agree with that either but it is not going to change.

So yes under these circumstances better to withdraw from the area.

Sometimes can sometimes not for both tactical and political reasons.

Where is the vital ground (VG)? Which is the ground of tactical importance (GTI)? Question answered.

Is it the right question? Given the lack of adequate troop strength, given the nature of the conflict and given the terrain involved, I think not. I agree with your contention that the basics are very important -- but that's a little too basic...

There's more to it than terrain

Oh yes... and get rid of the poppies... all of the poppies!

Far easier said than done.

[JMA]

are known and shared by the troops that are there and have been there. Unfortunately, they are severely constrained by Politicians and policy makers on those two major issues you cite as well as on the rules they must follow. That and the very significant terrain difference which you also tend to ignore lead to some odd conclusions on your part.

I ignore terrain? You got the wrong guy Ken.

I maintain the more time spent in-country the better the understanding of the terrain, the climate, the people and their culture etc etc. In other words continuity.

For example:What's classified? I get several e-mails a day from a US DoD automated system that gives me the daily casualty reports. Anyone in the US can sign up for it, don't know about overseas. While the opponents have an obvious desire and need to conceal their losses and while truly accurate data on those losses is difficult to obtain, the news media have numerous tales, some specious but a thread is detectable -- they get pounded pretty heavily in most contacts.

ISAF force causalities are not classified I know that andi suppose they are close to being 100% accurate.

It is the Taliban casualties that I talking about. What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released.

It might aid the discussion if you were to do your own research and avoid asking leading questions in what appear to generally be an attempt to imply malfeasance or worse on the part of westerners in Afghanistan.

It is natural that where the facts are embarrassing these facts would not be released. We might even hear that they don't want to release Taliban casualties to avoid alarming the Muslim world. I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.

If you believe 'we' shouldn't be there, then you and I can agree -- unfortunately, 'we' are there. That's reality. So is the fact that the combat effort there is severely constrained on political grounds. I don't agree with that either but it is not going to change.Sometimes can sometimes not for both tactical and political reasons.Is it the right question? Given the lack of adequate troop strength, given the nature of the conflict and given the terrain involved, I think not. I agree with your contention that the basics are very important -- but that's a little too basic...

There's more to it than terrain. Far easier said than done.

War is never easy, but may become impossible to conduct under a certain level of political restraints. When that point is reached the lives of soldiers are being meaninglessly squandered.

However, I don't see all the tactical issues on the ground being all as a result of the political issues. You yourself have commented on a photo where the most basic tactics are appalling. This more widespread than one would like to admit.

As far as the poppies are concerned I find it quite frankly hilarious that the US is arguing to allow the locals to grow a crop which when processed will kill many thousands of western kids. Actually its not hilarious, its damn sad.

You need to give these relics from the stone age the message that by growing this you are killing our children. If you attempt to carry on you will see what you will see... (no one has the balls to deal with that have they?)

[William F. Owen]

I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.

Again, you are just out of touch with the subject and/or poorly informed. Back in January I spoke at a UK School of Infantry seminar, where figures of Taliban KIA were openly discussed. Ratios >100:1 were mentioned, based on theatre experience. The issues remain around verification - go and read the "body count" thread.

This more widespread than one would like to admit.

How do you know, and are you actually well informed enough to pass comment?

[Red Rat]

I hear the same ratios as Wilf (unsurprisingly!).

There is an issue over verification. There are also issues in terms of campaign ethos, presentational and political issues and security over putting out a body count:

1) It smacks of Vietnam and measuring success in terms of body count. we may argue over the good/not so good ways of pursuing a COIN campaign, but in this campaign I understand that HQ ISAF do not regard a body count metric as very useful measure of success and so it is not publicised. I am not sure what HQ ISAF is currently using as a metric of success, but I suspect they would rather focus on areas where there is little violence.

2) Anything that smacks of likening this campaign to Vietnam presents huge political challenges to the domestic audience in a campagin that is increasingly seen as unwinnable.

3) publication of a large body count may have the same impact as the attack on the US embassy in the Tet offensive had on US public opinion or the CIMIC House saga had on UK public opinion. what was seen as a campaign under control was seen in both instances (rightly or wrongly) as a campaign out of control.

4) While verification is difficult on a security side we do not want the other side to know what we know. Also we do not want to upset worldwide sensibilities and start a surge of would be shaheed coming to Afghanistan.

I would be surprised if UNAMA and ANSO do not publish estimated figures, certainly I know of several security consultancies who track these metrics and will release them - for a sum!

[Infanteer]

Judging by the Afghan's ability to police up the battlefield, I'd be hesitant to accept any claim at a body count.

[JMA]

Again, you are just out of touch with the subject and/or poorly informed. Back in January I spoke at a UK School of Infantry seminar, where figures of Taliban KIA were openly discussed. Ratios >100:1 were mentioned, based on theatre experience. The issues remain around verification - go and read the "body count" thread.

How do you know, and are you actually well informed enough to pass comment?

Mentioned or verified?

Read and participated in the 'Body Counts and Metrics' thread nothing mentioned as to specifics of the Taliban KIA, captured etc. Wonder why?

[William F. Owen]

Mentioned or verified?

Read and participated in the 'Body Counts and Metrics' thread nothing mentioned as to specifics of the Taliban KIA, captured etc. Wonder why?

As I said, "mentioned." - see Red Rats post. As I said, "verification" remains an issue. If you do not have verification procedures in place, then you are dependant on estimates.

[Ken White]

I ignore terrain? You got the wrong guy Ken.

Not at all. You consistently go on about 'open ground.' What you say makes sense at platoon level in a location with mixed vegetation. It cannot apply in Afghanistan on the operational level due to the vast stretches of open terrain that must be used or crossed to get from one place to another.

...In other words continuity.

All true -- also not possible as you couch it for a variety of reasons, mostly UK/US/Other western nation domestic political.

It is the Taliban casualties that I talking about. What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released.

How can it be released if it is not known. Estimates could be released but the forces are leery of releasing an estimate that some media source disproves or challenges in a war that is essentially and effectively a media or information war. You also appear to discount the US' bad experience with the Viet Nam body count. The number killed actually proves little in any event.

I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.

Unsurprising. You have a number of strange 'beliefs.' Other disagree. You also make use of 'we' a great bit. Not a good idea to include others in arguable comments because as a reader on this board, I become a a part of that 'we' and I think that's a very specious statement. So 'we' cannot say that at all.

War is never easy, but may become impossible to conduct under a certain level of political restraints. When that point is reached the lives of soldiers are being meaninglessly squandered.

Brilliant statement!!! Great insight. We can all agree with that. I strongly doubt anyone on this board disagrees with that. Umm, good. Now, what do you propose we do about it?

You might also recall that a number of folks here agree with that but are still serving and have no choice but to go to the squandering in Afghanistan, that they do so without complaint and wonder why you -- who have not gone and are not going -- continually carp and complain to no effect about things neither they or you can change. Most of your complaints, some of which are valid, are with the political direction of this war. Few of those directing it will read anything here and the likelihood of any that do paying you much mind is quite slim. So all you often do is penalize others on the board and wrongly charge them with malfeasance or incompetence all too often. Thus, if your intent is to be a gadfly in the principal definition of the term, you're succeeding.

...You yourself have commented on a photo where the most basic tactics are appalling. This more widespread than one would like to admit.

Huh. Sure. I commented on it and have repeatedly done so, yet one doesn't like to admit it? Your statement contradicts itself, a not unheard of phenomenon.

As far as the poppies are concerned I find it quite frankly hilarious that the US is arguing to allow the locals to grow a crop which when processed will kill many thousands of western kids. Actually its not hilarious, its damn sad.

What is hilarious is your continuing mis or disinformation. The basic problem is that we could easily eradicate the poppies but that leaves more farmers without a viable crop and the environmental impact would be long lasting. There is on going discussion here about the policy, many here are as unhappy as you and the DEA who were scuffing up big dealers and labs is still pressing on. Policy is in flux; this a a US domestic political battle between left and right. The US is a center right nation, the current Administration is center left. Things change, we'll see how long the 'allow the farmers to grow Poppies' bit lasts.

You need to give these relics from the stone age the message that by growing this you are killing our children. If you attempt to carry on you will see what you will see... (no one has the balls to deal with that have they?)

Uh, no, no one apparently does in this day and age -- except for random marginally informed posters on discussion boards who have seem to have a collection of gripes and sour grapes but no responsibility for actually doing anything.

[JMA]

I hear the same ratios as Wilf (unsurprisingly!).

There is an issue over verification. There are also issues in terms of campaign ethos, presentational and political issues and security over putting out a body count:

1) It smacks of Vietnam and measuring success in terms of body count. we may argue over the good/not so good ways of pursuing a COIN campaign, but in this campaign I understand that HQ ISAF do not regard a body count metric as very useful measure of success and so it is not publicised. I am not sure what HQ ISAF is currently using as a metric of success, but I suspect they would rather focus on areas where there is little violence.

2) Anything that smacks of likening this campaign to Vietnam presents huge political challenges to the domestic audience in a campagin that is increasingly seen as unwinnable.

3) publication of a large body count may have the same impact as the attack on the US embassy in the Tet offensive had on US public opinion or the CIMIC House saga had on UK public opinion. what was seen as a campaign under control was seen in both instances (rightly or wrongly) as a campaign out of control.

4) While verification is difficult on a security side we do not want the other side to know what we know. Also we do not want to upset worldwide sensibilities and start a surge of would be shaheed coming to Afghanistan.

I would be surprised if UNAMA and ANSO do not publish estimated figures, certainly I know of several security consultancies who track these metrics and will release them - for a sum!

Good reply (I'm guessing you must have done some time at the MoD or Foreign office?

Found this Request for Information on the Net.

Sadly in this reply the MoD are trying to sell a line of crap when they say "There is also no reliable method to calculate the number of insurgents killed."

There is... you physically count the bodies and the weapons and if you have put in an airstrike you count heads and weapon barrels. Then you can verify 10 bodies and say 9 weapons (and then leave it to others to speculate what the 10th guy was doing there.) Body plus weapon = one gook. Verified by mark-one eyeball.

But... say you come under fire from an estimated 10 gooks from a tree line 300m away and call in an airstrike. The airstrike silences the firing but you don't sweep through and clear the area then YES you would have no idea of how many kills if any.

So what are we saying here? The actually verifiable kills may not be as good as some would like?