Anglo-US friction over ops in Iraq

[Hacksaw]

Ever wonder if they told you that, so you'd be willing to take the blame when they mess up?

Rank amateur...

The mentoring I was referring to came from senior officers I respected...

I never once regretted the approach...

Once folks understand you are willing to step in front of the bus for them, they tend to work real hard so that it wasn't necessary (and when it was - they usually jumped to take responsibility for their actions)...

All this is not to say that an offending Soldier/NCO was not disciplined for doing stupid stuff, just that the vast majority of stuff can be handled internal to the unit (if properly led), and owning failings in your unit while informing CDR how you were going to mitigate the same failing again is usually gratefully embraced by leaders who are too often surrounded by "leaders" unwilling to own/police their responsibilities...

PJW,

You stated far more briefly and coherently what I intended to do so earlier... Why the "need" to set the record straight, those were his words...

Thanks,

Live well and row

[SPWilson]

Maybe that was his view of things. I was in Charge of the Knights with my Iraqi NP battalion and know what I saw in Basra.

1. If the UK at the COB knew anything about the operation it is a surprise. Any attempt to pull SA prior to the mission was blocked or deflected with "we do not know what you are talking about." Even after the operation, coordination with any UK elements (aside from those at Basra Palace) was non-existant.

2. Its a great plan to put the Iraqis in the lead, but you can't throw them into the fire. My battalion could do independent operations and from time to time did, but not without our guidance and assistance. The U.S. developed a plan to develop and mentor the ISF which contrary to some professional opinions has been successful. It was only after the fact (after CoTK) did the British establish MiTTs in Basra. If they existed prior to the operation it was news to me.

3. You can argue all you want on how the UK pullout of Basra was not a retreat or say it was done to remove an impasse/ solve problems, etc, but the bottom line was that it is viewed as a retreat in the face of mounting pressure. It created a vacuum that allowed the JAM and Iran to move in. I lived at Basra Palace for 9 months, I saw the mortared living areas and carnage. Political necessity to keep the casaulties low and let the Iraqis figure things out was what lead to Basra's loss to JAM and Iran. To further strengthen my point,. look at the FP guidelines at the COB (the most stringent I have seen) and designed IMO to prevent casualties for political reasons.

4. No Iraqi commander in Basra holds a favorable opinion of the British. Im sorry to report the truth, but every Iraqi officer (some very senior) have an unfavorable opinion of the British they worked with. If British operations there were so successful prior to CotK, then why this attitude?

In the end it is for the MoD to anayze what worked or failed in Basra. Obviously I can speak to only what I saw in 2008 and through conversations about what happened previously.

I am not trying to point fingers b/c it really doesn't matter now. The UK and Austrailian forces I met in Basra were largely professional and had a great warrior ethos. Some I felt were less than stellar and simply marking time until they finished their tour.

Note:
I do not mean to sound brash or insulting, just my opinions and observations.