Anglo-US friction over ops in Iraq

[Hacksaw]

I should offer a disclaimer first, I am a UK apologist. I spent time at CENTCOM following 9/11... My association with UK officers/NCOs through GO was nothing but rewarding, and I defend UK at almost every opportunity...

However... I find very few things more distasteful than a senior officer going on the speech/book trail to "set the record straight". The US is certainly not immune to such behavior, in fact we seem to be a world leader in that as well...

I just don't think this an intellectually honest assessment of UK performance in the South/Basra, but then again the US has had its share of "odd interpreatation" of combat operations in Iraq itself (I can think of a briefing regarding the performance of rotary wing a/c in OIF I that was a particular affront to anyone's sense of reality).

I just wish these senior officers would stand up offer praise to Soldiers when and where warranted, and accept responsibility for the rest. Way back in the day as I was being mentored I was taught that an officer accepts responsibility for all under his command and passes accolades to his subordinates/Soldiers (e.g. 2LT your platoon really kicked @ss in that STX lane - sir I'll inform the men)

Soldiers deserve better...

Live well and row

[Tom Odom]

I should offer a disclaimer first, I am a UK apologist. I spent time at CENTCOM following 9/11... My association with UK officers/NCOs through GO was nothing but rewarding, and I defend UK at almost every opportunity...

However... I find very few things more distasteful than a senior officer going on the speech/book trail to "set the record straight". The US is certainly not immune to such behavior, in fact we seem to be a world leader in that as well...

I just don't think this an intellectually honest assessment of UK performance in the South/Basra, but then again the US has had its share of "odd interpreatation" of combat operations in Iraq itself (I can think of a briefing regarding the performance of rotary wing a/c in OIF I that was a particular affront to anyone's sense of reality).

I just wish these senior officers would stand up offer praise to Soldiers when and where warranted, and accept responsibility for the rest. Way back in the day as I was being mentored I was taught that an officer accepts responsibility for all under his command and passes accolades to his subordinates/Soldiers (e.g. 2LT your platoon really kicked @ss in that STX lane - sir I'll inform the men)

Soldiers deserve better...

Live well and row

Agreed with one caveat: as I read the piece I found the Brit general's comments to be rather balanced and well said. The issues I have with the article are the author's insistence on hyping those comments into something larger. For that I would say this is another case of British media looking for a cause. That is not say that US media is any less guilty of exactly the same thing. Sells newspapers I guess

[Rank amateur]

Given all the abuse I get, why would anyone else want to be even a lower case ra?

Way back in the day as I was being mentored I was taught that an officer accepts responsibility for all under his command and passes accolades to his subordinates/Soldiers (e.g. 2LT your platoon really kicked @ss in that STX lane - sir I'll inform the men)

Ever wonder if they told you that, so you'd be willing to take the blame when they mess up?

[datroy]

The surge and the Awakenings were not mutually exclusive. This is a favorite excuse of surge opponents, that it was actually the Awakenings that turned the corner in Iraq. It was actually a confluence of COIN tactics applied in certain cities that were having success in creating security, the tribes recognition that the Americans could effectively provide security from AQI, and their subsequent displeasure with AQI. They would not have joined the Americans simply b/c they were fed up with AQI if the Americans proved incapable of protecting them. The surge consisted of taking this model and applying it as a national, unified strategy.

[PJW]

As a Brit, I find it to some degree insulting that the Chief of the Defence Staff felt he needed to 'set the record straight'. The mad posturings of Maliki and his reliance on Al Sada should come as no suprise. Neither should the interpretation of UK's actions in Basrah by the world's media be paid too much attention.

The tag-line in the article is hugely misleading and the provocation it was, no doubt, meant to engender is unhelpful

[Hacksaw]

Ever wonder if they told you that, so you'd be willing to take the blame when they mess up?

Rank amateur...

The mentoring I was referring to came from senior officers I respected...

I never once regretted the approach...

Once folks understand you are willing to step in front of the bus for them, they tend to work real hard so that it wasn't necessary (and when it was - they usually jumped to take responsibility for their actions)...

All this is not to say that an offending Soldier/NCO was not disciplined for doing stupid stuff, just that the vast majority of stuff can be handled internal to the unit (if properly led), and owning failings in your unit while informing CDR how you were going to mitigate the same failing again is usually gratefully embraced by leaders who are too often surrounded by "leaders" unwilling to own/police their responsibilities...

PJW,

You stated far more briefly and coherently what I intended to do so earlier... Why the "need" to set the record straight, those were his words...

Thanks,

Live well and row

[SPWilson]

Maybe that was his view of things. I was in Charge of the Knights with my Iraqi NP battalion and know what I saw in Basra.

1. If the UK at the COB knew anything about the operation it is a surprise. Any attempt to pull SA prior to the mission was blocked or deflected with "we do not know what you are talking about." Even after the operation, coordination with any UK elements (aside from those at Basra Palace) was non-existant.

2. Its a great plan to put the Iraqis in the lead, but you can't throw them into the fire. My battalion could do independent operations and from time to time did, but not without our guidance and assistance. The U.S. developed a plan to develop and mentor the ISF which contrary to some professional opinions has been successful. It was only after the fact (after CoTK) did the British establish MiTTs in Basra. If they existed prior to the operation it was news to me.

3. You can argue all you want on how the UK pullout of Basra was not a retreat or say it was done to remove an impasse/ solve problems, etc, but the bottom line was that it is viewed as a retreat in the face of mounting pressure. It created a vacuum that allowed the JAM and Iran to move in. I lived at Basra Palace for 9 months, I saw the mortared living areas and carnage. Political necessity to keep the casaulties low and let the Iraqis figure things out was what lead to Basra's loss to JAM and Iran. To further strengthen my point,. look at the FP guidelines at the COB (the most stringent I have seen) and designed IMO to prevent casualties for political reasons.

4. No Iraqi commander in Basra holds a favorable opinion of the British. Im sorry to report the truth, but every Iraqi officer (some very senior) have an unfavorable opinion of the British they worked with. If British operations there were so successful prior to CotK, then why this attitude?

In the end it is for the MoD to anayze what worked or failed in Basra. Obviously I can speak to only what I saw in 2008 and through conversations about what happened previously.

I am not trying to point fingers b/c it really doesn't matter now. The UK and Austrailian forces I met in Basra were largely professional and had a great warrior ethos. Some I felt were less than stellar and simply marking time until they finished their tour.

Note:
I do not mean to sound brash or insulting, just my opinions and observations.