USMC and SOCOM

[davidbfpo]

Yogi,

Congratulations on such a first post, challenging "conventional" wisdom and advocating the USMC take on the GWOT role - even more of 'what' when you are an airman.

Elsewhere Imperial overstretch has been discussed, IIRC more on the financial burden, rather than who should be the "boots on the ground". Curiously after WW1 the British Empire considered and implemented the use of air power for imperial policing, notably in Iraq and less so along the Northwest Frontier (now the FATA). Military effectiveness and cost-cutting were involved, plus the then new "toy" of air power.

I was puzzled at this:

A speaker today from USSOCOM provided a “Strategic Appreciation” chart showing the potential tensions in the world system generating instability counter to the interests of the United States. The chart indicated instability and criminal activity followed migratory/trade routes from troubled areas to the doorstep of the United States.

For some the chart should have shown instability and criminal activity follow routes from the USA to troubled areas. Mexico is a good, current example where US domestic demand for drugs has increased the crisis of governance. I am sure other SWC members, including two SOF members, have chimed in on this theme recently.

Now I shall sit back and see if your post causes others to react.

[John T. Fishel]

David, I must take some minor issue with your characterization of drug related crime as flowing from the US (demand). Demand is, itself, much more complicated with Europe being as (nearly ore perhaps more so) big a market for illicit drugs as the US. Then there are the emerging drug markets in the producing and transit countries. Other issues that are related - criminal gangs. The Salvadoran MS 13 and Mexican 18th Street were founded in the US, exported back to their home countries through deportation exacerbated by no notice to the host country from the deporting country(US, UK, Canada) and then re-exported to the US (and UK and Canada). Point, as my title suggests, is that this is a highly complex issue with few, if any, good answers.

For our Air Force and USMC friends - our world is now JOINT whether we likeit or not. USMC capabilities can be enhanced in the direction suggested or not but the USMC (and USAF, USN, USA, and USCG) will operate jointly for the foreseeable future under unified commanders, JTFs and JIATFs. That means that the GWOT, by whatever name, will be joint (writ large) - which I applaud. Each military service along with other govt agencies brings unique capabilities to the table which are generally much more effective when employed together than when used alone.

Cheers

JohnT

[GI Zhou]

Yogi,

It could be argued that this was the mission of the Marine Corps in 1920s and 30s from Central America to China and outposts in between, and this continued after the Second World War. This is why they were so successful in the Chosin Resevoir Campiagn (the small number of Army tanks and tankers helped all out of proportion to their numbers too). The United States Marine Corps had kept its combat role and mission.

revet.

[JeffWolf]

Gi Zhou:

I think this article - http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/2/257 - argues it was Marine personnel policy that contributed to success at Chosin.(Mod's note - article behind a register and paywall).

Thanks
Jeff

[yogi]

Davidbfpo,

The SOCOM speaker acknowledged the return of resources/money etc. following the trade routes.

GI Zhou,

I agree that the Marines were highly effective at executing the majority of the President’s/United States foreign policy over the years. The Marines have used airpower in small wars for longer than the USAF has existed. My confidence in their capabilities and motivation are part of the reason I suggest their responsibility for this ongoing operation.

John T.

The GWOT is the “most likely” threat to the United States. Full up conventional or nuclear war, through direct conflict or the escalation smoldering cold war remnants is arguably the “most dangerous” for the long-term existence of the United States. One “joint” organization preparing for both means compromise. Jack of all trades, master of none…

If the Marine Corps assumed or is assigned the responsibility for the GWOT, this would increase the overall security of the United States. As an airman, I’ll use the debate about the Joint Strike Fighter and the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) to demonstrate. The USAF is purchasing 100 LAAR aircraft to fill the gap between conventional capabilities and Irregular Warfare requirements in a permissive air environment (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/th...hes-light.html). This procurement is simultaneous with the requirement to cut over 5,000 active airmen from the force to comply with resource constraints while ISR requirements continue to rise. The idea is that these aircraft will allow increased USAF Foreign Internal Defense (FID) capability as well as fill a niche capability for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander during JTF operations.

I would argue this LAAR capability, while extremely important, is better served by the USMC invested/responsible for the GWOT and assuming FID as part of that effort. Does the USMC really need a Harrier replacement in a 4th generation STOL aircraft? I think it is a hard sell. With the JSF estimated at $135M per aircraft (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/20/js...o-135-million/) that is an expensive platform for an arguably required capability. What if the USMC purchased 150 LAAR at $5M a piece (less than $1B for 150 aircraft and boats to preposition them on, or 7 JSF) and operated 50 for training and prepositioned the others afloat for potential FID or GWOT efforts? The bang for the buck would significantly increase for the United States if the Marines assumed this FID/GWOT role for the land/sea and air domains.

Thanks for the comments. Who listens to these ideas any way? Do they make a difference in the long run?

Yogi

[Pete]

Okay, for the purpose of discussion let's assume that the Marine Corps has transferred its conventional warmaking responsibilities to the other services so it can focus exclusively on the counterterrorist mission. Does this mean that Jcustis would be forced to become an Army officer?

[Old Eagle]

The last time I ran into this proposal was on the Army Staff where a bunch of heavy forces think tankers were toying with it. In the ramp down after Desert Storm, they were proposing that the Army transform itself into a heavy fighting force to "fight and win" the nations ground campaigns. Those light forces not transformed would be dealt away to the USMC to form contested entrance forces and troops for all the lesser included offenses.

I wonder if there was a good reason why it never came to fruition. Other than that "the division" (82d Abn for you uninitiated) would become a Marine asset.

Hmmm.

[kotkinjs1]

Yogi (post 52),

I think you missed the intent of the Strategic Appreciation brief. First, from your post:

Also clearly evident from the presentation, if not explicitly stated, was that USSOCOM required increased capability above the current 57,000 personnel in order to counter this threat and influence the unfolding global system in purposeful ways over the coming decades.

That's actually the exact opposite what the brief intends to get across. PM me for details, but basically, the brief tries to show that while we were in our happy foreign policy Cold War box that defined everything we did up till 1989 and the way we looked at all other countries and 'problems' across the globe, the world changed but we, the USG and hence DoD, did not adapt our respective mindsets. The result we see today are true, fundamental challenges that get short shrift from USG while we focus our blood and treasure on the symptoms, not the causes. What's worse, other challenges are being left unchecked to the detriment of future stability and national security.

The brief then attempts to draw a correlation between how the DoD, and USSOCOM specifically, have traditionally been used in the past and how currently, given systemic, environmental, demographic, and economic trends, the USG can adapt to meet rising and future challenges. Through the yet-to-be-learned effective partnering across the various Departments and even NGOs and possibly MNCs and partner nations where applicable, we could possibly focus on and manage/mitigate/lessen the negative effects which current foreign policy and military legacy mindsets ignore or otherwise sideline in favor of focusing on major theater war with hypothetical enemies or maintaining the comfortable Cold War, zero-sum box we live in to this day.

To do this, SOCOM isn't asking for more bodies from the Services but rather cooperation at the strategic through the tacical level, from DOS, Agriculture, FBI, CIA, etc, etc, etc. This will make our SOF more effective and help the USG realize that in the "3D" construct all Depts and especially the SOF warrior apply all three of the "Ds" (diplomacy, development, defense...or more properly, 'security') at various times in their respective deployed duties. DoD and DoS have nominally bought into this 3D construct/theory, but there are still too many stovepipes and mis-allocated funding to make it effective.

The Strat App only tries to show that the world has changed while we weren't looking; not that its more complicated now than ever before (that's a convenient excuse people use to forgo critical thought in seeking blanket funding), but rather that views of problems/challenges, partners, economies of force, training, strategies, and of course, budgets, have to adapt to the new environment and its challenges. Its not seeking a bigger USSOCOM empire; its actually seeking a smaller and more shared DoD slice of the pie. To do that, SOCOM is first focusing and realigning its doctrine, mission, strategy, and vision of the world. So far, we've had success in shedding light on the new environment and the failings of our legacy crutches.

It sounds like the J5 shop might need to reengage or at least provide some standalone briefs/EXSUMs. Are you at AWC? SAMS?

MAJ Kotkin
(I'm deploying in a week, but I can take any questions/concerns and forward them to the right POC in the Strategy Division to get back to you.)