USMC relieves SOF from certain aspects of FID like "training some guys".Originally Posted by GS
That's my point...
USMC relieves SOF from certain aspects of FID like "training some guys".
Dave, FID provides access, losing the FID mission denies access.
Very well said.
I doubt it will take the USMC element long to adapt to a new role.
Understood, but not my point...
The old paradigms of FID and SOF have changed and we have to keep up and not just assume it is business as usual - but on a global and consistent scale.
I fully understand the points raised here concerning FID as an integral part of SPECOPS and agree.
Still, there is not enough SOF to conduct all the traditional missions on a global basis. My suggestion was that conventional forces (USMC in this instance) take over the “less snake-eater” missions (training for one) while SOF continues to do what it does best. Under a JTF, and if well-planned and executed, this relationship could be codified and appropriate doctrine, TO&E, and TTP established.
All that said, it is a moot point. A USMC conference next week will hammer out the details on this done deal. As a good Marines, the USMC will salute sharply and carry out the new mission to the best of it's capabilities. Our nation will not be disappointed...
Dave,
Handing over the training mission has been tried several times in the past. In just the time I was active, I remember:
USMC telling Ted Kennedy they could do it and us having to do a dog and pony.
An experiment involving Puerto Ricans from the NG in Central America.
SEALs trying to do FID and train HN troops.
Drill Sergeants (Spanish-speakers) trying something somewhere.
None of it worked for various reasons. Language is often thought to be the critical path. My experience differs greatly.
I have friends in Iraq that frequently complain about the training being conducted over there.
I was fortunate enough to have worked with the USMC on several occasions. When they adapt to this new mission, I think they will be a great asset - but some adapting will have to be done. I look forward to watching the Marines attack this mission with the professionalism they have always shown every time I have had the priviledge to watch them work.
I firmly believe this will be a good thing for both sides of the house.
I'm not sure what you mean by the old paradigms of FID have changed - could you expound?
We have a saying we frequently tell the new guys - "If you can't do FID, seek life elsewhere."
Last edited by NDD; 12-11-2005 at 08:13 PM.
Don't confuse global war w/global FID
I understand your point that we're waging a global war, but that doesn't equate to global FID. We were waging a global war against communism, as we were fighting its spread in South and Central America, throughout Africa and Asia, and in Europe (Greece and Italy among others), but we were not executing global FID. FID by its very nature is very local in its design, so there isn't a global template for executing it. It is extremely dependent on the political and social environment where we contribute; more so than any other type of operation. If you're arguing the need to execute FID in more locations, thus the need for more forces to do so, then I would agree with some caveats, but we're not doing global FID. If anyone thinks we are please explain the concept.
I agree 100% that we are not doing global FID, nor should we be. The first criteria for FID should be that it is an "internal" that is worth "defending". In other words, worthy of strengthening. Why would we ever consider doing FID in Chechnya for example?
However, in your analogy of communism, can you tell me please in which of those areas you mentioned we were not doing FID?
Yes, FID is local - hence the area-oriented Group concept.
Is there a global template for other operations in LIC? Is there a global template for big war?
Groups like AQ would appear to me to prey on weak governments in Muslim countries. They are a virus, not an operating system. FID was designed to aid in preventing this very problem.
I agree that there is a need for big battalions, armor, the whole 9 yards. I also know first hand what it takes to get even a miniscule group prepared to do FID. But I have seen the results first hand and I have no doubt the USMC will be an asset in this role. The troops in OIF I did a fantastic job of running through the conventional Iraqi forces like crap through a goose. The force structure would appear to have been next to perfect - for that oepration against those people at that time. Can the same be said now? Could the USMC still have done the same tremendous job they did then without the Marines that will be moving to SOCOM?
Perhaps I don't understand what you are saying.
And I would love to hear your caveats.
NDD reply
I may have done a poor job of representing my position about losing two battalions worth of Marine INF, and my overall impression of SOF. I understand the utility of SOF; however, dont think that they will sink or swim based of the addition or lack of a USMC component. On the other hand, if the USMC loses 2 battalions worth of Marines comprised mostly of senior leaders, I think this will significantly degrade our capabilities. I am not advocated adding two more USMC battalions, but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.
And why should the USMC be the exception? Do you remember Kerry's campaign speeches reference super-sizing SF? We very narrowly missed being the victims of yet another social experiment. Ever hear of Katie Wilder? The 18X Program (not a bad thing)? There's pain enough to go 'round for everyone.but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.
On a more serious note, did you read the recent articles on Stability Operations and the new role in the chain? My personal opinion is that FID will be a key element in them and nobody does FID better than certain elements of SOF.
MarSOC: Just Call Them Marines
Fred L. Schultz
Proceedings, January 2006
The commanding general of the controversial new Marine Corps Special Operations Command--seen here in Iraq, greeting Marines of Gun 6, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment last year—talks to Proceedings.
Not long after he was tapped to lead the first leatherneck contingent into the nation's Special Operations Command, Brigadier Geneal Dennis J. Hejlik was asked by Marine Commandant Michael Hagee if he had settled on a catchy nickname for his troops. General Hejlik nodded.
"Marines," he replied.
Later that day, General Hejlik (pronounced Hey-lik), in an exclusive interview with Proceedings, outlined his plans for the new unit, known as the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MarSOC).
He also expressed support for the decision to finally make the Marines part of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom), a move long opposed by the Corps. From time to time, he revealed bits and pieces about himself. One thing was evident. He travels light. He showed up with a staff of none.
Over lunch at an Irish restaurant here in Annapolis, the 58-year-old career infantryman laughingly recalled how he found out about the new job. Transferred from California to Quantico, he and his wife, Sandy, were having dinner at a restaurant the night before they were to move into new quarters at the northern Virginia Marine base. His cell phone rang. He took it outside, returned an hour later.
"Where are we going now?" his wife asked. Her husband had been a Marine for 35 years. They had been married for all of those years. She knew something was up.
So long, Quantico. Hello, Camp Lejeune.
An Iowa farm boy, General Hejlik enlisted in the Marines in 1968. He got out four years later as a sergeant and headed off to Minnesota State University, Mankato, just across the border from his home state. On graduation day 1975, he received a diploma and a commission in the Corps.
He has since taken on a wide array of Marine assignments, getting his hands dirty with logistics and weaponry as well as earning a Master's degree from the Naval War College. He served as senior military fellow at the influential Council on Foreign Relations and was two-hatted as deputy commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Iraq. Especially important in light of his new assignment, he also was chief of staff and director of the Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness at SOCom, of which his new command will soon be a part.
His tour at SOCom, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, means he's no stranger to the snake-eater community, and his familiarity with the organization no doubt played a role in his selection to head the estimated 2,500-member Marine unit now being organized.
In his most recent combat tour, his brigade took on radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia in the fall of 2004 for control of the Islamic holy city of An Najaf. In this battle, General Hejlik's troops lived up to his widely quoted promise to "whack 'em."
After the shooting stopped, he returned to the command center in Fallujah, where his boss, Lieutenant General James T. Conway, the expeditionary force commander, greeted him as if bestowing knighthood.
"Marines, ladies and gentlemen, soldiers, sailors, airmen—The Lion of Najaf!"
The title stuck, and General Hejlik says it's all General Conway's fault.
When he spoke with us, at lunch and later at Naval Institute headquarters in Beach Hall, the general was relaxed and seemed to enjoy the interview. But he also had a sense of purpose, points he wanted to convey, and a good idea of how he wanted his new command to look, even at this early stage.
The Marines are anything but charter members of the Special Operations Command. For many years after Congress created the force in 1986, the Corps doggedly resisted contributing troops to it.
For those 20 years, a parade of commandants insisted that there was no need for such an affiliation, asserting that all Marines by definition were capable of special operations. The Marine leadership also maintained that the Corps, because of its small size, could not afford to detach any troops to another outfit. The leadership further feared that prized Marine units such as Force Recon would be prime targets for cherry picking if SOCom were licensed to do so.
Behind the Corps' about-face was a growing need to beef up and replenish special operations forces in the midst of draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing terrorist threat, along with a strong push for the Marines to get with the program from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. After a year and a half of negotiations, a meeting on 28 October 2005 among Secretary Rumsfeld, General Hagee, and the SOCom combatant commander, Army General Bryan D. (Doug) Brown, closed the deal.
While General Hejlik believes that senior leaders across the services think the move "is a good thing, good for the country, and good for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism," it has drawn opposition, both internally and externally. "With continued education," he said, "this will be a win-win for all."
"One of the things that really makes me nervous," General Hejlik said, "is the word 'special.' All Marines are special, all Marines are equal, and all Marines are riflemen." He intends to address this concern, because he doesn't want any Marine being treated differently from a special forces Marine.
He also said he does not expect residual hostility to the move to adversely affect recruiting for his special ops unit. On the contrary, he said, the new command already has an abundance of volunteers.
"The thing we have to be careful with," he stressed, "is that they're Marines, first and foremost." Marines who volunteer must come out of operating forces and will undergo a rigid assessment and selection process. Selectees will train to a standard similar to Army Ranger training. "What exact standard that is has not been fully determined," General Hejlik conceded.
The new command will consist of a Marine special operations regiment of two special forces battalions. A total of nine Marine special operations companies (four on the east coast and five on the west coast) will form the combat core of the command, and each will be from 85 to 110 strong. The force will be split, 75% to 25%, between command, regimental, and battalion headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and a battalion headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California.
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