USMC and SOCOM

[NDD]

Dave,
Handing over the training mission has been tried several times in the past. In just the time I was active, I remember:
USMC telling Ted Kennedy they could do it and us having to do a dog and pony.
An experiment involving Puerto Ricans from the NG in Central America.
SEALs trying to do FID and train HN troops.
Drill Sergeants (Spanish-speakers) trying something somewhere.

None of it worked for various reasons. Language is often thought to be the critical path. My experience differs greatly.

I have friends in Iraq that frequently complain about the training being conducted over there.

I was fortunate enough to have worked with the USMC on several occasions. When they adapt to this new mission, I think they will be a great asset - but some adapting will have to be done. I look forward to watching the Marines attack this mission with the professionalism they have always shown every time I have had the priviledge to watch them work.

I firmly believe this will be a good thing for both sides of the house.

I'm not sure what you mean by the old paradigms of FID have changed - could you expound?

We have a saying we frequently tell the new guys - "If you can't do FID, seek life elsewhere."

[Bill Moore]

I understand your point that we're waging a global war, but that doesn't equate to global FID. We were waging a global war against communism, as we were fighting its spread in South and Central America, throughout Africa and Asia, and in Europe (Greece and Italy among others), but we were not executing global FID. FID by its very nature is very local in its design, so there isn't a global template for executing it. It is extremely dependent on the political and social environment where we contribute; more so than any other type of operation. If you're arguing the need to execute FID in more locations, thus the need for more forces to do so, then I would agree with some caveats, but we're not doing global FID. If anyone thinks we are please explain the concept.

[NDD]

I understand your point that we're waging a global war, but that doesn't equate to global FID. We were waging a global war against communism, as we were fighting its spread in South and Central America, throughout Africa and Asia, and in Europe (Greece and Italy among others), but we were not executing global FID. FID by its very nature is very local in its design, so there isn't a global template for executing it. It is extremely dependent on the political and social environment where we contribute; more so than any other type of operation. If you're arguing the need to execute FID in more locations, thus the need for more forces to do so, then I would agree with some caveats, but we're not doing global FID. If anyone thinks we are please explain the concept.

I agree 100% that we are not doing global FID, nor should we be. The first criteria for FID should be that it is an "internal" that is worth "defending". In other words, worthy of strengthening. Why would we ever consider doing FID in Chechnya for example?

However, in your analogy of communism, can you tell me please in which of those areas you mentioned we were not doing FID?

Yes, FID is local - hence the area-oriented Group concept.

Is there a global template for other operations in LIC? Is there a global template for big war?

Groups like AQ would appear to me to prey on weak governments in Muslim countries. They are a virus, not an operating system. FID was designed to aid in preventing this very problem.

I agree that there is a need for big battalions, armor, the whole 9 yards. I also know first hand what it takes to get even a miniscule group prepared to do FID. But I have seen the results first hand and I have no doubt the USMC will be an asset in this role. The troops in OIF I did a fantastic job of running through the conventional Iraqi forces like crap through a goose. The force structure would appear to have been next to perfect - for that oepration against those people at that time. Can the same be said now? Could the USMC still have done the same tremendous job they did then without the Marines that will be moving to SOCOM?

Perhaps I don't understand what you are saying.

And I would love to hear your caveats.

[Steve Blair]

More SOF is not the answer? Is two more infantry battalions the answer? I disagree most wholeheartedly that more SOF is not what is needed. Hearts & Minds are needed, and SOF is the key to H&Ms.

I do not agreee that a blanket SOF policy is the way to H&M. Certain aspects of what have been lumped into SOCOM are very useful in this area, but it's not a blanket solution.

[NDD]

I do not agreee that a blanket SOF policy is the way to H&M. Certain aspects of what have been lumped into SOCOM are very useful in this area, but it's not a blanket solution.

What is a blanket SOF policy? A blanket solution? No, SOF is not THE solution. COIN requires other than military assets to achieve. However, on the military side of the house, I would be very interested in hearing what else you suggest.

[Strickland]

I may have done a poor job of representing my position about losing two battalions worth of Marine INF, and my overall impression of SOF. I understand the utility of SOF; however, dont think that they will sink or swim based of the addition or lack of a USMC component. On the other hand, if the USMC loses 2 battalions worth of Marines comprised mostly of senior leaders, I think this will significantly degrade our capabilities. I am not advocated adding two more USMC battalions, but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.

[NDD]

but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.

And why should the USMC be the exception? Do you remember Kerry's campaign speeches reference super-sizing SF? We very narrowly missed being the victims of yet another social experiment. Ever hear of Katie Wilder? The 18X Program (not a bad thing)? There's pain enough to go 'round for everyone.

On a more serious note, did you read the recent articles on Stability Operations and the new role in the chain? My personal opinion is that FID will be a key element in them and nobody does FID better than certain elements of SOF.

[NDD]

MarSOC: Just Call Them Marines

Fred L. Schultz

Proceedings, January 2006

The commanding general of the controversial new Marine Corps Special Operations Command--seen here in Iraq, greeting Marines of Gun 6, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment last year—talks to Proceedings.

Not long after he was tapped to lead the first leatherneck contingent into the nation's Special Operations Command, Brigadier Geneal Dennis J. Hejlik was asked by Marine Commandant Michael Hagee if he had settled on a catchy nickname for his troops. General Hejlik nodded.

"Marines," he replied.

Later that day, General Hejlik (pronounced Hey-lik), in an exclusive interview with Proceedings, outlined his plans for the new unit, known as the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MarSOC).

He also expressed support for the decision to finally make the Marines part of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom), a move long opposed by the Corps. From time to time, he revealed bits and pieces about himself. One thing was evident. He travels light. He showed up with a staff of none.

Over lunch at an Irish restaurant here in Annapolis, the 58-year-old career infantryman laughingly recalled how he found out about the new job. Transferred from California to Quantico, he and his wife, Sandy, were having dinner at a restaurant the night before they were to move into new quarters at the northern Virginia Marine base. His cell phone rang. He took it outside, returned an hour later.

"Where are we going now?" his wife asked. Her husband had been a Marine for 35 years. They had been married for all of those years. She knew something was up.

So long, Quantico. Hello, Camp Lejeune.


An Iowa farm boy, General Hejlik enlisted in the Marines in 1968. He got out four years later as a sergeant and headed off to Minnesota State University, Mankato, just across the border from his home state. On graduation day 1975, he received a diploma and a commission in the Corps.


He has since taken on a wide array of Marine assignments, getting his hands dirty with logistics and weaponry as well as earning a Master's degree from the Naval War College. He served as senior military fellow at the influential Council on Foreign Relations and was two-hatted as deputy commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Iraq. Especially important in light of his new assignment, he also was chief of staff and director of the Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness at SOCom, of which his new command will soon be a part.

His tour at SOCom, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, means he's no stranger to the snake-eater community, and his familiarity with the organization no doubt played a role in his selection to head the estimated 2,500-member Marine unit now being organized.

In his most recent combat tour, his brigade took on radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia in the fall of 2004 for control of the Islamic holy city of An Najaf. In this battle, General Hejlik's troops lived up to his widely quoted promise to "whack 'em."

After the shooting stopped, he returned to the command center in Fallujah, where his boss, Lieutenant General James T. Conway, the expeditionary force commander, greeted him as if bestowing knighthood.

"Marines, ladies and gentlemen, soldiers, sailors, airmen—The Lion of Najaf!"

The title stuck, and General Hejlik says it's all General Conway's fault.

When he spoke with us, at lunch and later at Naval Institute headquarters in Beach Hall, the general was relaxed and seemed to enjoy the interview. But he also had a sense of purpose, points he wanted to convey, and a good idea of how he wanted his new command to look, even at this early stage.

The Marines are anything but charter members of the Special Operations Command. For many years after Congress created the force in 1986, the Corps doggedly resisted contributing troops to it.

For those 20 years, a parade of commandants insisted that there was no need for such an affiliation, asserting that all Marines by definition were capable of special operations. The Marine leadership also maintained that the Corps, because of its small size, could not afford to detach any troops to another outfit. The leadership further feared that prized Marine units such as Force Recon would be prime targets for cherry picking if SOCom were licensed to do so.

Behind the Corps' about-face was a growing need to beef up and replenish special operations forces in the midst of draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing terrorist threat, along with a strong push for the Marines to get with the program from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. After a year and a half of negotiations, a meeting on 28 October 2005 among Secretary Rumsfeld, General Hagee, and the SOCom combatant commander, Army General Bryan D. (Doug) Brown, closed the deal.

While General Hejlik believes that senior leaders across the services think the move "is a good thing, good for the country, and good for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism," it has drawn opposition, both internally and externally. "With continued education," he said, "this will be a win-win for all."

"One of the things that really makes me nervous," General Hejlik said, "is the word 'special.' All Marines are special, all Marines are equal, and all Marines are riflemen." He intends to address this concern, because he doesn't want any Marine being treated differently from a special forces Marine.

He also said he does not expect residual hostility to the move to adversely affect recruiting for his special ops unit. On the contrary, he said, the new command already has an abundance of volunteers.

"The thing we have to be careful with," he stressed, "is that they're Marines, first and foremost." Marines who volunteer must come out of operating forces and will undergo a rigid assessment and selection process. Selectees will train to a standard similar to Army Ranger training. "What exact standard that is has not been fully determined," General Hejlik conceded.

The new command will consist of a Marine special operations regiment of two special forces battalions. A total of nine Marine special operations companies (four on the east coast and five on the west coast) will form the combat core of the command, and each will be from 85 to 110 strong. The force will be split, 75% to 25%, between command, regimental, and battalion headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and a battalion headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California.

[NDD]

To complement the special operations companies, two other principal components will be a support unit of radio, communications, and intelligence specialists, and a foreign military training unit, both based at Camp Lejeune.

The foreign training unit will consist of 430 Marines who will train military forces from around the world that lack such training, such as those from some of the poorer central African nations.

Special operations groups will deploy with Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that already have troops capable of special operations on board amphibious ships. As special operations companies are organized within these groups, the existing Maritime Special Purpose Force—a unit capable of conventional or selected maritime special missions—will be phased out.

Special operations companies will be separable but not separate from expeditionary units, while specific command-and-control relationships are being worked out.

"Right now, it's kind of the best of both worlds," General Hejlik said. "We work with the MEU, but we belong to SOCom as a component. That will fill part of the capability gap. Special operations have suffered a little bit, because the Global War on Terrorism has worn them a little thin."

For those concerned about what all this bodes for the future of Force Reconnaissance, the Marines' elite deep-penetration units and the Corps' answer to special ops in the past, General Hejlik assured that it "will be alive and well. The core of the company will be a Force Recon platoon, which will retain all of its specialized skills, such as deep reconnaissance, advanced communications, precision shooting, and specialized insertion and extraction capabilities."

The general expects his new command to work regularly with Army Rangers and Green Berets. But Marines will be treated as Marines, he said, right down to their gear and weaponry.

"If I'm an 03-21 reconnaissance Marine, I will come with my helmet, my flak jacket, my rucksack, and my warfighting gear. My weapon could be an M-4, M-16A-4, or 9-mm, but if the mission requires special equipment, SOCom will supply it. Hands down, SOCom has the most efficient and proficient acquisition process in the Department of Defense."

Marines have been working with the Special Operations Command since the 1980s, "so this is not a new thing," General Hejlik said.

"In my own experience, the special operations in Najaf and Fallujah were well organized and very interoperable," he emphasized. "The Global War on Terrorism has forced everyone to take a fresh look at the way they fight irregular warfare, which has no rules. This is why special forces have become such sought-after commodities."

General Hejlik said his new command originally was going to be part of a reconnaissance unit that would complement the Special Operations Command. "That's where Det. One [Marine Special Operations Detachment One, set up as proof of the concept that Marines were suited for special operations] came from," he said. But he thinks this new arrangement will be much more effective.

Negotiations prior to the establishment of the Marine Special Operations Command in October were characterized in some press reports as difficult and long. General Hejlik agreed that they were long and acknowledged one major difficulty:

"The difficult part was the cultural aspect. There are always going to be soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who want things to stay the way they are. They say, 'Let's not change for change's sake.' But this is not the case; change here is necessary. We want to get the Marine Corps fully involved in the.war on terrorism. We want to complement SOCom and fill in some of the gaps. This is the right thing to do. I'm an optimist at heart and by trade, and I think this will work."

General Hejlik learned two major lessons from his most recent service in Iraq. He found that a special operations force borders on the unique, "small in size but packing a great big punch. What such a force brings to the battlefield is much more than just trigger pullers," he said. Lesson two was that today's conventional soldiers or Marines are better trained, better led, and better equipped than any he has seen.

"When you combine conventional war fighters with a Marine special operations team, the culture and the war-fighting ethos are the same, and you've got a force that's unbeatable."

Mr. Schultz is Senior Editor of Proceedings.

[GorTex6]

"My weapon could be an M-4, M-16A-4, or 9-mm,

What happened to the high speed custom Kimber 1911?

[SWJED]

Reprinted in full with permission from the MCG. Original copyright applies to further reproduction...

January Editorial: A Time for Every Purpose

There has been a lot of talk lately in defense circles about the Marine Corps finally hopping aboard the special operations bandwagon. On 1 November 2005, the Department of Defense formally announced the approval of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC). The command will consist of a headquarters element, a foreign military training unit (FMTU), a Marine special operations regiment consisting of two battalions, and a Marine special operations support group. The authorized strength for the entire enterprise is approximately 2,600. Most of the MarSOC elements will be located at Camp Lejeune, with one of the battalions of the regiment located at Camp Pendleton.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) was formed at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL in April 1987. For over 18 years the operators have been from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Marines chose not to play—opting for similar training for its MEUs designating them as “special operations capable.” USSOCom is taking on an increasing role in the global war on terrorism, and it is time for the Marines to jump aboard the special operations train. The trick is to do it right. If we don’t get it right, we become irrelevant in that increasingly important milieu.

We are fortunate in that we are not starting from scratch. In November 2001 our 32d Commandant, Gen James L. Jones, signed a memorandum of agreement with USSOCom to work together. In July 2003 the Marines formed an 86-man contingent, called Detachment 1, to train and operate specifically in special operations missions.

As tantalizing as it is to declare victory in the world of the 24-hour news cycle, it is important to understand that the “beam me up, Scotty” mantra from Star Trek days just isn’t doable. To get it right, we must go about the formation in stages, and we must ensure that each stage is fully funded. We may not see MarSOC at full operational capability for about 5 or 6 years. Here are some knotty things to think about as we go along.

Manpower issues. Once the units are formed, we must keep the manning at 100 percent plus. Anything less will be unacceptable. Once designated, expect individuals to remain in the business for consecutive tours—perhaps even for the duration of careers. Our promotion boards will have to adapt to this reality. Other concerns are skill qualifications to be designated, impacts on the ability of the Marine Corps to deploy other operational units under current plans, and creating the MarSOC out of existing end strength authorizations of approximately 175,000 if required to do so.

Concept of employment. Since the FMTU already exists, the continuance of that program should proceed unimpeded. Presumably, the special operations elements, probably of company size, would deploy with our forward deployed MEUs, much in the manner of special purpose MAGTFs that we have formed in the past. If this kind of deployment is routine in the future, what is the impact on the MEU? Who will task, command and control, and provide support for operations? What is the role of Marine aviation from the seabase in support of this special unit? How is the current air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) configuration impacted since the support group missions in the joint world coincide to a degree with that of ANGLICO?

MarSOC headquarters. What is the role of the headquarters staff for MarSOC? Is it a warfighting staff or just an administrative organization that will simply man, equip, and train the various units?

Operational security. There is no organization in the Nation that has a better feel for public relations than our Marine Corps, but this is one of the areas that is best handled out of the limelight. We have some very smart officers at the upper echelons dealing with this issue. I’m confident that they will get it right, and in the end, we will be that part of USSOCom that is called upon repeatedly to handle the toughest tasks in the war on terror in the difficult days ahead.

[DDilegge]

Sorry for the delayed response. Most of the replies (questions) to my original posts were, in my opinion, answered adequately enough for those that read those posts. The USMC - SOCOM relationship is a done deal and the debate on the positive or negative aspects of this relationship is moot.

That said, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with MG Geoffrey Lambert (USA Ret.). General Lambert is one of the “grey beards” (senior mentors) of a program I work on (Joint Urban Warrior) and of course, one of our nation’s foremost experts on SOF related issues. His background in SOF speaks volumes.

Reader digest version – I asked him how the USMC could maintain its “youth” (large turnover of first-term Devil-Dogs) while "taking on" many SOF missions that historically have been filled by senior NCO’s and SCNO’s. His advice was to look at the US Army Ranger model for a possible answer to this issue. Any thoughts out there? I know just enough about the Ranger community to make me dangerous.

S/F

Dave

[SWJED]

25 Jan. American Forces Press Service - Marine Corps Special Ops Will Add to Military Capability, Commander Says
.

By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Jan. 26, 2006 – The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, the newest addition to the special operations community, will be a complementary force that will ease the strain on other services' elite units and will contribute to the nation's readiness in the global war on terror, the new unit's commander said here today.

"I firmly believe that this is the right thing to do for the country at this time," said Marine Brig. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik, commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. "This irregular warfare is here to stay. If we don't start to go that way, where the force is more joint and more capable across the spectrum, that's not a good thing."

The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, will formally stand up its headquarters Feb. 24 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. In addition to the headquarters, Camp Lejeune will be home to the Marine Special Operations Support Group, several foreign military training units, a Marine special operations battalion, and the Marine Special Operations School, Hejlik said. Another Marine special operations battalion will be stationed at Camp Pendleton, Calif., he said.

Over the next five years, MARSOC will grow to an end strength of 2,600 people, Hejlik said. This will include 24 foreign military training units that will deploy worldwide in support of U.S. Special Operations Command and the various combatant commanders, he said. MARSOC already has three FMTUs that will deploy in 2006 and 2007, he said.

The Marine special operations battalion will include four Marine special operations companies, each with 97 to 118 people, depending on mission requirements, Hejlik said. The core of these companies will be experienced force reconnaissance Marines taken from the mainstream Marine Corps, he said.

"There's a lot of capability there, because they're a little bit older; they're a little bit more mature," he said.

The Marine special operations companies will deploy with Marine expeditionary units, Hejlik said. Once deployed, the companies will under operational control of the special operations commander in theater, but be available to support the MEU if needed, he said.

"The intent is not just to rip the guts out of the MEU," he said. "We like to say that they're not separate, but separable."

The focus of MARSOC at the beginning will be the foreign military training units and their missions, Hejlik said. These units will complement the work being done by similar units in other special operations forces and will fill gaps that have arisen due to the recent high demand on special operations, he said. The Marine FMTUs will support all five geographic combatant commanders, with the first scheduled to carry out a mission for U.S. European Command, he said.

The first Marine special operations company will not be formed until May 2006 at Camp Lejeune, Hejlik said.

Marines will only spend three to five years in MARSOC and then will be rotated back into the regular Marine Corps, Hejlik said. This rotation will benefit the entire force, because young Marines will be trained to a higher standard in MARSOC and will bring those skills to other units, he said. It will also prevent Marines from becoming stagnant in one unit and give them opportunities for advancement and education, he said.

"If you take a quality Marine and you bring him up to a little higher standard using (special operations forces) standards, and you give him the right equipment, he is unbeatable," he said.

[NDD]

Sorry for the delayed response. Most of the replies (questions) to my original posts were, in my opinion, answered adequately enough for those that read those posts. The USMC - SOCOM relationship is a done deal and the debate on the positive or negative aspects of this relationship is moot.

That said, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with MG Geoffrey Lambert (USA Ret.). General Lambert is one of the “grey beards” (senior mentors) of a program I work on (Joint Urban Warrior) and of course, one of our nation’s foremost experts on SOF related issues. His background in SOF speaks volumes.

Reader digest version – I asked him how the USMC could maintain its “youth” (large turnover of first-term Devil-Dogs) while "taking on" many SOF missions that historically have been filled by senior NCO’s and SCNO’s. His advice was to look at the US Army Ranger model for a possible answer to this issue. Any thoughts out there? I know just enough about the Ranger community to make me dangerous.

S/F

Dave

I knew him when he was a Major. Ranger Batts do not do FID. I think there are many SOF missions that the Marines and Rangers do with junior troops. I would say FID and UW would be the exceptions I can think of right off the top of my head.

[DDilegge]

Ranger Batts do not do FID. I think there are many SOF missions that the Marines and Rangers do with junior troops. I would say FID and UW would be the exceptions I can think of right off the top of my head.

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?

[NDD]

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?

Yes, unconventional warfare - as defined by SF.

Unconventional Warfare (UW). These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a Special Operation (SO) that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander's overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required,accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set ofcircumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:

1. Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.

2. Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

3. Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

4. Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.

5. Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.


The common element between FID and UW is rapport. They require patience in abundance.

At the end of the day, I think it all depends on what the unit will be capable of within their limitations. There really aren't a lot of UW missions to do. There is a lot of FID.

Mr. Bill Moore made a statement previously in this thread along the lines of "the USMC has done FID thoughout history" or words to that effect - without trying to ruffle, I disagree with that statement. Yes, other units have done some FID. And I fully believe the Marines are capable of doing it - if they are trained to do it and will accept the need to change in order to get it done. But nobody but SF has been doing FID, I mean really doing it, for the last 50 years.

In order for this unit to have FID as a primary mission, the young-old thing will have to be put aside. If I were king, this unit would be doing DA, SR and CT, not FID. That would free up A-Teams to focus on FID and UW. That way everybody is sort of in their lane. And it would be easy to keep them young.

My experience has shown me that there is a progression: When one is young, door kicking is all that. Then there comes the maturity and patience needed to do FID - about the same time one can no longer run and gun with the 20 year-olds.

I would use the Marine element to hunt down and interdict high value targets and let them slowly work their way into the FID thing, if it all. I think the Marines bring a lot to the table and I'm really glad this is happening.

[Bill Moore]

DDilegge,

Sounds like the Marines signed up for the entire thing, DA, CT, and FID. I haven't read all the posts, I have a lot of catching up to do, but I would like to see how you're going to task organize. As MG(R) Lambert pointed out the Rangers are uniquely organized, equipped, and trained for their DA role, and unlike the old days, they keep their people in their ranks longer now, but they are still a relatively young unit, so I don't think that will be overwhelming challenge for you guys.

Growing the FID forces is another story. If they are going to be strictly trainers and combat advisors, I would speculate that they have no need to go through a Commando like selection process. You simply pull good guys out your ranks in the grades of E5 and above that have the identified traits you're looking for (interpersonal skills, capability to learn a language, adaptable, and appropriate skills) and train them to work as a trainer/advisor. Have them commit to a three year stint with an option to stay longer. The last thing you want to do is make guys stay there that don't take to the mission. Over time you'll develop a capable cadre, but until you do don't overstate your capability.

FID isn't rocket science, you guys did it throughout the Banana wars in Central America. The regular Army did it very successfully in the Philippines and Greece, and the list goes on. FID is an interagency mission and all of DoD participates as it makes sense. Helicopter pilots taught El Salvadorians how to fly (part of FID), the Coast Guard teachs costal security around the world (part of FID), the AF plays a critcal role, along with the Regular Army and the Marines, so figure out exactly what the so called FID force your training is trying to accomplish (they will only do a small piece of the overall FID role) and task organize and train accordingly. SF is ideal at working with light infantry units and paramilitary units, but they are not the ideal advisors for other types of units. SF cannot sustain support for running basic training type programs either, that is why we have the regular running them in OIF and OEF-A. Admittedly their is a considerable loss of quality when you throw a unit at a problem like that instead of seasoned personnel who know how to train others, but we all have to operate within our limitations. I hate to say it, but the best executers of FID that I have seen to date (over 25 years doing this now) is MPRI guys. Some of their work is simply top notch, and they may be able to provide some trainers to help you stand up your program. Good luck!

[NDD]

Yes, there are special skill sets that SF cannot train, such as piloting aircraft. However, we ran the CREM (Basic Training) in Honduras for years. We also ran BCT in El Sal for a lot of that conflict. We turned the Panamanian PDF into a police force with FID. And we are helping the Colombians turn the tide on the world's longest continuously running insurgency with FID.

I don't really know anything about the ME, my AO is LATAM. Those high tech MTTS are nice, but Gs are beaten on the ground by privates, NCOs and LTs.

No, FID isn't rocket science. And that is why a lot of people think they can "just do it" - doesn't work that way most of the time. FID isn't just an MTT to teach pilots to fly. It is about building relationships and changing thought processes. It is about trust and rapport. It is about sowing a seed through that trust and having the patience to watch it grow.

Unless something has changed I don't know about, the Ranger Batts are not uniquely organized. I never had the priveldge of serving in one, but I worked closely with them and their success is in my outsider's opinion due more to their continuing selection process and tradition more than anything else.

I would hardly call the advisors in Greece and the Philippines "regular Army".

I think this is pertinent to the discussion. It has already been posted, so I'll just post the link:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...6/649qrsob.asp

[SWJED]

According to the 20 Feb edition of the Marine Corps Times here is what MARSOC will look like...

Three main components: direct-action companies under a Marine Special Operations Regiment; a Foreign Military Training Unit; and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. Officials expect MarSOC will reach full operational capability by 2010.

The first FMTU teams, which are based at Lejeune, are training and will deploy starting in May.

The first Marine Special Operations Company - there will be nine direct-action MSOCs under the Marine Special Operations Regiment - will organize in May, train with the Lejeune-based 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deploy later this year. The first West Coast-based spec ops company is slated to join the 13th MEU in September.

Under current plans - outlined to senior leaders during their quarterly "executive off-site" on Jan. 18 and remaining in flux as working group studies and reviews continue - the nine direct-action companies will fall under two Marine Special Operations Battalions. Those battalions report to the Marine Special Operations Regiment.

Besides the direct-action companies and FMTUs, plans also call for the establishment in July of a Marine Special Operations Support Group, which will provide battalions with a range of specialized skills, from security and K-9 teams to communications, intelligence and logistics.

Marine Special Operations Command

Under current plans, the MarSOC will be broken into three main sections:

Marine Special Operations Regiment

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Four Marine Special Operations Companies

1st Special Missions Training Branch

2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion

Five Marine Special Operations Companies

2nd Special Missions Training Branch

Small Craft Company

Foreign Military Training Unit

Alpha Company

12 teams

Bravo Company

12 teams

Marine Special Operations Support

Support Company

ANGLICO Platoon

Security Platoon

Communications Platoon

Intelligence Company

CI/HUMINT Platoon

SIGINT Platoon

Analysis Platoon

Logistics Company

[NDD]

Interesting TO&E. I wonder what the size of the teams in the FMTU will be. Also be interesting to see the rank structure of those teams. I'm not a Marine, but with 24 teams it looks like they will be NCO led? Maybe a Corporal?