USMC and SOCOM

[SWJED]

Reprinted in full with permission from the MCG. Original copyright applies to further reproduction...

January Editorial: A Time for Every Purpose

There has been a lot of talk lately in defense circles about the Marine Corps finally hopping aboard the special operations bandwagon. On 1 November 2005, the Department of Defense formally announced the approval of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC). The command will consist of a headquarters element, a foreign military training unit (FMTU), a Marine special operations regiment consisting of two battalions, and a Marine special operations support group. The authorized strength for the entire enterprise is approximately 2,600. Most of the MarSOC elements will be located at Camp Lejeune, with one of the battalions of the regiment located at Camp Pendleton.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) was formed at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL in April 1987. For over 18 years the operators have been from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Marines chose not to play—opting for similar training for its MEUs designating them as “special operations capable.” USSOCom is taking on an increasing role in the global war on terrorism, and it is time for the Marines to jump aboard the special operations train. The trick is to do it right. If we don’t get it right, we become irrelevant in that increasingly important milieu.

We are fortunate in that we are not starting from scratch. In November 2001 our 32d Commandant, Gen James L. Jones, signed a memorandum of agreement with USSOCom to work together. In July 2003 the Marines formed an 86-man contingent, called Detachment 1, to train and operate specifically in special operations missions.

As tantalizing as it is to declare victory in the world of the 24-hour news cycle, it is important to understand that the “beam me up, Scotty” mantra from Star Trek days just isn’t doable. To get it right, we must go about the formation in stages, and we must ensure that each stage is fully funded. We may not see MarSOC at full operational capability for about 5 or 6 years. Here are some knotty things to think about as we go along.

Manpower issues. Once the units are formed, we must keep the manning at 100 percent plus. Anything less will be unacceptable. Once designated, expect individuals to remain in the business for consecutive tours—perhaps even for the duration of careers. Our promotion boards will have to adapt to this reality. Other concerns are skill qualifications to be designated, impacts on the ability of the Marine Corps to deploy other operational units under current plans, and creating the MarSOC out of existing end strength authorizations of approximately 175,000 if required to do so.

Concept of employment. Since the FMTU already exists, the continuance of that program should proceed unimpeded. Presumably, the special operations elements, probably of company size, would deploy with our forward deployed MEUs, much in the manner of special purpose MAGTFs that we have formed in the past. If this kind of deployment is routine in the future, what is the impact on the MEU? Who will task, command and control, and provide support for operations? What is the role of Marine aviation from the seabase in support of this special unit? How is the current air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) configuration impacted since the support group missions in the joint world coincide to a degree with that of ANGLICO?

MarSOC headquarters. What is the role of the headquarters staff for MarSOC? Is it a warfighting staff or just an administrative organization that will simply man, equip, and train the various units?

Operational security. There is no organization in the Nation that has a better feel for public relations than our Marine Corps, but this is one of the areas that is best handled out of the limelight. We have some very smart officers at the upper echelons dealing with this issue. I’m confident that they will get it right, and in the end, we will be that part of USSOCom that is called upon repeatedly to handle the toughest tasks in the war on terror in the difficult days ahead.

[DDilegge]

Sorry for the delayed response. Most of the replies (questions) to my original posts were, in my opinion, answered adequately enough for those that read those posts. The USMC - SOCOM relationship is a done deal and the debate on the positive or negative aspects of this relationship is moot.

That said, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with MG Geoffrey Lambert (USA Ret.). General Lambert is one of the “grey beards” (senior mentors) of a program I work on (Joint Urban Warrior) and of course, one of our nation’s foremost experts on SOF related issues. His background in SOF speaks volumes.

Reader digest version – I asked him how the USMC could maintain its “youth” (large turnover of first-term Devil-Dogs) while "taking on" many SOF missions that historically have been filled by senior NCO’s and SCNO’s. His advice was to look at the US Army Ranger model for a possible answer to this issue. Any thoughts out there? I know just enough about the Ranger community to make me dangerous.

S/F

Dave

[NDD]

Sorry for the delayed response. Most of the replies (questions) to my original posts were, in my opinion, answered adequately enough for those that read those posts. The USMC - SOCOM relationship is a done deal and the debate on the positive or negative aspects of this relationship is moot.

That said, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with MG Geoffrey Lambert (USA Ret.). General Lambert is one of the “grey beards” (senior mentors) of a program I work on (Joint Urban Warrior) and of course, one of our nation’s foremost experts on SOF related issues. His background in SOF speaks volumes.

Reader digest version – I asked him how the USMC could maintain its “youth” (large turnover of first-term Devil-Dogs) while "taking on" many SOF missions that historically have been filled by senior NCO’s and SCNO’s. His advice was to look at the US Army Ranger model for a possible answer to this issue. Any thoughts out there? I know just enough about the Ranger community to make me dangerous.

S/F

Dave

I knew him when he was a Major. Ranger Batts do not do FID. I think there are many SOF missions that the Marines and Rangers do with junior troops. I would say FID and UW would be the exceptions I can think of right off the top of my head.

[DDilegge]

Ranger Batts do not do FID. I think there are many SOF missions that the Marines and Rangers do with junior troops. I would say FID and UW would be the exceptions I can think of right off the top of my head.

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?

[NDD]

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?

Yes, unconventional warfare - as defined by SF.

Unconventional Warfare (UW). These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a Special Operation (SO) that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander's overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required,accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set ofcircumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:

1. Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.

2. Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

3. Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

4. Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.

5. Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.


The common element between FID and UW is rapport. They require patience in abundance.

At the end of the day, I think it all depends on what the unit will be capable of within their limitations. There really aren't a lot of UW missions to do. There is a lot of FID.

Mr. Bill Moore made a statement previously in this thread along the lines of "the USMC has done FID thoughout history" or words to that effect - without trying to ruffle, I disagree with that statement. Yes, other units have done some FID. And I fully believe the Marines are capable of doing it - if they are trained to do it and will accept the need to change in order to get it done. But nobody but SF has been doing FID, I mean really doing it, for the last 50 years.

In order for this unit to have FID as a primary mission, the young-old thing will have to be put aside. If I were king, this unit would be doing DA, SR and CT, not FID. That would free up A-Teams to focus on FID and UW. That way everybody is sort of in their lane. And it would be easy to keep them young.

My experience has shown me that there is a progression: When one is young, door kicking is all that. Then there comes the maturity and patience needed to do FID - about the same time one can no longer run and gun with the 20 year-olds.

I would use the Marine element to hunt down and interdict high value targets and let them slowly work their way into the FID thing, if it all. I think the Marines bring a lot to the table and I'm really glad this is happening.

[SWJED]

According to the 20 Feb edition of the Marine Corps Times here is what MARSOC will look like...

Three main components: direct-action companies under a Marine Special Operations Regiment; a Foreign Military Training Unit; and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. Officials expect MarSOC will reach full operational capability by 2010.

The first FMTU teams, which are based at Lejeune, are training and will deploy starting in May.

The first Marine Special Operations Company - there will be nine direct-action MSOCs under the Marine Special Operations Regiment - will organize in May, train with the Lejeune-based 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deploy later this year. The first West Coast-based spec ops company is slated to join the 13th MEU in September.

Under current plans - outlined to senior leaders during their quarterly "executive off-site" on Jan. 18 and remaining in flux as working group studies and reviews continue - the nine direct-action companies will fall under two Marine Special Operations Battalions. Those battalions report to the Marine Special Operations Regiment.

Besides the direct-action companies and FMTUs, plans also call for the establishment in July of a Marine Special Operations Support Group, which will provide battalions with a range of specialized skills, from security and K-9 teams to communications, intelligence and logistics.

Marine Special Operations Command

Under current plans, the MarSOC will be broken into three main sections:

Marine Special Operations Regiment

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Four Marine Special Operations Companies

1st Special Missions Training Branch

2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion

Five Marine Special Operations Companies

2nd Special Missions Training Branch

Small Craft Company

Foreign Military Training Unit

Alpha Company

12 teams

Bravo Company

12 teams

Marine Special Operations Support

Support Company

ANGLICO Platoon

Security Platoon

Communications Platoon

Intelligence Company

CI/HUMINT Platoon

SIGINT Platoon

Analysis Platoon

Logistics Company

[NDD]

Interesting TO&E. I wonder what the size of the teams in the FMTU will be. Also be interesting to see the rank structure of those teams. I'm not a Marine, but with 24 teams it looks like they will be NCO led? Maybe a Corporal?

[NDD]

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/20051...special-forces

Long, but good FID stuff.

[SWJED]

March issue of National Defense - Corps’ Trainers Target ‘Ungoverned’ Areas of World.

The first element of the Marine Corps’ new special-operations command already is scrambling to tackle its mission—to help prepare the soldiers of under-developed nations to defend themselves against terrorists.

The foreign military unit, as it has been dubbed, was established in October 2005, said its operations officer, Maj. Herman Glover. Ultimately, it will include 430 Marines and Navy medical corpsmen. The unit will be organized into a headquarters element, four companies built around two-dozen 11-man teams and a standards and training cadre. The companies will focus on specific regions where cultures and languages are similar, Glover said...

Training foreign military personnel has been a core assignment for special operators at least since 1952, when the Army’s Special Forces were founded. But the pace of that training has grown significantly in recent years as part of emerging U.S. counter-terrorist operations. In 2004, in addition to fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operators participated in more than 50 joint combined-exercise training events with other nations around the world...

Teams will deploy to host nations for periods ranging from six weeks to three months, he said. They will teach basic infantry and counter-terrorist tactics. Among the subjects will be:

• Individual skills, such as marksmanship with individual and crew-served weapons, hand-to-hand combat, first aid and tactical communications.

• Small-unit tactics, including coastal interdiction, patrolling, offensive and defensive operations, urban shooting skills and civil affairs.

• Anti-terrorism and force protection, such as access control and unit self-defense.

• Support functions, including basic logistics and casualty evacuation.

• Leadership and law of land warfare.

... The FMTU is recruiting mature Marines who can work independently, knowing that their actions can have strategic implications, he said. In fact, the first two teams, which began training in August 2005, are made up entirely of non-commissioned officers with at least one overseas deployment in an infantry unit and foreign language capability.

Once they join the FMTU, Marines will be expected to stay three to five years—a relatively long tour of duty—Glover said. “We will invest a lot of time and money to teach them those skills, and we want to get our money’s worth.”

After their tours in the FMTU is over, Marines can either go back to a regular Marine unit or transfer to another MARSOC element, such as one of the special-operations battalions or the support group...

[SWJED]

25 Jan. American Forces Press Service - Marine Corps Special Ops Will Add to Military Capability, Commander Says
.

By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Jan. 26, 2006 – The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, the newest addition to the special operations community, will be a complementary force that will ease the strain on other services' elite units and will contribute to the nation's readiness in the global war on terror, the new unit's commander said here today.

"I firmly believe that this is the right thing to do for the country at this time," said Marine Brig. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik, commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. "This irregular warfare is here to stay. If we don't start to go that way, where the force is more joint and more capable across the spectrum, that's not a good thing."

The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, will formally stand up its headquarters Feb. 24 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. In addition to the headquarters, Camp Lejeune will be home to the Marine Special Operations Support Group, several foreign military training units, a Marine special operations battalion, and the Marine Special Operations School, Hejlik said. Another Marine special operations battalion will be stationed at Camp Pendleton, Calif., he said.

Over the next five years, MARSOC will grow to an end strength of 2,600 people, Hejlik said. This will include 24 foreign military training units that will deploy worldwide in support of U.S. Special Operations Command and the various combatant commanders, he said. MARSOC already has three FMTUs that will deploy in 2006 and 2007, he said.

The Marine special operations battalion will include four Marine special operations companies, each with 97 to 118 people, depending on mission requirements, Hejlik said. The core of these companies will be experienced force reconnaissance Marines taken from the mainstream Marine Corps, he said.

"There's a lot of capability there, because they're a little bit older; they're a little bit more mature," he said.

The Marine special operations companies will deploy with Marine expeditionary units, Hejlik said. Once deployed, the companies will under operational control of the special operations commander in theater, but be available to support the MEU if needed, he said.

"The intent is not just to rip the guts out of the MEU," he said. "We like to say that they're not separate, but separable."

The focus of MARSOC at the beginning will be the foreign military training units and their missions, Hejlik said. These units will complement the work being done by similar units in other special operations forces and will fill gaps that have arisen due to the recent high demand on special operations, he said. The Marine FMTUs will support all five geographic combatant commanders, with the first scheduled to carry out a mission for U.S. European Command, he said.

The first Marine special operations company will not be formed until May 2006 at Camp Lejeune, Hejlik said.

Marines will only spend three to five years in MARSOC and then will be rotated back into the regular Marine Corps, Hejlik said. This rotation will benefit the entire force, because young Marines will be trained to a higher standard in MARSOC and will bring those skills to other units, he said. It will also prevent Marines from becoming stagnant in one unit and give them opportunities for advancement and education, he said.

"If you take a quality Marine and you bring him up to a little higher standard using (special operations forces) standards, and you give him the right equipment, he is unbeatable," he said.

[yogi]

Bring back the GWOT and make the USMC responsible for “winning” this conflict over the next forty years.

Just a quick thought to resurrect this train. As a “conventional” fighter pilot/Air Force officer at an Army school for the past year, I am an outside observer to both the Army and Marine Corps institutions.

A speaker today from USSOCOM provided a “Strategic Appreciation” chart showing the potential tensions in the world system generating instability counter to the interests of the United States. The chart indicated instability and criminal activity followed migratory/trade routes from troubled areas to the doorstep of the United States. Also clearly evident from the presentation, if not explicitly stated, was that USSOCOM required increased capability above the current 57,000 personnel in order to counter this threat and influence the unfolding global system in purposeful ways over the coming decades.

I am not an economist or an historian. But my instinct tells me that the United States is in danger of financial ruin caused in part by “imperial overstretch” and poor political decisions. The debt has reached the insanity level. Military resources are sure to decline in the coming years out of necessity for the United States to continue adequate governance at home. USSOCOM expansion currently requires sacrifices from the existing budgets of the services.

What if the USMC transitioned from an energetic and youthful force bred to take the hill to a more mature force capable of nuanced decision making and influence backed up with lethal effects? What if the USMC were given the task to fully assume responsibility to conduct Overseas Contingency Operations (GWOT)? The Marines already have significant capabilities in their favor to execute this mission: motivated; mobile by boat, air, or land; joint within the department; and a select group full of pride and tradition. These characteristics are immediately transferrable to turn this force into an effective GWOT capability for the benefit of the United States.

USMC responsibility for the GWOT would allow the Army, Air Force and Navy to focus on conventional and nuclear deterrence. This arrangement provides the highest potential for success in today’s fight while deterring or winning tomorrow’s conflict within the resource constraints of future budgets paying down massive debt.

[davidbfpo]

Yogi,

Congratulations on such a first post, challenging "conventional" wisdom and advocating the USMC take on the GWOT role - even more of 'what' when you are an airman.

Elsewhere Imperial overstretch has been discussed, IIRC more on the financial burden, rather than who should be the "boots on the ground". Curiously after WW1 the British Empire considered and implemented the use of air power for imperial policing, notably in Iraq and less so along the Northwest Frontier (now the FATA). Military effectiveness and cost-cutting were involved, plus the then new "toy" of air power.

I was puzzled at this:

A speaker today from USSOCOM provided a “Strategic Appreciation” chart showing the potential tensions in the world system generating instability counter to the interests of the United States. The chart indicated instability and criminal activity followed migratory/trade routes from troubled areas to the doorstep of the United States.

For some the chart should have shown instability and criminal activity follow routes from the USA to troubled areas. Mexico is a good, current example where US domestic demand for drugs has increased the crisis of governance. I am sure other SWC members, including two SOF members, have chimed in on this theme recently.

Now I shall sit back and see if your post causes others to react.

[John T. Fishel]

David, I must take some minor issue with your characterization of drug related crime as flowing from the US (demand). Demand is, itself, much more complicated with Europe being as (nearly ore perhaps more so) big a market for illicit drugs as the US. Then there are the emerging drug markets in the producing and transit countries. Other issues that are related - criminal gangs. The Salvadoran MS 13 and Mexican 18th Street were founded in the US, exported back to their home countries through deportation exacerbated by no notice to the host country from the deporting country(US, UK, Canada) and then re-exported to the US (and UK and Canada). Point, as my title suggests, is that this is a highly complex issue with few, if any, good answers.

For our Air Force and USMC friends - our world is now JOINT whether we likeit or not. USMC capabilities can be enhanced in the direction suggested or not but the USMC (and USAF, USN, USA, and USCG) will operate jointly for the foreseeable future under unified commanders, JTFs and JIATFs. That means that the GWOT, by whatever name, will be joint (writ large) - which I applaud. Each military service along with other govt agencies brings unique capabilities to the table which are generally much more effective when employed together than when used alone.

Cheers

JohnT

[GI Zhou]

Yogi,

It could be argued that this was the mission of the Marine Corps in 1920s and 30s from Central America to China and outposts in between, and this continued after the Second World War. This is why they were so successful in the Chosin Resevoir Campiagn (the small number of Army tanks and tankers helped all out of proportion to their numbers too). The United States Marine Corps had kept its combat role and mission.

revet.

[JeffWolf]

Gi Zhou:

I think this article - http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/2/257 - argues it was Marine personnel policy that contributed to success at Chosin.(Mod's note - article behind a register and paywall).

Thanks
Jeff

[yogi]

Davidbfpo,

The SOCOM speaker acknowledged the return of resources/money etc. following the trade routes.

GI Zhou,

I agree that the Marines were highly effective at executing the majority of the President’s/United States foreign policy over the years. The Marines have used airpower in small wars for longer than the USAF has existed. My confidence in their capabilities and motivation are part of the reason I suggest their responsibility for this ongoing operation.

John T.

The GWOT is the “most likely” threat to the United States. Full up conventional or nuclear war, through direct conflict or the escalation smoldering cold war remnants is arguably the “most dangerous” for the long-term existence of the United States. One “joint” organization preparing for both means compromise. Jack of all trades, master of none…

If the Marine Corps assumed or is assigned the responsibility for the GWOT, this would increase the overall security of the United States. As an airman, I’ll use the debate about the Joint Strike Fighter and the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) to demonstrate. The USAF is purchasing 100 LAAR aircraft to fill the gap between conventional capabilities and Irregular Warfare requirements in a permissive air environment (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/th...hes-light.html). This procurement is simultaneous with the requirement to cut over 5,000 active airmen from the force to comply with resource constraints while ISR requirements continue to rise. The idea is that these aircraft will allow increased USAF Foreign Internal Defense (FID) capability as well as fill a niche capability for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander during JTF operations.

I would argue this LAAR capability, while extremely important, is better served by the USMC invested/responsible for the GWOT and assuming FID as part of that effort. Does the USMC really need a Harrier replacement in a 4th generation STOL aircraft? I think it is a hard sell. With the JSF estimated at $135M per aircraft (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/20/js...o-135-million/) that is an expensive platform for an arguably required capability. What if the USMC purchased 150 LAAR at $5M a piece (less than $1B for 150 aircraft and boats to preposition them on, or 7 JSF) and operated 50 for training and prepositioned the others afloat for potential FID or GWOT efforts? The bang for the buck would significantly increase for the United States if the Marines assumed this FID/GWOT role for the land/sea and air domains.

Thanks for the comments. Who listens to these ideas any way? Do they make a difference in the long run?

Yogi