Modify Eisenhower's Policy of Massive Retaliation to Precision Retaliation or Precision Engagement.Originally Posted by jmm99
Modify Eisenhower's Policy of Massive Retaliation to Precision Retaliation or Precision Engagement.
What he said...
Only slightly modified...
I'd have to second
Ken's modification to Slaps suggestions,
along with required recognition at a national level exactly what type of resources/capability/institutional organizations need to exist in order to actually make both viable options in international partner and not-so-partners calculations.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Does not ....
Precision Engagement (what you do and how you do it) include Precision Retaliation and Precision Prevention (both going to why you do it).
I like Bill's Framework - to which, could be added the "Precision" stuff.
The "off the cuff" remark reminded me of my friend's father who had so much active and reserve time in as a Navy SNCO, his service stripes covered most of his left sleeve.
Somewhere in this discussion, I'd like to work in Marc Legrange's concept of looking at violent non-state actor vs violent non-state actor (e.g., Somalia, Sudan) conflicts as less a matter of distributing security than as distributing insecurity. I don't fully understand exactly where he is going (maybe he doesn't either
Maybe his is the product of warped TdM-NGO experience (), but it may be a more useful way to look at "failed state" situations than the "Westphalian state in a neat box" approach, where the "need to provide security" is always the paramount concern.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 12-06-2009 at 08:59 PM.
Close enough for Guvmint workOnly slightly modified...
Excuse me, but didn't the Soviets try the terror through mass murder method in Afghanistan already? They killed something like 1.5 million Afghans and created 3 million refugees out of a prewar population of 15 million. Does anyone here believe that Afghan villagers did not live in fear of Soviet bombers and artillery? Certainly enough Pashtuns in the south were terrified enough to flood Pakistan with 2 million refugees.I consider this "strongest tribe" idea to be very mislead. It's not about strength or reliability. It's about threat value instead. There's little to no booty (the classic tribal warfare motivator) to gain in the Afghanistan conflict, therefore choosing sides is either about power (relevant only to a minority) or security.
The "strongest tribe" concept doesn't pass my plausibility check, a "most threatening power" concept could do so.
This did not help their security problem in the countryside nor did it kill resistance to DRA rule. By 1986 they had already decided to withdraw from the country, despite the fact that the first Stinger missiles had not yet arrived.
Moreover, can someone please tell me how a foreign occupation that bases its control on terror can create a semi-stable native regime once it leaves? One not based on hopes and dreams?
To kill isn't the same as to threaten. It's more like a failure, just as WW3 would have been a failure of MAD deterrence.
Rational humans don't get influenced by risks for their life if said risks are random. The Russian methods were not really extortion-oriented, but rather the application of firepower in support of ground ops.
- - - - -
Today it's like
ISAF/OEF = policeman
Taliban = racketeers
Civilians = shop owner
The shop owner gets extorted by the racketeers, the policeman doesn't catch the racketeers red-handed, but learns about it and speaks to the shop owner.
The shop owner stays silent because he knows that the policeman won't be able to bust the whole racketeer gang and he doesn't want his shop burned down.
On top of that, the policemen rarely leave their fortified police stations, drive around in armoured patrol cars - and still get killed quite often by racketeers.
The promise of security is worthless, the threat is real.
What is the difference between "strongest tribe" and "most threatening power"? I see no real difference. The strongest tribe is strong precisely because it can impose the most punishment if pushed.
Security is not about providing total protection. If that is the focus, its bound to fail. The "strongest tribe" does not provide guards and forts to protect every dwelling. The British famously policed the entire gulf with what, one battalion of coldstream guards? The strongest tribe reliably and consistently helps its allies (at least after the fact) and reliably and ruthlessly goes after tribes that cross its red lines. But it also draws red lines that are pretty basic and not unrealistic.
There is no general rule. Afghanistan is a particular case. The real question is not whether X country can be "pacified" this way or not. The question is "can Afghanistan be pacified in this or that manner".
I think that the taliban could have been overthrown and replaced with a long lived Afghan govt that could survive with some help from outside. And that govt would have been helped to provide more services and benefits than the taliban could. OK, mistakes were made. but lets not forget that most Afghan refugees came back to Afghanistan AFTER the supposedly safe and brilliantly in-control Taliban had been driven away. More kids are in school, many many more young people are in college, much more economic activity is going on even now (most of it is foreign aid, I know).
I think its possible, from THIS situation, to get to a reasonably functional Afghan regime and its even possible to get many taliban to join such a state. But to do so, pakistan has to be on board on the side of this experiment, not against it. AND most communities have to see that the taliban are pursued after X or Y acts and that promises are kept. The taliban are not some sort of amorphous ocean. They have commanders, bases, networks. These can be identified and targeted. All these things are possible (though certainly not guaranteed to happen). So its not just hopes and dreams. Its a real possibility (even if not the likeliest possibility?).
Is the team in place now capable of carrying it off and is it worth it? those are different questions. My point is, its not hopelessly naive to think this can be done (and done without using infinite resources or mass killings of hostages) , even in Afghanistan.
I'd look again ...
to this (meaning Fuchs finds agreement):
From the shop owner's standpoint, the racketeers are not security. In fact, they can operate only in a zone of insecurity. Now, the policeman could be security, but only if he operates in a zone of security. Since the policeman cannot provide real security (elimination of the racketeers), the promise of security is relatively worth less (is more insecure) than the insecurity assured by the racketeers.from Fuchs
Today it's like
ISAF/OEF = policeman
Taliban = racketeers
Civilians = shop owner
The shop owner gets extorted by the racketeers, the policeman doesn't catch the racketeers red-handed, but learns about it and speaks to the shop owner.
The shop owner stays silent because he knows that the policeman won't be able to bust the whole racketeer gang and he doesn't want his shop burned down.
On top of that, the policemen rarely leave their fortified police stations, drive around in armoured patrol cars - and still get killed quite often by racketeers.
The promise of security is worthless, the threat is real.
Thus, in distributing insecurity, the racketeer comes out ahead of the police. Legrange could illustrate this concept with more specific, current examples.
My historical example is southern Cork, Ireland from ca. 1200-1600:
policeman = British Crown, whose writ was de jure, not de facto
racketeers = MacCarthy Reagh, an extended family network (sept) of reasonable military talents (centered at Rosscarbery and Kilbrittain, and better political talents (not good for much else)
shop owner = the several hundred septs who were linked to MacCarthy Reagh via an elaborate pecking order; and who paid for and benefited from Reagh's protection money (Black Rents) and loan sharking (cattle lending and raiding) rackets.
To the British Crown, southern Cork was a zone of instability - and perhaps, if the inhabitants had known real security, they would have agreed. In the fact, Reagh offered its inhabitants the best "distribution of insecurity" (which is my use of that term - Marc Legrange may have a different take).
Possibly too much history here of my name "tribe", but it happens to be the traditional tribe best known to me.
Cheers
Mike
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