The "we need to provide security" argument and the "strongest tribe" hypothesis

[jmm99]

If so, what are the recommended options, or a recommended singular COA if there are not options, for democracies to pursue in situations where another nation-state is beset by an armed conflict with one or more violent non-state actors, or where a country (a de jure, but not a de facto, nation-state) is beset by an armed conflict between two or more violent non-state actors ?

This question is more generic than Astan-centric. That situation will play out despite what "COIN theorists and pro-Afghan "surge"(tm) pundits" might now say about it.

In effect, what should the "Weinberger-Powell doctrine" be for the future ?

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Jmm99

If so, what are the recommended options, or a recommended singular COA if there are not options, for democracies to pursue in situations where another nation-state is beset by an armed conflict with one or more violent non-state actors, or where a country (a de jure, but not a de facto, nation-state) is beset by an armed conflict between two or more violent non-state actors?

Off the cuff,

Rule 1 Don't Get Involved: Don't get involved unless it is absolutely in our national interest to do so.

Rule 2 Pick the Winning Team: make an assessment of who the winning actor will be and support that actor so we have influence after the conflict. If a State government is hopelessly corrupt and refuses to address the real issues that are driving the insurgency, then the last thing we need to do is side with that government. Instead quietly support the insurgency and then recognize the new government when they win. Think of all the lives that will be saved by not dragging the conflict on for years by keeping a lame duck government alive.

Rule 3 Limit Complexity: Limit complexity to the extent possible, don't bring in a multiple-nation coalition just for IO purposes (instead carefully pick partners). Garner international support without asking for their troops who are generally not willing to fight. You simply added another guy with a vote at the decision table who has different objectives that will further restrict your freedom of movement (big change from how we do business now).

Rule 4 Keep the Host Nation in the Lead: Assuming we're supporting a real nation state, not one in name only, then ensure we stay in a supporting role, except when it is necessary for our troops to suppress a threat militarily that the host nation doesn't have the capacity for, but then after we suppress, roll back immediately into a support role.

Rule 5 Conduct a Non-Bias Assessment: Conduct a non-bias assessment to ensure we understand the context of the conflict so we can develop realistic objectives (vice feel good effects) and devise the appropriates ways and means to achieve them. Don't embrace COIN and nation building unless it is appropriate.

Rule 6 Don't Commit to Fluff: national leadership carefully avoids making any fluff statements (we'll change country X into a budding democracy with a growing economy before we go home), and only make public statements about obtainable military objectives. Then maybe make comments something like we'll assist the host nation with development and reforming their government, but I want to be clear we'll only assist as long as they are making progress, if they refuse our advice, we won't waste our assets there. It isn't our success or failure, but theirs.

Caveat, none of these rules will necessarily get you one step closer to winning, but they may leave you in a position with options.

In effect, what should the "Weinberger-Powell doctrine" be for the future

Great question, and one that has been ignored too long.

[William F. Owen]

A key element of defeating an insurgency by making insurgents fear you. I have no problem with that at all. Old as the hills and solid common sense.

[Ken White]

Plural...

Rule 4 Keep the Host Nation in the Lead: Rule 5 Conduct a Non-Bias Assessment

Yes. Though I frankly don't think we're capable of doing either...

Great question, and one that has been ignored too long.

Doctrine (in that case is) dogma...

[Bill Moore]

Rule 6 Don't Commit to Fluff: national leadership carefully avoids making any fluff statements (we'll change country X into a budding democracy with a growing economy before we go home), and only make public statements about obtainable military objectives. Then maybe make comments something like we'll assist the host nation with development and reforming their government, but I want to be clear we'll only assist as long as they are making progress, if they refuse our advice, we won't waste our assets there. It isn't our success or failure, but theirs.

Change Rule 6 to its their war.

Example in today's news summary:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/op...oEk3anNjZVVxAA

a Sept. 2, 1963, interview with Walter Cronkite:

Cronkite: “Mr. President, the only hot war we’ve got running at the moment is, of course, the one in Vietnam, and we have our difficulties there.”

Kennedy: “I don’t think that unless a greater effort is made by the [Vietnamese] government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them; we can give them equipment; we can send our men out there as advisers. But they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last two months, the [Vietnamese] government has gotten out of touch with the people. ...”

Cronkite: “Do you think this government still has time to regain the support of the people?”

Kennedy: “I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel I think it can. If it doesn’t make those changes, the chances of winning it would not be very good.”

[slapout9]

In effect, what should the "Weinberger-Powell doctrine" be for the future ?

Regards

Mike

Modify Eisenhower's Policy of Massive Retaliation to Precision Retaliation or Precision Engagement.

[Ken White]

Modify Eisenhower's Policy of Massive Retaliation to Precision Retaliation and / or Precision Engagement.

Only slightly modified...

[Ron Humphrey]

Ken's modification to Slaps suggestions,
along with required recognition at a national level exactly what type of resources/capability/institutional organizations need to exist in order to actually make both viable options in international partner and not-so-partners calculations.

[jmm99]

Precision Engagement (what you do and how you do it) include Precision Retaliation and Precision Prevention (both going to why you do it).

I like Bill's Framework - to which, could be added the "Precision" stuff.

The "off the cuff" remark reminded me of my friend's father who had so much active and reserve time in as a Navy SNCO, his service stripes covered most of his left sleeve.

Somewhere in this discussion, I'd like to work in Marc Legrange's concept of looking at violent non-state actor vs violent non-state actor (e.g., Somalia, Sudan) conflicts as less a matter of distributing security than as distributing insecurity. I don't fully understand exactly where he is going (maybe he doesn't either ); but the basic idea seems to be: how do traditional, subsistence tribal groups approach taking sides (or staying neutral) in a situation where the sides are both knuckleheads ?

Maybe his is the product of warped TdM-NGO experience ( ), but it may be a more useful way to look at "failed state" situations than the "Westphalian state in a neat box" approach, where the "need to provide security" is always the paramount concern.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Only slightly modified...

Close enough for Guvmint work

[tequila]

I consider this "strongest tribe" idea to be very mislead. It's not about strength or reliability. It's about threat value instead. There's little to no booty (the classic tribal warfare motivator) to gain in the Afghanistan conflict, therefore choosing sides is either about power (relevant only to a minority) or security.

The "strongest tribe" concept doesn't pass my plausibility check, a "most threatening power" concept could do so.

Excuse me, but didn't the Soviets try the terror through mass murder method in Afghanistan already? They killed something like 1.5 million Afghans and created 3 million refugees out of a prewar population of 15 million. Does anyone here believe that Afghan villagers did not live in fear of Soviet bombers and artillery? Certainly enough Pashtuns in the south were terrified enough to flood Pakistan with 2 million refugees.

This did not help their security problem in the countryside nor did it kill resistance to DRA rule. By 1986 they had already decided to withdraw from the country, despite the fact that the first Stinger missiles had not yet arrived.

Moreover, can someone please tell me how a foreign occupation that bases its control on terror can create a semi-stable native regime once it leaves? One not based on hopes and dreams?

[Fuchs]

Excuse me, but didn't the Soviets try the terror through mass murder method in Afghanistan already? They killed something like 1.5 million Afghans and created 3 million refugees out of a prewar population of 15 million. Does anyone here believe that Afghan villagers did not live in fear of Soviet bombers and artillery? Certainly enough Pashtuns in the south were terrified enough to flood Pakistan with 2 million refugees.

This did not help their security problem in the countryside nor did it kill resistance to DRA rule. By 1986 they had already decided to withdraw from the country, despite the fact that the first Stinger missiles had not yet arrived.

Moreover, can someone please tell me how a foreign occupation that bases its control on terror can create a semi-stable native regime once it leaves? One not based on hopes and dreams?

To kill isn't the same as to threaten. It's more like a failure, just as WW3 would have been a failure of MAD deterrence.

Rational humans don't get influenced by risks for their life if said risks are random. The Russian methods were not really extortion-oriented, but rather the application of firepower in support of ground ops.

- - - - -

Today it's like
ISAF/OEF = policeman
Taliban = racketeers
Civilians = shop owner

The shop owner gets extorted by the racketeers, the policeman doesn't catch the racketeers red-handed, but learns about it and speaks to the shop owner.
The shop owner stays silent because he knows that the policeman won't be able to bust the whole racketeer gang and he doesn't want his shop burned down.

On top of that, the policemen rarely leave their fortified police stations, drive around in armoured patrol cars - and still get killed quite often by racketeers.

The promise of security is worthless, the threat is real.

[omarali50]

What is the difference between "strongest tribe" and "most threatening power"? I see no real difference. The strongest tribe is strong precisely because it can impose the most punishment if pushed.
Security is not about providing total protection. If that is the focus, its bound to fail. The "strongest tribe" does not provide guards and forts to protect every dwelling. The British famously policed the entire gulf with what, one battalion of coldstream guards? The strongest tribe reliably and consistently helps its allies (at least after the fact) and reliably and ruthlessly goes after tribes that cross its red lines. But it also draws red lines that are pretty basic and not unrealistic.
There is no general rule. Afghanistan is a particular case. The real question is not whether X country can be "pacified" this way or not. The question is "can Afghanistan be pacified in this or that manner".
I think that the taliban could have been overthrown and replaced with a long lived Afghan govt that could survive with some help from outside. And that govt would have been helped to provide more services and benefits than the taliban could. OK, mistakes were made. but lets not forget that most Afghan refugees came back to Afghanistan AFTER the supposedly safe and brilliantly in-control Taliban had been driven away. More kids are in school, many many more young people are in college, much more economic activity is going on even now (most of it is foreign aid, I know).
I think its possible, from THIS situation, to get to a reasonably functional Afghan regime and its even possible to get many taliban to join such a state. But to do so, pakistan has to be on board on the side of this experiment, not against it. AND most communities have to see that the taliban are pursued after X or Y acts and that promises are kept. The taliban are not some sort of amorphous ocean. They have commanders, bases, networks. These can be identified and targeted. All these things are possible (though certainly not guaranteed to happen). So its not just hopes and dreams. Its a real possibility (even if not the likeliest possibility?).
Is the team in place now capable of carrying it off and is it worth it? those are different questions. My point is, its not hopelessly naive to think this can be done (and done without using infinite resources or mass killings of hostages) , even in Afghanistan.