Fuchs

Great post, and while I admire our efforts to get better at COIN, I think much of our COIN doctrine is built upon false assumptions, or more accurately the assumptions are applied to broadly to too many conflicts, when in many cases they may not be relevant (using Gian's term it has become an intellectual straight jacket).

'The pro-Western powers (the government) needs to earn the local's support and allegiance by providing services and constructing objects for better quality of life. This construction work and the maintenance of public services can only succeed if protected properly against enemy.
Regardless of who doing is fighting the insurgency (western or eastern governments) the stated goal in our doctrine is too separate the insurgent from the populace, and generally this attempted through security/combat operations and economic reform, or hearts (my life will be better if the counterinsurgent wins) and minds (the counterinsurgent is going to win, so it is probably a better decision to side with them).

There is some historical evident that this approach has merit, especially if you're fighting a communist based insurgency, which often focuses on mobilizing the poor masses against corrupt governments (it is a hearts and mind struggle based somewhat on ideology, but also there is generally a tribal aspect to it) with promises of economic reform (buyer beware). Let's assume the struggle isn't about economic systems, but more focused on identity, then perhaps the hearts and minds approach is ill suited?

This allegiance thing is also imo the core of the talk about "being the strongest tribe" that's popular among many COIN crowd members.
The "strongest tribe" idea means that locals ally with the strongest (and reliable) power and despise, even attack a weak or unreliable power.
It's a close relative of the "we must provide security" and "Afghan surge" concepts because it's all at least in part about having more forces in place.
I consider this "strongest tribe" idea to be very misleading. It's not about strength or reliability. It's about threat value instead. There's little to no booty (the classic tribal warfare motivator) to gain in the Afghanistan conflict, therefore choosing sides is either about power (relevant only to a minority) or security.
The "strongest tribe" concept doesn't pass my plausibility check, a "most threatening power" concept could do so.
Throughout history I can't recall any situations off the top of my head where working through tribes and tribe like structures has ever led to any degree of long term political stability. By enabling one tribe you simply drive the wedge in deeper between them and opposing tribes. In a historical context the stroingest tribe status is generally a fleeting moment, which may explain the push by our neo-cons to reform these governments (into a democracies), and perhaps hoping to create a tribal melting pot political system where everyone has a voice, thus there is no need to take up arms outside the established political process. I don't complete disagree with the idea since I'm somewhat of a closet neo-con at heart, but I do question its feasibility.

IMHO If and when a society is ready to transition into a democracy we should help them with all the elements of our national power, and more importantly with the great talent and knowledge embedded in our society outside of the government. In the meantime if we feel compelled to interfere, then we should limit that interference to gentle nudges and by demonstrating the merit of our system through our successes at home. For some reason an attempt to impose democracy by bayonet is not generally effective; however, you can impose draconian forms of government by bayonet. The bottom line appears to be if the people don't want it, then you won't impose it.

Back to the military perspective, why should we get involved in tribal engagement? First off I think tribal engagement is a necessity regardless of your goals, because we're going to have to deal with the civilian populace, but engage to what end? One aspect as was demonstrated by the CIA and Special Forces is you can form a "business" relationship of convenience (a temporary merger) to kick a mutal competitor's butt. If we limited the engagement to facilitating a punitive military engagement, then we could have left with our heads held high, and there would be no hurt feelings with our business partners if the terms were properly negotiated in the first place. Probably wise to maintain a relationship incase we need to merge again. That is a much more economically viable form of tribal engagement.

I don't agree, for I do not support warfare that's critically based on hopes and dreams.
That's a strong statement, but I think it is well within the bounds of being an honest critique.

I think you achieved your goal of opening a debate.