The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[MikeF]

Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Apr...tion&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

I thought some of the points were good, some bad. They're trying to address the security issue- Good on them; however, I dislike many over the overgeneralizations. Anytime one talks about a controversial subject and begins with "it is widely agreed that..," they usually lose my attention. We have a lot of untested theorems circulating right now.

One common element that I find missing in many of these reports is assuming what the local populace needs instead of asking. Here's an example of how I learned this through blunt trauma.

In Zaganiyah back in June 2007, we started seeing great strides in security. I wanted to begin lifting many of the blocking positions, curfews, and other emergency measures to begin transitioning into "hold and build." We started planning and resourcing for project money for clinics ($150,000) and schools ($200,000).

Before we executed my brilliant plan, a local came by to talk to us at the patrol base. He stated that he was a doctor, a clinic already existed, and all he needed was some soldiers to provide security, medical supplies, and a salary to pay him and his nurses. I looked at him dumbfounded. I was like, "that's it?"

The clinic was up and running the next week at a cost of less than $3000. The IA pulled security, our medics ordered extra CL VIII supplies, and some cash got the doctor back in business.

Same answer with the schools. The lesson I learned was to always ask the people that live in the area how best to help them instead of planning up grand schemes in a vacuum.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Thanks for the positive.

What I love about your posts is that they always seem to focus on identifying the actual folks involved in deciding what is needed, then engaing them in getting it done.

It's like US planning 101, but seems so difficult to get across in the reconstruction game.

Steve

[Ross Wherry]

Steve,

Apologies for seeming prickly. I agree that it's the contract culture. But like honest politicians, good contractors stay bought and get their job done with a minimum of whining.

The UPI article posted recently is dead on, or at least completely consonent with my biases. I was also impressed by Micheal Yon article from 13 Dec on SWJ. He sees clearly. My own experience in Helmand was 2005, flying into Lashkar Gah's pebble runway. I can only be in awe of Marines now operating south of there. The farmers we were trying to help still had dried poppies hung up in barns in case the Americans left (which eventually happened).

On the issue of clearing and holding villages, I hold the position that villages are probably the right level for "clear and hold" security operations since that the bad guys move into the villages first, whether it's Nepal or Colombia. The "build" operations probably are best run out of the equivalent to a county, call it a district or a qada or a municipality. It lends a certain economy of scale, and allows for balancing local rivalries. MikeF had it right with the need to be circumspectly consultative -- if the local folks chose the project, it's less likely to be destroyed by one or another of the armed groups. We saw that in Salvador and Colombia, but not in eastern Zaire.

Lastly, I had the honor of running the RTI project in Iraq for 18 months. Thanks for the kind words.

[Ross Wherry]

Steve.

Who writes that stuff? The authors I recognized spent their tours in Baghdad in the friendly confines of the Republican Palace.

see also Imperial Life in the Emerald City, but don't buy a copy.

Guess my biases are all out on the table now.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross:

That's what it looks like to me.

Lot's of money in them there think tanks afterwards, too.

I think I was in the embassy a few times, usually on the way to somewhere that you could actually see and learn things...

[Steve the Planner]

OK.

Here's a good test.

Press coverage indicates that the battle of Now Zad,second largest town in Helmand is complete and they are just mopping up now.

Clear is done, lots of refugees fled.

Now what comes next?

Steve

[Cole]

Here's a good test.

Press coverage indicates that the battle of Now Zad,second largest town in Helmand is complete and they are just mopping up now.

Clear is done, lots of refugees fled.

Now what comes next?

Steve

I'll bite. Cognizant that we want civil, government, and security activities to occur simultaneously, I would start by positioning FOBs, COPs and OPs around Now Zad that are mutually supporting and adjacent to the population. I would collocate ANA/ANP and U.S. security personnel in each of the FOB and platoon (+) sized COP. Also would position OPs in between the COPs and FOBs with vehicle crew-served weapon firing positions available at each protected by HESCO.

Looking at this maplandia photo of Now Zad, where would the best locations for the FOB and COP be based on both METT-TC and ASCOPE:

http://www.maplandia.com/afghanistan/helmand/now-zad/

I might suggest putting the FOB in the open area and inch and a half north of the blue dot at the end of the diagonal main street appearing to run through town. On the southern end of town and that diagonal road, would take over the entire compound of buildings and courtyards that sits alone at the end of the road, to create a COP. Just east of the zoom tool in an L-shaped open area inside the town, would create another COP. Midway along the west end of town in the open desert south of the zoom tool would create a COP. On the east side of town about 4 inches from the west COP would position another COP in the open area close to the town, but not too close.

Would construct tall towers at each COP and FOB with video surveillance to ensure coverage of much of the town. Would place a QRF in the FOB in the center of town. Construction of that large FOB with interior helicopter landing area would facilitate resupply. Might consider building housing for government civilians, civilian aid workers, and contractors within that FOB. Might consider building or walling in housing adjacent to the FOB for families of locally recruited Pashtun Soldiers who return to town looking for work and a place to live.

Would build girl's schools next to each COP and FOB with women's clinics adjacent to each. Would encourage mothers to bring their girls to school where the mothers can get medical help next door. Waiting rooms for moms with televisions would provide information messages that will be passed along to husbands. All employees in the girl's school and clinic would be women. Male doctors might provide televised advice to clinic personnel and televisions in classrooms would help teach students. Hot meals prepared at COPs and FOBs would also be provided for school breakfast and lunch to encourage attendance. Other grains and raw foods might be handed out to mothers on a limited basis.

Would include wind turbines and solar power panels at each COP and FOB and large generators to power both the FOB/COP and adjacent neighborhoods eventually, with nearby government offices and schools/clinics receiving power initially.

How does that sound for someone tempting William F. Owens wrath about seeing something work in theory given my novice awareness of COIN?