The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[Steve the Planner]

CMSBelt:

Agree that security and availability are overstated problems.

On the civilian reconstruction side, however, I think the same is true of post-conflict reconstruction.

I have read all the literature and manuals recently produced on the subject, but most miss the point. Most, IMHO, are assemblages of political and organizational slogans, but provide little if any guidance on the actual how to's needed for effective solutions.

Immediate reconstruction, ie, restarting what existed before, is neither complicated nor non-linear. In sum, very much adaptable to traditional mil approaches and resources. Rapid and effective reconstruction requires, more than anything, a systematic approach to understanding what was there before, and what needs to be done to get it operational again.

In Iraq, I put together a simple diagram---a triangle with Water, Energy, Mobility (WEM). Beyond security, these were the essentials to get back in place, and the pre-conditions (in varying degrees) for any business, factory and local economic restarts. Systems of roads and bridges, articulatedto identify local trade connections, patterns and dependencies, as an example, helps to prioritize which repairs are needed when, and which roads and bridges are essential to do first. Also, quick repairs and route/movement security are usually well within the military sphere--including construction resources.

So, there is a Level One which is deeply tied to military reconstruction for immediate and basic services.

Level Two is more complex, involving major repairs and system replacements---like engineering and constructing a major bridge replacement.

The place where things bog down is when people, organizations attempt to go beyond reconstruction into the sphere of development, whether social, economic or political.

At the first level, you have folks doing what they thing are "quick hits" like building schools and public health clinics, but these are actually local/provincial organizational and systemic changes that require, for sustainability, a level of organizational/institutional engagement that may, from the outset, assume levels of political stability and will that goes far beyond the immediately possible. The slippery slope to a higher level of problem/solution.

At the next level, you get into regional and national system change which, in any light, is a very advanced problem/solution set (nation-building) which, at it's core, involves every possible "wicked" problem.

Instead of rationalizing the levels and distinctions between immediate post-conflict reconstruction (a very military-oriented problem), and the distinctly different start down the slope of development, we operationalize a series of competing, and often conflicting, US and international agencies, armed with contractors and contract managers, to create a mix and muddle with little feasible sustainability or focus.

Minister Ghani and Stephen Hadley were discussing this at USIP on Monday. As the Minister indicated, a lot of US/Int'l reconstruction is just a mess, and far more expensive, rife with corruption, and ineffective than it should be. It is a dance of aid agency organizational imperitives, and not a genuine and focused reconstruction effort. Now, if you can't get the baseline reconstruction part going, how do you effectively leap to complex social and organizational development?

I spent time with Dr. Baban, Iraq's Minister of Planning, looking at the US effort, and shaking heads. Last month, he was quoted in the NYT as saying our $53 billion reconstruction effort left no marks---he was starting from scratch. I agree.

Notwithstanding, our Iraq Surge succeeded in getting us out, and begs the question of which parts, if any, of the failed $53 billion effort, actually contributed to the military and political problems we faced/addressed in Iraq.

This problem becomes uniquely important in Afghanistan where, unlike Iraq, our focus is not on a unity of indigenous government, but, instead on a complex, disaggregated approach to the body politic.

Add complexity to complexity, and immerse it in development missions with little focus, and you get what you get.

Steve

[Ken White]

I just subcribe to realism and accept that it will not be pretty, they way most would like, or the best we could do. I wish it could be different but accept that it likely will not be and I can very grudgingly accept that...

And that's okay, it will be adequate. Mediocrity is our touchstone.

Bob's World: There always are...

Rob:

"...I don't expect a budget shift and part of the reason is based on what I have seen I don't think any potential beneficiary would be willing to risk having the marker called in - they only seem to want the sure thing and I don't see many of those in the near future."

Exactly -- that's why it will not get fixed.

A big part of the problem is that we -- military and civilian -- have become so bureaucratic and so very risk averse in all aspects that we are becoming a true danger to ourselves. We aren't there yet but the prognosis is not good unless those trends are reversed...

CMS and Steve the Planner:

We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body...

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

"We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body... "

Right.

Within my aspirations (World Peace? A Bugatti on the Autobahn?) is a
Field Guide to Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction, laying out the stages and actions required to do at least a functional job of getting the basics done after fighting. It is, of necessity, military led and focused. And just the basics of stabilization.

(Quite apart from all the confusing multi-agency Development initiatives that people seem to get lost in).

Another forest cut down to become a paperweight?

Steve

[jmm99]

The FM should be in three parts:

1. The Ways and Means of a Punitive Raid, where there is no intent to occupy a country legally.

2. Your Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction in situations where a short-term legal occupation follows from an intervention.

3. Clear doctrine when we should use 1 vs 2 - there is a difference.

Cheers

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Right. Different types of engagements have different requirements.

My version is that it runs from theatre to village, but focuses exclusively on the immediate post-conflict reconstruction process.

First, post-conflict reconstruction is the stage at which immediate issues of human services are addressed---food security, health/casualty care, refugees, basic system restoration, and basic establishment of the writ of government (to include security/rule of law).

Also, it focuses on basic systems studies, fact-finding, forensic analysis, and documentation to establish what was there before, what is there now (post-conflict assessment), and establishes the analytical tool kit for what comes now and later (background systems mapping, population & refugee accountability, infrastructure availability and condition studies)---the essentials for figuring out what is there now, and the analytical spine for future "development" considerations.

It proceeds in basically three stages through the "handoff" to development. Stage 1 is just about human and essential services (first aid, refugees, food, water and security).

Stage 2 begins to focus more on improving systems stuff, courts and procedures, intergovernmental connections and public works projects (as opposed to immediate relief/repair).

Stage 3 starts to prepare for hand-off to either development (if applicable within the mission) or indigenous government with the caveat that Rule of Law seems to be the last and most important continuing component.

The How To part should be general enough to guide theatre level oversight, but with enough basics and case studies of projects and types to take a platoon through an engagement in a village that wants a new school or well repair.

Like the old 1940's Country books for Iraq, Iran, etc... Here are the basicxs you need to know to move intelligently through this objective...

Embedded in that is the notion that CERP (Commander's Emergency funds) are for immediate restoration and stability, and some other coordinated support system exists for development (ie, school building, major projects).

When, were and if "something else" like development, region, or nation-building is needed, that is a different manual....

Something like that.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Hugh:

My understanding is that SCRS didn't get funded (again) to move beyond the theoretical. Unfortunate, IMHO, that they were not able to organize, step up, and get some streamers for their guidon while the two biggest post-WWII operations were underway. Probably not a good sign...

MG Caslen (just left MND-North) did a presentation today at USIP on the Way Forward in Iraq.

Interesting that, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, a uniform is a big deal. In the middle, a civilian is probably, as you suggest, the best counter-party for civ-to-civ gov't interface; a local public works manager or transportation engineer speaks the same functional language across the world. At the end, as MG Caslen pointed out, they appreciate the military contribution but cannot afford to be photographed too often with the military in the post conflict/occupation periods.

Personally, I think they are all just ephemeral presentations, but recognizing the importance of appearance is critical. Getting the job done right is the heart---changing uniforms is easy.

Personally, I thought the State Department's Blue Badge was the all-purpose badge, but, with the exception of the 2007/8 Civilian Surge, it seems that DoS mostly just staffs within its species now (foreign service/governance, not technical SMEs).

In Afghanistan, from the looks of it, there are a number of different agency-by-agency stripes, and they each seem to have their own plans, purpose. Lots of noise about cooperation, but my friends on the ground there don;t see much difference from what was described in the opening Foreign Policy Article.

[jmm99]

It is interesting to look at FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (which is primarily a 1956 effort, except in some areas not relevant here, representing the post-WWII experience with Germany, Japan and transitions where a friendly government is on deck):

Section II. ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

362. Necessity for Military Government

Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises governmental authority over occupied territory. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military occupation, or the undesirability of allowing it to do so. (See par. 12, which discusses military government, and par. 354, dealing with civil affairs administration.)

363. Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (HR, art. 43.)

which are the default for a legal occupation. The transition to civil affarirs adminitration is covered here:

354. Friendly Territory Subject to Civil Affairs Administration Distinguished

Civil affairs administration is that form of administration established in friendly territory whereby a foreign government pursuant to an agreement, expressed or implied, with the government of the area concerned, may exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government.

Such administration is often established in areas which are freed from enemy occupation. It is normally required when the government of the area concerned is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. Territory subject to civil affairs administration is not considered to be occupied.

If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the enemy, military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure (see par. 12 b and c). A civil affairs agreement should, however, be concluded with the lawful government at the earliest possible opportunity.

A neat simple outline of legal responsibilities. As you say, "nation building" is another manual.

Regards

Mike

[Hugh Davis]

I hope somebody at DoS's S/CRS reads this thread & asks for Steve's advice before the process of organizing & recruiting for the CRC gets committed to the "bridge to nowhere" syndrome.

I am confident that everyone involved in these stabilization & reconstruction projects really wants to make things better. I also understand the natural tendency to assume that qualifications similar to those of the planners would be appropriate for the people they bring in to carry out the projects.

If I were hiring employees, or forming a partnership, I would look for people whose strengths offset my own weaknesses, and let's face it, we all have some. I'd also try to identify the body of knowledge, skills & abilities (KSA) needed to attain the objective, & try to figure out where people are most likely to develop those KSAs.

I think the KSAs for development & stabilization are more likely to exist in the private sector & local government than in the Federal government. Even the ability to articulate policy in a variety of forums exists among local government & private sector employees.

I understand our government's aversion to risk the lives of civilians, but they really ought to give both the volunteers & the public more credit for having the courage to accept risks for a worthwhile goal. Manage the risk rather than trying to hide from it.

At the risk of sounding facetious, rural Americans from private sector or local government backgrounds may be able to establish rapport with HN personnel in a way that some other USG representatives don't. We can honestly tell the HN officials & local leaders that we understand exactly why they feel uncomfortable & suspicious when someone introduces himself by saying, "I'm from Washington, & I'm here to help." Once that's out of the way, maybe we can help. After all, some Federally funded projects actually do some good at home, even if there are good reasons to ask whether the strings are worthwhile.

Maybe USAID is the natural home for the CRC whenever it finally gets organized. It's amazing how much of their budget is in the form of grants & contracts to be administered, rather than hands-on development work. I suspect "The Ugly American" would have trouble getting hired in this generation.

[Ross Wherry]

Steve,

I agree that direct hire govt employees might be more efficient than those awful contractors, of whom I'm one. But the Feds aren't allowed outside the wire without massive security. Counterproductive. Contractors, being modestly more expendable, can often get out and be useful if well directed.

Contracts should be judged by their tooth-to-tail ratio. More than half tail -- send 'em home, with no further ado.

Poppy eradication is a steadily receding mirage. Same for spraying coca bushes. Been there, chased it, came home disillusioned. Until the marketing links are disrupted, Smith's invisible hand will keep the harvests coming.

I like your thought of a well staffed hub, provided that there is unity of purpose. A half-pint replication of the WDC interagency process isn't good for the mission. There are (too) few examples of ready reserves in civilian instances, but they exist. The trick seems to be finding a city/county with enough good men and women willing to take a walk on the wild side from time to time.

How do we make this hub work? Komer did it in Viet Nam, but I haven't seen it be successful since.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross;

My problem with contractors isn't, per se, with the contractors, but the contracts.

Too often, I have seen, or heard of contractors who, because of their status, are just not allowed into the game---so their effectiveness gets limited. Otherwise, it is the gamesmanship of the contracts themselves.

In Iraq, I worked closely with some RTI contractors, who were genuine specialists, and real did great work where they could. One was around since Basra in '04 and is mentioned in the Prince of the Marshes. I wished, though, that he had a proper Blue Badge so he could be more effectively engaged in '08, and that he wasn't tied to tripping over contract/admin stuff so much.

Even though we might have been great side-by-side, the contract was a stumbling block. Same with the civilian GIS folks---good skills but no clearances was a problem for rapid ramp up using US base data.

Being concerned more with the end product than the who, I felt that many of the people would have been more effective for the US effort if there was a direct structure.

Sorry if you took it the wrong way.

Steve

[Hugh Davis]

Steve & Ross,

I've learned a lot from reading SWJ's discussions, & spent several weeks reading the discussions before registering. As you may have gathered, most of my career is in State & municipal government. I haven't yet had the opportunity to serve overseas. I appreciate folks like you sharing your lessons learned. If (when?) I get the call, I want to be as prepared as I can be, which, to me, includes anticipating potential problems & trying to have at least a partial solution in mind.

I hope I'm wise enough to remember that these partial solutions aren't set in stone, & have to be adapted to the facts on the ground.

In the meantime, as we discuss this "big picture" stuff about how the civilian effort should be organized, I agree that mid-career SMEs have additional responsibilities & concerns that need to be addressed differently than we approach the recruitment of an 18 year old military volunteer. Ross is right that career protection is important. It would be helpful if Congress would consider protecting these volunteers' jobs the way we protect reservists deployed on military duty. Steve is also right that continuing professional education & certification is an important concern.

It's tempting to get frustrated about how imperfect the system is. It does take time, though, for the US to figure out what does & does not work, & then to figure out why, & then to make improvements. It's not just Congress & the bureaucrats; they have to figure out how to explain to the rest of us what they're trying to accomplish & why it's a good idea to spend our money on it. I think that's part of our "national character," to be difficult to persuade & slow to decide. Sometimes it's a strength, & sometimes a weakness.

Again, I appreciate y'all sharing your experience, & I hope somebody in a position to influence the decisions is paying attention.

[CMSbelt]

Steve:

My observations come from serving in Baghdad as an Army National Guard colonel in CJTF-7 (I was Chief of Policy in the C-5 Directorate) in 2004 and then as a State Department civilian in the US Embassy Baghdad’s Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment (JSPA) office in 2006 and 2007. My academic background includes a good deal of work in Public Policy. (Before I decided to focus upon security studies, I was interested in urban planning.)

While you raise many good points and your “three stage” outline is a useful structure to prioritize post-conflict reconstruction activities, my argument is that:

(1) It may be getting close in some places, and some areas such as the Kurdish provinces have been mostly peaceful for several years, for the most part Iraq has not yet reached the “post-conflict” stage and is at best is currently a semi-permissive environment;

and

(2) Development/Reconstruction in conflict areas or semi-permissive environments has a quantum difference from those activities in peaceful areas or permissive environments. This is because our normal development and economic practices and models operate under the assumption of a relatively high degree of security, which is necessary for the spontaneous individual economic decisions and investment that are required to expand and link together the efforts of the government (and/or occupying forces and/or international development programs). As a sheer matter of manpower and funding limitations, centrally directed and funded efforts cannot do very much on their own. It’s not merely a matter of having funding, a good central plan, and sensible priorities--solutions also require the participation of individuals who contribute value and begin to “fill in the gaps” and can leverage the government/occupier/international community efforts.

The problem in a semi-permissive environment is that no logical person will want to invest in a business if the storefront is likely to blown up and its employees and customers frequently murdered. And, government/occupier/international community activities are attractive targets for terrorists, insurgents, and guerillas unless a high degree of security is provided. But, securing business areas, residential areas, and infrastructure requires a large force—whether military, contractors, or police—until the conflict is reduced to the point where the environment really becomes “post-conflict” and normal development/economic growth processes can be used.

During the interim period we recognize that jobs and economic opportunity play an important role in reducing incentives to engage in violence, but I do not believe it is at all clear how to integrate military/police security efforts with economic and civil society development efforts in manner that will help to push the environment into a “post-conflict” situation. To date, I think we’ve attempted to follow the processes and practices that are known to work in primarily peaceful environments but we either do not understand how to adequately adapt them to situations of high violence or have been unwilling or unable to devote enough resources to create enduring pockets of security within which the usual approaches will be effective.

In late 2003 and early 2004, when violence was relatively low compared to the peaks of 2006, the priority effort to restore electrical power to Baghdad in particular and across Iraq more generally seemed sensible and a great deal of expertise and money was devoted to repairing and enhancing the electrical infrastructure.

--Chris Schnaubelt

[CMSbelt]

---Continued---

In late 2003 and early 2004, when violence was relatively low compared to the peaks of 2006, the priority effort to restore electrical power to Baghdad in particular and across Iraq more generally seemed sensible and a great deal of expertise and money was devoted to repairing and enhancing the electrical infrastructure.

This effort pretty much aligned with your description of Stage 2.

However, the US-led coalition forces were either unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection to hundred of kilometers of power lines and insurgents soon discovered they could easily bring down power lines and pylons to disrupt the supply of electricity and achieve an important psychological effect of showing the impotence and/or incompetence of the occupation forces at first and then the new Government of Iraq once sovereignty was handed over.

Although everyone recognized that Iraq was still a "war zone," efforts to repair and improve the electrical infrastructure did not adequately recognize the special requirements of an environment at the level of conflict existing at the time. (Also critical, the military senior leadership tended to view the infrastructure and economic development efforts as separate and unrelated to security and thus protecting them was "somebody else's" problem.)

This only one example, but is representative--I think--of the way economic development efforts must operate differently, and require additional integration with security efforts--in environments that have not yet achieved the "post-conflict" stage.

The attitudes have changed with new leadership and the publication of FM 3-24 (COIN), and there is more willingness today to cooperate amongst military and civilian officials than what I saw in the first half of 2004. But, I believe there are unique features of a semi-permissive environment that require tailored activities and integration between security and development activities that we haven't quite figured out yet.

[Steve the Planner]

CMSbelt:

Security is not a decisive factor in whether people need to eat on a given day.

Either security permits free access and low prices, people starve, or it comes some other way.

A battle space commander does not own the economy unless he actively engages and understands it---from day one. Markets, supply routes, sources, etc...

Mishandling has two alternative consequences: (1.) people suffer from lack of supplies, which destabilizes support for him; or (2) a black market grows which destabilizes support for him.

Iraq and Afghanistan are conflict zones of long-standing, and American occupation did little to materially change the economic difficulties they learned to adapt to. People find a way or they starve. Black markets cannot be eradicated in those places without reasonably abundant free trade and basically functional markets---or by mass feeding programs.

Baby needs to eat every day, and if a battle space commander does not know how the people in his space are eating, there is probably a lot more that he is not tracking.

KRG prosperity is a really bad example. If you track the supply routes supporting their relatively peaceful economy, they were primarily Diyala and Ninewa---the conflict zones that they were equally dependent on.

There was never a day when the oil barons of Bayji did not have fresh eggs and Hillal chicken, nor one where people couldn't buy gas from him (even if the government supply wasn't delivered). This despite inaccurate assurances from Baghdad that poultry re-start in the North could not occur until the train restarted to move grain from Basrah.

KRG got its grain without a train, and Bayji had abundant fresh poultry if you could afford it. How did that happen?

The sustainable solution to black market oil profiteers in Kirkuk was not to arrest the bad guys, but to fill the market with legitimate gas.

An effective Stage 1 response to conflict is to identify and stabilize economic systems, and to supplement legitimate ones as rapidly as possible. Otherwise, you can end up in a years long occupation in a very troubling space.

Perhaps it is too simplistic to draw the distinctions, but, somewhere, there is a thesis waiting to be written contrasting occupation without due consideration for economics vs. non-occupation or occupation that focused on economic systems.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Civilian surge: an expensive failure or an emerging force?


AFN Leads with a headline that Risks Limit Civilian Movement:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp...MFjVWJE9A0Zcdg

""So what we're doing is embedding a lot of our civilians with our military troops," the chief US diplomat said as she stood next to Jandrokovic.

The policy allows the civilian experts and aid workers to get out "at the same time or literally the next day after the Marines and the army have sent the go signal that civilians can begin to work with... the Afghan people on a range of issues," she said.

But John Dempsey, a United States Institute of Peace analyst, told AFP last month that if civilians are stuck mainly on a military base or with armed escorts, "the impact of the increase will be marginal yet expensive."

President Barack Obama has called for increasing the number of civilian experts from 320 in January 2009 to 974 by January 2010 in order to help the Kabul government serve its people and wean the economy off opium production.

Jack Lew, the deputy secretary of state for management and resources, told US lawmakers Wednesday that he forecast a "20 to 30 percent" increase in 2010 above the current civilian target of 974."

Attackerman writes about a civilian to military ratio of 1 to 100.

"About 1,000 civilians overall in Afghanistan,” with 400 of those “out in the field” beyond Kabul, “USAID development specialists, Department of Agriculture specialists, throughout the country,” law-enforcement, DEA agents. They’ll “multiply the effects of wherever they are by hiring Afghans.”"

The civilian surge continues to be emerge...