Hugh:

You are drawing the relevant distinction between technical Subject Matter Experts in development, government finance, and operations of government vs. diplomacy and foreign assistance program managers.

It was bewildering to me in Iraq how the Subject Matter Experts (the few of us there were) were scattered out to PRTs, and subject to the direction of folks with little to no background in State & Local government, technical aspects of development, etc...

I do a lot of expert consulting in the public and private sectors, and nothing in the structure of US civilian assistance remotely resembles how it is actually done, or could viably be done.

It's that dumb old question: If the power goes out and the sewers back up at home, who you going to call? No offense but a foreign service officer wouldn't be on the list---they have no technical skills in those areas.

Same with a school system. Might help to have an actual experienced school administrator/facilities person engage in the dumb technical questions: Where are the nearby schools? How are teachers and supplies going to be delivered (after US expeditionary funds stop)? Do we have clear title and school system acceptance for the school?

In Iraq, DoS had a handful of slots in 2007/8 for Senior Planning Advisers and Senior City Management Advisers, but not for Afghanistan. Go figure?

In my opinion, senior technical reconstruction advisers should be flying squads to support/synchronize provincial/national/US/international reconstruction focus and resources through RCs, Brigades, Battalions, FSOs, USAID, PRTs and DSTs. No reason, with a good technical back-up, that a sergeant can't do a lot more, and a lot more effectively, with that approach.

That way, you magnify the capabilities of the folks on the ground by giving them helpful technical support and advice (and not just a new layer of bureaucracy) without impeding their hard-earned local relationships.

Also, you synchronize efforts by connecting the dots, at the local level, to programs and practices used elesewhere. At a USIP Conference yesterday, Ashraf Ghani (Former Minister of Finance, Afghanistan) was adamant that most of the reconstruction efforts could be done a lot cheaper, quicker and more effectively---a 90% cost/effectiveness increase. I agree.

As an example, in most small counties, they use "circuit rider" planners for special projects, and local engineering/legal, etc., experts as asupplement to local governments for those special projects. The locals keep control and responsibility, but get access to broader knowledge and best practices when needed. It's a pretty time-worn process.

The results in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is not used, speak for themselves.

If you check out a USAID application process, the big screen-out question is whether you have spent four years with an NGO in a post-conflict environment---so they are unlikely to ever obtain subject matter and technical experts in development---just more NGO contract managers.

When is USAID going to waive it's closed shop union requirements to recruit technical experts? I haven't seen that on anyone's list.

But, what do I know?

Steve

Affiliations:
Former Senior Urban Planning Adviser, Iraq
American Planning Association
American Institute of Certified Planners
Institute of Transportation Engineers
Council of Educational Facilities Planners, Int'l