The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[Ken White]

I just subcribe to realism and accept that it will not be pretty, they way most would like, or the best we could do. I wish it could be different but accept that it likely will not be and I can very grudgingly accept that...

And that's okay, it will be adequate. Mediocrity is our touchstone.

Bob's World: There always are...

Rob:

"...I don't expect a budget shift and part of the reason is based on what I have seen I don't think any potential beneficiary would be willing to risk having the marker called in - they only seem to want the sure thing and I don't see many of those in the near future."

Exactly -- that's why it will not get fixed.

A big part of the problem is that we -- military and civilian -- have become so bureaucratic and so very risk averse in all aspects that we are becoming a true danger to ourselves. We aren't there yet but the prognosis is not good unless those trends are reversed...

CMS and Steve the Planner:

We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body...

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

"We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body... "

Right.

Within my aspirations (World Peace? A Bugatti on the Autobahn?) is a
Field Guide to Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction, laying out the stages and actions required to do at least a functional job of getting the basics done after fighting. It is, of necessity, military led and focused. And just the basics of stabilization.

(Quite apart from all the confusing multi-agency Development initiatives that people seem to get lost in).

Another forest cut down to become a paperweight?

Steve

[jmm99]

The FM should be in three parts:

1. The Ways and Means of a Punitive Raid, where there is no intent to occupy a country legally.

2. Your Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction in situations where a short-term legal occupation follows from an intervention.

3. Clear doctrine when we should use 1 vs 2 - there is a difference.

Cheers

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Right. Different types of engagements have different requirements.

My version is that it runs from theatre to village, but focuses exclusively on the immediate post-conflict reconstruction process.

First, post-conflict reconstruction is the stage at which immediate issues of human services are addressed---food security, health/casualty care, refugees, basic system restoration, and basic establishment of the writ of government (to include security/rule of law).

Also, it focuses on basic systems studies, fact-finding, forensic analysis, and documentation to establish what was there before, what is there now (post-conflict assessment), and establishes the analytical tool kit for what comes now and later (background systems mapping, population & refugee accountability, infrastructure availability and condition studies)---the essentials for figuring out what is there now, and the analytical spine for future "development" considerations.

It proceeds in basically three stages through the "handoff" to development. Stage 1 is just about human and essential services (first aid, refugees, food, water and security).

Stage 2 begins to focus more on improving systems stuff, courts and procedures, intergovernmental connections and public works projects (as opposed to immediate relief/repair).

Stage 3 starts to prepare for hand-off to either development (if applicable within the mission) or indigenous government with the caveat that Rule of Law seems to be the last and most important continuing component.

The How To part should be general enough to guide theatre level oversight, but with enough basics and case studies of projects and types to take a platoon through an engagement in a village that wants a new school or well repair.

Like the old 1940's Country books for Iraq, Iran, etc... Here are the basicxs you need to know to move intelligently through this objective...

Embedded in that is the notion that CERP (Commander's Emergency funds) are for immediate restoration and stability, and some other coordinated support system exists for development (ie, school building, major projects).

When, were and if "something else" like development, region, or nation-building is needed, that is a different manual....

Something like that.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Hugh:

My understanding is that SCRS didn't get funded (again) to move beyond the theoretical. Unfortunate, IMHO, that they were not able to organize, step up, and get some streamers for their guidon while the two biggest post-WWII operations were underway. Probably not a good sign...

MG Caslen (just left MND-North) did a presentation today at USIP on the Way Forward in Iraq.

Interesting that, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, a uniform is a big deal. In the middle, a civilian is probably, as you suggest, the best counter-party for civ-to-civ gov't interface; a local public works manager or transportation engineer speaks the same functional language across the world. At the end, as MG Caslen pointed out, they appreciate the military contribution but cannot afford to be photographed too often with the military in the post conflict/occupation periods.

Personally, I think they are all just ephemeral presentations, but recognizing the importance of appearance is critical. Getting the job done right is the heart---changing uniforms is easy.

Personally, I thought the State Department's Blue Badge was the all-purpose badge, but, with the exception of the 2007/8 Civilian Surge, it seems that DoS mostly just staffs within its species now (foreign service/governance, not technical SMEs).

In Afghanistan, from the looks of it, there are a number of different agency-by-agency stripes, and they each seem to have their own plans, purpose. Lots of noise about cooperation, but my friends on the ground there don;t see much difference from what was described in the opening Foreign Policy Article.

[jmm99]

It is interesting to look at FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (which is primarily a 1956 effort, except in some areas not relevant here, representing the post-WWII experience with Germany, Japan and transitions where a friendly government is on deck):

Section II. ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

362. Necessity for Military Government

Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises governmental authority over occupied territory. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military occupation, or the undesirability of allowing it to do so. (See par. 12, which discusses military government, and par. 354, dealing with civil affairs administration.)

363. Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (HR, art. 43.)

which are the default for a legal occupation. The transition to civil affarirs adminitration is covered here:

354. Friendly Territory Subject to Civil Affairs Administration Distinguished

Civil affairs administration is that form of administration established in friendly territory whereby a foreign government pursuant to an agreement, expressed or implied, with the government of the area concerned, may exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government.

Such administration is often established in areas which are freed from enemy occupation. It is normally required when the government of the area concerned is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. Territory subject to civil affairs administration is not considered to be occupied.

If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the enemy, military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure (see par. 12 b and c). A civil affairs agreement should, however, be concluded with the lawful government at the earliest possible opportunity.

A neat simple outline of legal responsibilities. As you say, "nation building" is another manual.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

jmm:

If I am not mistaken, there are certain rules of the road/treaty obligations for occupation reconstruction/safeguarding populace, which would be worthwhile to summarize.

And a collection of technical "thou shalts" when a project is built by the US, even in a foreign country.

Steve

[Hugh Davis]

I hope somebody at DoS's S/CRS reads this thread & asks for Steve's advice before the process of organizing & recruiting for the CRC gets committed to the "bridge to nowhere" syndrome.

I am confident that everyone involved in these stabilization & reconstruction projects really wants to make things better. I also understand the natural tendency to assume that qualifications similar to those of the planners would be appropriate for the people they bring in to carry out the projects.

If I were hiring employees, or forming a partnership, I would look for people whose strengths offset my own weaknesses, and let's face it, we all have some. I'd also try to identify the body of knowledge, skills & abilities (KSA) needed to attain the objective, & try to figure out where people are most likely to develop those KSAs.

I think the KSAs for development & stabilization are more likely to exist in the private sector & local government than in the Federal government. Even the ability to articulate policy in a variety of forums exists among local government & private sector employees.

I understand our government's aversion to risk the lives of civilians, but they really ought to give both the volunteers & the public more credit for having the courage to accept risks for a worthwhile goal. Manage the risk rather than trying to hide from it.

At the risk of sounding facetious, rural Americans from private sector or local government backgrounds may be able to establish rapport with HN personnel in a way that some other USG representatives don't. We can honestly tell the HN officials & local leaders that we understand exactly why they feel uncomfortable & suspicious when someone introduces himself by saying, "I'm from Washington, & I'm here to help." Once that's out of the way, maybe we can help. After all, some Federally funded projects actually do some good at home, even if there are good reasons to ask whether the strings are worthwhile.

Maybe USAID is the natural home for the CRC whenever it finally gets organized. It's amazing how much of their budget is in the form of grants & contracts to be administered, rather than hands-on development work. I suspect "The Ugly American" would have trouble getting hired in this generation.

[Ross Wherry]

Steve,

I agree that direct hire govt employees might be more efficient than those awful contractors, of whom I'm one. But the Feds aren't allowed outside the wire without massive security. Counterproductive. Contractors, being modestly more expendable, can often get out and be useful if well directed.

Contracts should be judged by their tooth-to-tail ratio. More than half tail -- send 'em home, with no further ado.

Poppy eradication is a steadily receding mirage. Same for spraying coca bushes. Been there, chased it, came home disillusioned. Until the marketing links are disrupted, Smith's invisible hand will keep the harvests coming.

I like your thought of a well staffed hub, provided that there is unity of purpose. A half-pint replication of the WDC interagency process isn't good for the mission. There are (too) few examples of ready reserves in civilian instances, but they exist. The trick seems to be finding a city/county with enough good men and women willing to take a walk on the wild side from time to time.

How do we make this hub work? Komer did it in Viet Nam, but I haven't seen it be successful since.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross;

My problem with contractors isn't, per se, with the contractors, but the contracts.

Too often, I have seen, or heard of contractors who, because of their status, are just not allowed into the game---so their effectiveness gets limited. Otherwise, it is the gamesmanship of the contracts themselves.

In Iraq, I worked closely with some RTI contractors, who were genuine specialists, and real did great work where they could. One was around since Basra in '04 and is mentioned in the Prince of the Marshes. I wished, though, that he had a proper Blue Badge so he could be more effectively engaged in '08, and that he wasn't tied to tripping over contract/admin stuff so much.

Even though we might have been great side-by-side, the contract was a stumbling block. Same with the civilian GIS folks---good skills but no clearances was a problem for rapid ramp up using US base data.

Being concerned more with the end product than the who, I felt that many of the people would have been more effective for the US effort if there was a direct structure.

Sorry if you took it the wrong way.

Steve

[Hugh Davis]

Steve & Ross,

I've learned a lot from reading SWJ's discussions, & spent several weeks reading the discussions before registering. As you may have gathered, most of my career is in State & municipal government. I haven't yet had the opportunity to serve overseas. I appreciate folks like you sharing your lessons learned. If (when?) I get the call, I want to be as prepared as I can be, which, to me, includes anticipating potential problems & trying to have at least a partial solution in mind.

I hope I'm wise enough to remember that these partial solutions aren't set in stone, & have to be adapted to the facts on the ground.

In the meantime, as we discuss this "big picture" stuff about how the civilian effort should be organized, I agree that mid-career SMEs have additional responsibilities & concerns that need to be addressed differently than we approach the recruitment of an 18 year old military volunteer. Ross is right that career protection is important. It would be helpful if Congress would consider protecting these volunteers' jobs the way we protect reservists deployed on military duty. Steve is also right that continuing professional education & certification is an important concern.

It's tempting to get frustrated about how imperfect the system is. It does take time, though, for the US to figure out what does & does not work, & then to figure out why, & then to make improvements. It's not just Congress & the bureaucrats; they have to figure out how to explain to the rest of us what they're trying to accomplish & why it's a good idea to spend our money on it. I think that's part of our "national character," to be difficult to persuade & slow to decide. Sometimes it's a strength, & sometimes a weakness.

Again, I appreciate y'all sharing your experience, & I hope somebody in a position to influence the decisions is paying attention.

[Steve the Planner]

I guess I had my fingers crossed that somebody on this Board was going to jump out and, No you are wrong. New things are coming. It will all improve.

I keep scanning for articles, but all I ever find are the kind, like below that explan why or how the civilian effort isn't working: a UPI Report about "the missing tool" for Afghanistan:

"First is the means to bring governance to Afghans. In this regard, the government in Kabul is incapable certainly over the next year or two and almost certainly for the longer term. Appointing an overseer or foreign viceroy to put some steel into President Hamid Karzai's backbone is entirely infeasible and will no doubt force the resignation of the three or four capable ministers in the government who do not wish their authority bypassed. Hence, the job of bringing governance will fall on the shoulders of an already overstretched U.S. and NATO military and a so-called surge in civilian capacity that is a fiction. Unfortunately, even if the president had agreed with commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's upper-limit request of 80,000 additional troops, this nation building is not a job any military can do with confidence.

Second, the Afghan government has been roundly and correctly challenged on the grounds of corruption and waste. But even if those excesses could be magically corrected -- which they cannot -- this criticism misses the point. It is not Afghan waste and incompetence in managing its resources that is the issue. It is the incompetence and waste with which the tool of Western aid has been so grossly mismanaged that needs immediate redress.

The investigations of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan who reports to Congress -- not the White House -- suggest the scope of mismanagement. These could have been harsher. Specifically, for every dollar spent on Afghanistan reconstruction and aid, about a dime goes to the Afghan people. If this tool cannot be made to work, then all the king's horses and men will not turn Afghanistan into a functioning state."

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis...0201259762400/

Maybe somebody will come along....