The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[Hugh Davis]

I hope somebody at DoS's S/CRS reads this thread & asks for Steve's advice before the process of organizing & recruiting for the CRC gets committed to the "bridge to nowhere" syndrome.

I am confident that everyone involved in these stabilization & reconstruction projects really wants to make things better. I also understand the natural tendency to assume that qualifications similar to those of the planners would be appropriate for the people they bring in to carry out the projects.

If I were hiring employees, or forming a partnership, I would look for people whose strengths offset my own weaknesses, and let's face it, we all have some. I'd also try to identify the body of knowledge, skills & abilities (KSA) needed to attain the objective, & try to figure out where people are most likely to develop those KSAs.

I think the KSAs for development & stabilization are more likely to exist in the private sector & local government than in the Federal government. Even the ability to articulate policy in a variety of forums exists among local government & private sector employees.

I understand our government's aversion to risk the lives of civilians, but they really ought to give both the volunteers & the public more credit for having the courage to accept risks for a worthwhile goal. Manage the risk rather than trying to hide from it.

At the risk of sounding facetious, rural Americans from private sector or local government backgrounds may be able to establish rapport with HN personnel in a way that some other USG representatives don't. We can honestly tell the HN officials & local leaders that we understand exactly why they feel uncomfortable & suspicious when someone introduces himself by saying, "I'm from Washington, & I'm here to help." Once that's out of the way, maybe we can help. After all, some Federally funded projects actually do some good at home, even if there are good reasons to ask whether the strings are worthwhile.

Maybe USAID is the natural home for the CRC whenever it finally gets organized. It's amazing how much of their budget is in the form of grants & contracts to be administered, rather than hands-on development work. I suspect "The Ugly American" would have trouble getting hired in this generation.

[Ross Wherry]

Steve,

I agree that direct hire govt employees might be more efficient than those awful contractors, of whom I'm one. But the Feds aren't allowed outside the wire without massive security. Counterproductive. Contractors, being modestly more expendable, can often get out and be useful if well directed.

Contracts should be judged by their tooth-to-tail ratio. More than half tail -- send 'em home, with no further ado.

Poppy eradication is a steadily receding mirage. Same for spraying coca bushes. Been there, chased it, came home disillusioned. Until the marketing links are disrupted, Smith's invisible hand will keep the harvests coming.

I like your thought of a well staffed hub, provided that there is unity of purpose. A half-pint replication of the WDC interagency process isn't good for the mission. There are (too) few examples of ready reserves in civilian instances, but they exist. The trick seems to be finding a city/county with enough good men and women willing to take a walk on the wild side from time to time.

How do we make this hub work? Komer did it in Viet Nam, but I haven't seen it be successful since.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross;

My problem with contractors isn't, per se, with the contractors, but the contracts.

Too often, I have seen, or heard of contractors who, because of their status, are just not allowed into the game---so their effectiveness gets limited. Otherwise, it is the gamesmanship of the contracts themselves.

In Iraq, I worked closely with some RTI contractors, who were genuine specialists, and real did great work where they could. One was around since Basra in '04 and is mentioned in the Prince of the Marshes. I wished, though, that he had a proper Blue Badge so he could be more effectively engaged in '08, and that he wasn't tied to tripping over contract/admin stuff so much.

Even though we might have been great side-by-side, the contract was a stumbling block. Same with the civilian GIS folks---good skills but no clearances was a problem for rapid ramp up using US base data.

Being concerned more with the end product than the who, I felt that many of the people would have been more effective for the US effort if there was a direct structure.

Sorry if you took it the wrong way.

Steve

[Hugh Davis]

Steve & Ross,

I've learned a lot from reading SWJ's discussions, & spent several weeks reading the discussions before registering. As you may have gathered, most of my career is in State & municipal government. I haven't yet had the opportunity to serve overseas. I appreciate folks like you sharing your lessons learned. If (when?) I get the call, I want to be as prepared as I can be, which, to me, includes anticipating potential problems & trying to have at least a partial solution in mind.

I hope I'm wise enough to remember that these partial solutions aren't set in stone, & have to be adapted to the facts on the ground.

In the meantime, as we discuss this "big picture" stuff about how the civilian effort should be organized, I agree that mid-career SMEs have additional responsibilities & concerns that need to be addressed differently than we approach the recruitment of an 18 year old military volunteer. Ross is right that career protection is important. It would be helpful if Congress would consider protecting these volunteers' jobs the way we protect reservists deployed on military duty. Steve is also right that continuing professional education & certification is an important concern.

It's tempting to get frustrated about how imperfect the system is. It does take time, though, for the US to figure out what does & does not work, & then to figure out why, & then to make improvements. It's not just Congress & the bureaucrats; they have to figure out how to explain to the rest of us what they're trying to accomplish & why it's a good idea to spend our money on it. I think that's part of our "national character," to be difficult to persuade & slow to decide. Sometimes it's a strength, & sometimes a weakness.

Again, I appreciate y'all sharing your experience, & I hope somebody in a position to influence the decisions is paying attention.

[Steve the Planner]

I guess I had my fingers crossed that somebody on this Board was going to jump out and, No you are wrong. New things are coming. It will all improve.

I keep scanning for articles, but all I ever find are the kind, like below that explan why or how the civilian effort isn't working: a UPI Report about "the missing tool" for Afghanistan:

"First is the means to bring governance to Afghans. In this regard, the government in Kabul is incapable certainly over the next year or two and almost certainly for the longer term. Appointing an overseer or foreign viceroy to put some steel into President Hamid Karzai's backbone is entirely infeasible and will no doubt force the resignation of the three or four capable ministers in the government who do not wish their authority bypassed. Hence, the job of bringing governance will fall on the shoulders of an already overstretched U.S. and NATO military and a so-called surge in civilian capacity that is a fiction. Unfortunately, even if the president had agreed with commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's upper-limit request of 80,000 additional troops, this nation building is not a job any military can do with confidence.

Second, the Afghan government has been roundly and correctly challenged on the grounds of corruption and waste. But even if those excesses could be magically corrected -- which they cannot -- this criticism misses the point. It is not Afghan waste and incompetence in managing its resources that is the issue. It is the incompetence and waste with which the tool of Western aid has been so grossly mismanaged that needs immediate redress.

The investigations of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan who reports to Congress -- not the White House -- suggest the scope of mismanagement. These could have been harsher. Specifically, for every dollar spent on Afghanistan reconstruction and aid, about a dime goes to the Afghan people. If this tool cannot be made to work, then all the king's horses and men will not turn Afghanistan into a functioning state."

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis...0201259762400/

Maybe somebody will come along....

[Steve the Planner]

Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Apr...tion&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

[MikeF]

Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Apr...tion&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

I thought some of the points were good, some bad. They're trying to address the security issue- Good on them; however, I dislike many over the overgeneralizations. Anytime one talks about a controversial subject and begins with "it is widely agreed that..," they usually lose my attention. We have a lot of untested theorems circulating right now.

One common element that I find missing in many of these reports is assuming what the local populace needs instead of asking. Here's an example of how I learned this through blunt trauma.

In Zaganiyah back in June 2007, we started seeing great strides in security. I wanted to begin lifting many of the blocking positions, curfews, and other emergency measures to begin transitioning into "hold and build." We started planning and resourcing for project money for clinics ($150,000) and schools ($200,000).

Before we executed my brilliant plan, a local came by to talk to us at the patrol base. He stated that he was a doctor, a clinic already existed, and all he needed was some soldiers to provide security, medical supplies, and a salary to pay him and his nurses. I looked at him dumbfounded. I was like, "that's it?"

The clinic was up and running the next week at a cost of less than $3000. The IA pulled security, our medics ordered extra CL VIII supplies, and some cash got the doctor back in business.

Same answer with the schools. The lesson I learned was to always ask the people that live in the area how best to help them instead of planning up grand schemes in a vacuum.

Mike