The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[Steve the Planner]

Ross:

The crux of the problem.

In the field, everybody wants (and might actually need) Greg Mortenson or Rory Stewart to come in, join the tea party, and work out effective schools, jobs, etc.., in a village they have just invested a huge amount of time, blood and treasure to clear, so that it can be effectively held and built---a stable addition to the win column.

Reality is that actual trained civilian SMEs will always be a shortage, and the conditions will not support and sustain them to operate effectively beyond one-on-one examples. 12,000 some villages need 12,000 Greg Mortensons working for two years; not going to work, or happen.

What we get instead is something that does not work. Lots of contractors where, a contract let in Washington gets flipped down through so many groups that only 5% of the money/value ever hits the ground in Afghanistan. This being managed by US federal civilians whose expertise is, in fact, in those contracts, and contracted engagements. It is expensive, inefficient, and does not deliver what hold and build promises.

The statement was that there would be 1,000 civilians of which 400 will be in the field. What do the 600 do? What do the 400 do? How are they resourced? What are their specific expertises for the problems faced?

Most, it seems are ag experts (a big help maybe), FBI/DEA, transferees from higher level federal agencies. Oh, and plenty of reflagged military---while I agree that the pay/benefits are better, and that an experienced military reflag will always be productive, they are not civilian SMEs of the type required for serious change. And are, too often, compromised by prior position from reaching beyond "this is how we have always done it."

The big disconnect, it seems, is that soldiers in villages are calling for schools and services (immediate and medium term engagement tools), while the US civilian focus was and remains on poppy irradication (Ag, FBI, DEA). While laudable, it is a very big mismatch.

We all know that, especially for an older civilian, their are huge risks and discomforts to going out in the field for the civilian, and an additional burden on those who are carrying them. The challenge, however, should be whether it is worth it.

My argument was, and remains, that civilian SMEs will always be in short supply (absent a genuine Reconstruction Corp which doesn't exist, or USAID retooling/restaffing with SMEs---this would not happen in any time frame related to Afghanistan).

Assuming the 400 are genuine SMEs in, say, transportation, schools, health, once one is assigned out to a FOB or DST, how productive can he be? He is only one expert in one of potentially many needed specialties.

The question is: Given that they will always be in short supply, how do you magnify their work to support the required mission?

Off the bat, I can imagine lots of ways to magnify SMEs down to the village-level, but most involve working out of a hub that brings advice, training and resources down to the front line.

Personally, I believe the hub works most effectively as a civilian SME activity engaged around an MND or RC, and sets up a service delivery system that takes advantage of what they offer: Division-level engineering, terrain, intel, CA, construction battalions, oversight, coordination, movement, finance, logistics.

From there, it serves as an expert tool with linkage downward to the field, but links upward to national and US-level programs. Civilian planners, for example, are trained to connect dots between resources and needs, and its that vital connecting of dots that is missing.

In many cases, too, as with UN Development Program, the system of hubs and satellites can extend back even to a safe ground. In Bahgdad, the UN's main hub was in Amman where engineering, data were free from the strains of war, but readily accessible; experts came and went in rotations, which had two results: made it more attractive for civilians, and made them more productive. At the same time, the UN's expert hub is not built on SMEs sitting at a FOB for one year, but coming and going to problems and places as an when needed---often over many years, so they were deep experts whose one day on the ground was better than most SMEs could accomplish in a month.

I know from my experience with State, however, that there was no plan or structure to effectively use SMEs, and, for example, not even a dwell time or home training piece. If you wanted a year away to gather your thought, you had to not take an assignment. If like myself and other SMEs, you needed to catch up on professional certifications and continuing education, you went home. My professional requirements, for example, would not allow me to do a back-to-back two year tour as a State SME because my certifications would all lapse, and I would be too far out of touch with my profession.

At home, I can take course in regional watershed management and international development efforts (Honduras, Nairobi), go to conferences on UN Habitat initiatives, and have access to unlimited professional research bases and tools.

I listened hard last week at a DC seminar as Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani explained why the current US civilian program fails, and how to improve it by a factor of ten. There is a lot to learn here that just doesn't get transferred down to a FOB (except probably through this board).

But, as you said, there is no system to effectively engage/retain actual civilian SMEs any more than there is one to take full advantage of them once they are one the ground.

It could all be changed, but, to my knowledge, no effective changes have hit the ground yet.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Just in from AP: Kai Eide willleave when his two-year contract ends in March.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...hjZJQD9CH5EB80

Much controversy about him and his position but, at the least, his analysis of the situation is on par:

"Speaking in Kabul, Eide lamented that civilian work remains too "fragmented," too "ad hoc," and expressed hope that future work done by the international community will be sustainable when foreign assistance declines."

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

World Politics Review has an article about the spheres of influence (China/India) and the Big Game being played out through Afghanistan on the economic development side:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4796

"To begin with, a de facto division of the country into these spheres of influence is already taking place. China is making investments in mining all around the country, but its flagship project -- the massive copper mine at Aynak -- is, significantly, in the Pashtun belt. Beijing seems to be counting on Pakistan's support in the event the central Afghan government loses control of this region. But would Pakistani guarantees be sufficient to keep the mine in operation? Meanwhile, India's influence is strongest in the north and west, the heartlands of the old Northern Alliance.

Unlike the situation in Persia, where spheres were imposed on the country, the outside players in Afghanistan do find genuine support among specific ethnic groups and regions of the country.

And unlike the treaty of a century ago, there need be no formal document drawn up this time around. An informal agreement whereby the major players voluntarily placed limits on where they will situate their investments and security services would suffice. Kabul could return to its traditional function as the country's marketplace, where all sides are represented. A settlement in Afghanistan could work to guarantee China's vital Baluchistan lifeline, while leaving intact the Indian-Iranian transport routes that provide New Delhi with a direct route to Central Asia."

To me, there are two implicit elements: (1.) Eide's role was probably eclipsed long before he started by the Big Game; and (2.) the humble troops in the field cannot have a big and sustainable effect using a village-by-village approach without some form of engagement/coordination of their local work to the Bigger Game being played around them; they don't need to understand it, but they need to effectively walk with and around it.

Steve