TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

[Schmedlap]

I would offer that AWG as currently organized makes little sense... the same as the 1st IO Command... they were aligned they way they were in order to take them "out of the system"... much like an AD HOC planning element...

I think the good outweighs the bad. To me, these arrangements are analogous (maybe not by design) to spinning off subsidiaries or joint ventures in the business world to develop a new competency/technology/skill.

AWG, 1st IO, and similar do in-house training, farm out their personnel in support of other units, learn, then personnel come back, share lessons with fellow "subject matter experts" (for lack of a better term), and then adjust their training... and repeat. Imo, they provide a higher quality augmentee than individual units are currently poised to provide and they help to speed up the process of developing a new (or neglected) competency.

Obviously, we would all prefer greater unit integrity, rather than augmentees, but the general lack of competence/proficiency/etc across the force in certain areas makes the ad hockery a good plan for now. The lack of unit integrity is mitigated by having only Officers and (usually senior) NCOs in these units who generally don't need a lot of supervision. They show up having done their own SRP and bringing their own gear and put little to no logistical burden on the receiving unit.

Just my take on the situation. I have no idea what the actual intent was for said ad hoc arrangements. But, those are the upsides as I see it.

[Hacksaw]

I think I'm going to excuse myself from this thread only because I seem to have clouded the discussion rather than shed light... but as a last ditch effort at explaining myself...

I argued, and still hold the opinion, that the current C2 alignment of AWG and to a lesser extent 1st IO Command are less than logical... just an opinion, but I think if after 4-5 years... they still exist because they still add value... then we might think about making them a more permanent fixture... and if we think the system can't take the shock, then we might be better off healing the system rather than working around...

It was not my intent to denigrate the efforts or contribution of either organization.... Both are professional and provide added value to their "customers"....

But, and its a big but, is something that has existed for 4-5 years still considered ad hoc... and if its not, I'd argue that its not, why still held out as extra-ordinary in C2 arrangement??? and if the reason is institutional ineptness... might want to put a little energy into fixing that... then again I think TRADOC is perfectly capable of institutionalizing AWG, might even help it transform from within...

My original beef was with a "personality" who decided to take an ad hominen swipe at TRADOC in general and General Dempsey in particular, and cited as an example the creation of FM 3-24 which in fact was perfect illustration of TRADOC writ large and CG, TRADOC in particular (then General Wallace) acting/not-acting exactly as designed...

I now bow... head bloody and beaten... and back away from the thread

Just an idle thought.... but as the or

[Schmedlap]

I think I'm going to excuse myself from this thread only because I seem to have clouded the discussion rather than shed light...

I don't think anything can get any cloudier after Ricks handles it.

It was not my intent to denigrate the efforts or contribution of either organization....

I didn't get that impression - hopefully no one else did.

I argued, and still hold the opinion, that the current C2 alignment of AWG and to a lesser extent 1st IO Command are less than logical... is something that has existed for 4-5 years still considered ad hoc... and if its not, I'd argue that its not, why still held out as extra-ordinary in C2 arrangement??? and if the reason is institutional ineptness... might want to put a little energy into fixing that

Can't argue with that.

[Pete]

My original beef was with a "personality" who decided to take an ad hominen swipe at TRADOC in general and General Dempsey in particular, and cited as an example the creation of FM 3-24 which in fact was perfect illustration of TRADOC writ large and CG, TRADOC in particular (then General Wallace) acting/not-acting exactly as designed...

Actually it wasn't Tom Ricks who brought up the subject of FM 3-24 in his blog, it was me in the post that started this thread. In the comment section to Rick's online article on Friday I made a point of saying that it was the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that was the agency responsible for writing the manual. The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.

[Ken White]

...because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations...

That would be a huge mistake.

They've already added 'light' Bdes to heavy Divs and that isn't going to end well.

[Rob Thornton]

There is an interview over at National Journal Online with GEN Dempsey. The title: Adaptability is Power

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

Quote:
I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.

For the rest, click on:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain

I can't say for sure they are avoiding the assignments, some of it is due to operating force demands. However a hole is a hole, and I suspect there will be more of them and one sourcing solution will be contractors, another DA civilians.

I'm also not totally convinced of the quality issues associated with the use of civilians to teach ILE. From my perspective, the folks that taught my ILE class were very good, they were not outmoded or outdated, and they were very curious about our uniformed experiences and encouraged and facilitated working them into the course. At the top of the schools there is a uniformed leader who charts the course of what will be taught.

What concerns me is not the quality of the instruction, or the ability of the instructors to deliver the material (or take advantage of the students' experiences), rather its the question of determining if the things that are taught are in line with what we say we desire and require out of leaders. Until we answer the question of what we want our leaders to be capable of at each grade or position it will be hard to determine if what they are being taught is right or wrong, or can be improved upon. I think we could say the same for the other generating force responsibilities as well.

Best, Rob

[Fuchs]

What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

[Steve Blair]

What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

Giving up or surrendering, more or less.