TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

[Hacksaw]

IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it

couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...

Wilf...
"Who was sloppy?
IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some."

I suppose if all soldiers and leaders were nuanced enough to adapt Saint Carl's musing into a framework that allows them to perform as effective counterinsurgents we'd all be better off... the fact is the vast majority of the unwashed want/need some checklist material... I refuse to enter into the debate of whether 3-24 is good or bad (I think both... good for what it was intended by their "god fathers", bad in that it is often ill-applied) - that said it has filled a role in helping the less nuanced to think differently about their mission and their environment... and from personal observation that was a dire need... as for your point... it was a part of this discussion because Ricks used the development of 3-24 and TRADOC HQ lack of involvement in its development as an example of the deterioration of TRADOC from what it once was...

Pete... LTG (R) Barno is/was a fine officer/great intellect according to those I know who served with him (I didn't)... I'm sure given space and time to think about the challenges the Army faces as it attempts to build a force to prevail in current operations and set a stance to succeed in the future, that he has some worthwile and perhaps even novel ideas (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)... I'm sure Barno is probably in some way shape or form in dialogue with TRADOC since his intellectual interests seem to lean in that direction...

comparing a 10 page paper with a presentation at AUSA is in a word... Silly on the part of Ricks... and lacks rigour...

Didn't I say I was going to excuse myself -- truly hell is freezing over when I'm defending TRADOC

[Pete]

The main appeal of the lighter MTOE is its strategic deployability--the problem of course is what to do if once in-theater an adversary confronts us with heavy weapons. I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.

[slapout9]

couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...

Yep, and we seem to ignore factual evidence that when we created a Cavalry Constabulary in both the early Philippine campaigns and Germany WW2 the US was very successful.