Yep, lost as in badly...
Did you serve in it before Viet Nam? After VN, we dumbed down training to cope with McNamara's Project 100,000 intake with the task condition and standard foolishness; and even though those losers are long gone and we have some sharp troops, we're still using that flawed training model. We also concentrated solely on fighting a major land war in Europe to the exclusion of other theaters and other levels of combat. Absolutely foolish. I'm thoroughly familiar with both DePuy and Starry and am not a fan of either. The only saving grace in that period was Shy Meyer as Chief of Staff. He had great plans for the training arena but TRADOC just waited him out; the bureaucracy won.Originally Posted by Pete
Ah, yes -- with Battle Books. Any tactical evolution that requires a three ring binder to execute will get you killed. Quickly....the active defense and all that.Why is that so? They will only be if we allow that to happen. I guess we could be dumb enough to play by the other guys rules; we certainly have before -- but that doesn't seem very smart to me. I think we should make them play by our rules...With unconventional wars being our most likely challenge during the next several decades...First, we aren't all that competent at the core -- never have been in peacetime -- not allowed to do that in a democracy, the mothers get upset at training casualties and Congress gets upset at spending training money instead of equipment money which provide more jobs.I'm trying to understand how we should go about maintaining our core competencies in combined arms while we're simultaneously facing unconventional adversaries.
Second, core competency for an Army is basic simple warfighting, it is not difficult. We now half train people and hope for the best. That is not a good plan. If individuals can do the basics well, they can easily and quickly adapt to any level on the spectrum of warfare with decent leadership. We understood how to do what you're trying to understand in the late 50s and early 60s. We just forgot and then got really dumb post VN in an effort to avoid another war like that -- then we wandered into two more.
The key thing to remember is that if you deploy general purpose forces to a Foreign Internal Development (FID) or security Force Assistance (SFA) effort as in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will not be done well -- you're using a sledge hammer to build a piece of cabinetry...
I served from 72-75 and yes they (Army) got lost in the wilderness. Around late 73 the Army started losing highly experienced NCO's in a big way. When the Sergeants start voting with their feet....... you is in big trouble.Vietnam darn near destroyed the Army IMO.
Battle Books
I remember when someone lost a Battle Book in Germany in around 1979 by leaving it on the canvas roof of a jeep during a terrain walk. It wasn't my battalion that did it but if I recall correctly the incident was even in Stars and Stripes. I think 3rd Armored had to re-do all their plans for the first few days of WW III.
Merry Christmas. I wish we could send you some of the snow we have around here in the Martinsburg, WV-Winchester, VA area. There was a Union Signal Corps observation station 1000 yards from here in 1864 to watch the Valley Pike, now U.S. Route 11. On a clear day Winchester could be seen with telescopes.
Last edited by Pete; 12-25-2009 at 05:04 AM.
The year 1965 was when the last of the WWII veterans hit the big two-zero year mark.
I wasn't talking about WW2 vets, I was talking about Vietnam vets.
If you want to know how bad it was go to the link below. The comic book called "Dopin Dan" was about some hippie in the 82nd Division, I had this edition in my wall locker. It was part of what was known as the Underground Press back then. The comic book was all over Ft. Bragg and it was nothing but Communist Propaganda and subversion. Crap like that was all over Fayetteville and drifted onto Bragg. I got mine mine for free but if you don't mind spending a few bucks it it a Propaganda masterpiece and the guy that wrote it new a lot of things about the 82nd SOP's that should not have been published but they were. Ken is right the Army went into the Twilight Zone for awhile,might end up back there if they are not careful.
http://www.newkadia.com/?Dopin_Dan_C...oks=1111122415
That sort of thing was over with when I enlisted. What we had were lots of foot-dragging attitudes, guys yelling "short" all the time, and racial resentment simmering beneath the surface.
Interesting discussion.
2 Points)
1. From the perspective in Afghanistan, I have trouble conceptualizing "COIN" as something unique, new or different. I prefer the Afghan approach of terming it "war". "Clear, Hold, Build" makes sense as a general concept of ops - I wouldn't say it is a novel novel; didn't we have to do that to the Germans in Paris in 1944? "Small war" and "big war" just refers to how many players and how much lead is moving around.
2. Light, heavy and medium brigades. Must be nice to be able to argue this.From our small, 3 Brigade Army we can't afford to do this (although we tried in the past - going to war threw a wrench in that). Alot of the times I find the "light/heavy" argument to be a false dichotomy. My Pl is mechanized (or motorized) but does most of its work on foot due to the nature of the terrain and the tasks. We're just "infantry".
Our Division Commander required the whole division to watch the movie "Brian's Song" about Gayle Sayers and Brian Piccolo as part of our Race Relations class.
Link to movie clip. They were the first Black and White roomates in the NFL....very big deal back then.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sF8lE...eature=related
Last edited by slapout9; 12-25-2009 at 03:25 PM. Reason: stuff
Conventional and Unconventional Wars
One of the big differences between conventional wars such as World War II and the ones going on now is the considerable reduction in the role of fire support. This is done to avoid collateral damage and the effect it has on winning "hearts and minds."
The role of infantry described below is from the Paul F. Gorman monograph "The Secret of Future Victories" in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It might even arouse some people from their holiday torpor.
In 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.
I'm aroused from my holiday torpor...
Not collateral damage avoidance, scarcity of targets. Different wars entirely. Little WW II experience in NW Europe is relative outside NW Europe...
"but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique." The flaw in much of that statement by DePuy is that it stuck in the minds of many young impressionable CPTs who later became Flag Officers and who proceeded to fight major land wars in Europe while actually confronting far different enemies with very different TTP and cultural attributes (yes, culture matters in wars other than COIN fights) in such diverse places as Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq. How did that work out for us?
Every war is different and formative experiences need to be carefully winnowed lest they lead people -- even entire Armies -- astray.
Which brings up a question. I know why FOs were Officers in WW I and even WW II -- because they could read and count. Why are they being wasted as FOs today?
Ken, the U.S. Army was all but out of the Vietnam War when DePuy said that in 1971. We've had enlisted forward observers of MOS 13F for several decades now. During the First World War battery commanders or other battery officers were the forward observers, the old "command observation post."
I'm aware of that, honest.
I'm also aware of the fact that we really misused Artillery in Viet Nam. Badly. All of which elides the fact that DePuy was guilty of selling snake oil.I'm also aware of 13Fs (Fire Support Specialist; and their predecessor MOSC, 2705 IIRC) -- they were around before I retired, in fact they were around when I was in Korea and in Viet Nam. They were even around in WW II...We've had enlisted forward observers of MOS 13F for several decades now.
That still doesn't explain why THE FO is still an officer even though the NCOs on the FIST or COLT or JTAC can do it as well or better than most of the 2LTs. Could it possibly have something to do with Branch Officer Strength? Thus future promotion opportunities...
It was an academic question in any event -- the new JTAC AGOS courses will aim for 13Fs and some 18 series. So we're finally getting a bit smarter. My intent was to point out we used to ride to work on elephants but we no longer do that. The corollary is that Officers as FO were needed in WW I, possibly desirable in WW II and have not really been necessary for effective functioning of field artillery since then.
Point being that we change but we change too slowly because people don't like change and they get stuck in the past -- and they try to carry what worked in one war forward to do the same thing in another war (that seldom works well...).
That and that the Personnel system is screwed up...Initially, others were added by late 1918 and WW II saw Officers as Forward Observers everywhere. Initially because they had math skills and they've been around ever since. Waste of Officers...During the First World War battery commanders or other battery officers were the forward observers, the old "command observation post."
The above is from William S. Lind last September, who I realize is not everyone's favorite person. He's saying much the same thing as Gen DePuy did in 1971--in any event I think both were exaggerating to make a point. When DePuy was at TRADOC he did a lot for the infantry, such as defining the infantry movement techniques of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.The problem is that virtually all American infantry are trained in Second Generation tactics. The Second Generation reduces all tactics to one tactic: bump into the enemy and call for fire. The French, who invented the Second Generation, summarize it as, "Firepower conquers, the infantry occupies." The supporting firepower, originally artillery, now most often airstrikes, must be massive. If it is not -- as is now the case in Afghanistan, under General McChrystal's directive -- the infantry is in trouble. Everything it has been taught depends on fire support it no longer has. Inevitably, its casualties will rise, and it will often lose engagements.
Below is the Gorman monograph with the DePuy anecdote. I like the part about McNair and Army Ground Forces.
http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/g...man.asp#ch2-69
Last edited by Pete; 12-27-2009 at 06:00 AM.
Overwatch predates DePuy by many years.
I was taught overwatch movement techniques as a 15 year old NG Pvt by a bunch of WW II vets, got to practice it as a Marine in Korea where it was SOP for all movement. Cavalry and Infantry used overwatch for years, centuries even, before DePuy was born
The best thing DePuy did at TRADOC was consolidate the three different Track Vehicle Mechanic Schools and insist the new school at Knox teach all tracked vehicles. Most of the rest of his 'reforms' were tacking names on things and standardizing training literature. Needed to be done but it was not innovative. DePuy was a good commander (not least because he relieved inept subordinates -- much to PersCom's chagrin) and he did good at TRADOC -- but he was formed by WW II in NW Europe and he never let it go. He was and is not alone in that shortfall...
The monograph I added the link to in my message above includes a discussion on how infantry training changed in about 1973. Perhaps it's what you were speaking of the other day.
Lind doesn't know what he's talking about, as usual...
That quote from him is wrong on virtually every level. That generation of warfare foolishness will get more people killed than will lack of fire support. His allegation is true with respect to some commanders but most know better; most infantry can operate quite well with their own mortars and do not need or want Arty or Air unless it's really bad. That "Firepower conquers, the infantry occupies." dictum is as bad as DePuys comment; there's a time and place for artillery and there are times and place where it is superfluous. I'd like to see Lind in a fighting hole and watch an average Rifle Platoon from the 82d move through...The first statement is correct -- goes with the job; more patrols, more contacts. The second is TBD; my bet is that it's wrong more often than not (all US units are not equalInevitably, its casualties will rise, and it will often lose engagements.Invalid point, IMO. Poorly stated in both cases as well. However, I suspect both believed what they said. Pity...
I gather then that you weren't overly impressed by the "Revolution in Military Affairs"?
In 1973, TRADOC and FORSCOM were activated.
They immediately started to wake waves so their initial Commanders could make an impression on their watch. Some improvements were made in OBC and the Career Course at the Infantry School.
The training process I cited was developed in the mid-70s and TRADOC foisted the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) and the FM 25 series with that Task, Condition and Standard dumb-down in the late 70s and it was fully implemented Army wide by the early 80s. Unfortunately.
Note the name, Battalion Tng Mgmt Sys -- that's because a lot of Bn Cdrs in Viet Nam discovered in the 1968-73 period that they had few Captains and few Senior NCOs but a slew of 2LTs and SGTs (who were mostly NCO Candidate Course graduates). They were all great and smart kids, would do anything you asked them to -- but they didn't know much tactically, so the two LTCs who commanded the typical Bn for a year in VN learned to micromanage. The training system they then developed reflected that micromanagement. Dumber than a box of hammers. They should have better trained the 2LTs and SGTs...
As I haven't seen one, I find it difficult to be impressed.
There is no revolution, war hasn't changed a bit -- but warfare always changes due to technological and societal changes. That change is always incremental. Been that way for over 5,000 years.
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