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  1. #1
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

    One would hope that FM 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine are not regarded as "not invented here" topics by TRADOC. From an entry today in The Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

    There was a time a couple of decades ago when the Army's Training and Doctrine Command was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding the post-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it is doing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.
    To read the rest of Tom Ricks' piece, click on the below link:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ened_to_tradoc
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-11-2009 at 11:37 PM. Reason: Add quote marks

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Over the past 5 years or so TRADOC and the rest of the generating force have been significant bill payers for a service that has also been a huge bill payer for a department that has been the primary bill payer to meet operational requirments in multiple theaters.

    One can argue that this is good as it gets folks back into operational positions and as such should bring that experience back into the generating force. While that may be true, a hole is hole. If you think of the generating force as a mechanical generator that provides a power supply to operating force, how many kilo watts are required to provide power? How much is required to provide minimal power (meet current requirments) and maximum power (meet current and future requirements)? How many kilo watts do we have on hand relative to the requirment(s)? I don't know the answer to that question, and I don't think many others do as well.

    I do think TRADOC has managed to do its part in ensuring that the wheels don't fall off as we increase the demands on the Army - demands that will likely increase with additional mission creep. This is a feat in itself, and I think a testimony to stewardship of an important and limited resource - our Army. Some may argue it could be done more efficiently or more effectively, I'd only ask them to prove it. I'd add that there are lots of folks in and outside the Army who are in fact trying to do that, its proven to be harder than some have thought.

    I think we've done OK, and could perhaps do better, but I'm not totally sure how - or if in fact its within a given leader's, organization's, command's, service's, or department's authority to make it so. While that is frustrating, I do beleive that there are a lot of folks trying hard to get things more right, and that the leadership has set a mostly conducive and tolerant atmoshpere. That they don't jump to every proposed solution may seem recalcitrant or obstinant, however I'd offer it may in fact be the knowledge and experience that recognizes that while an organization as big as the Army can recover from not getting it quite right, its very hard to recover from getting it completely wrong.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 12-11-2009 at 08:30 PM.

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Ricks is a dope

    Wow so this is what happens when I guy excuses himself from the rigor of writing for a respected news agency...

    "yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."

    Ricks accusing Dempsey of being intellectually sloppy is the pot calling the kettle black...


    Hmmm...
    "I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle."

    Let's see the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) is a major subordinate organization of the Combined Arms Center... a Major Subordinate Command of TRADOC... so it is an organizational failing that the higher headquarters didn't get in the way of the subordinate organization's mission... if only it were so more often...

    I wonder when was the last time Ricks spent some time, beyond a stop and pop to pimp a book, to discover how TRADOC/CAC is organized and what it is up to...

    Rather you get this type of silliness (nicest term I could come up with)... recommend we just kill this one, it doesn't deserve much more...

    Oh by the way, I may be the biggest critic of TRADOC...

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    AWG - is that a TRADOC effort?

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    Council Member IntelTrooper's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    AWG - is that a TRADOC effort?
    Wikipedia claims that they are.
    Last edited by IntelTrooper; 12-12-2009 at 12:37 AM. Reason: verb confusion
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Huh?

    Check the LINK.

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default What Happened to TRADOC? (II)

    Retired Army Major General Robert Scales says the following in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

    You have made some very useful observations about TRADOC. But really the issue is not TRADOC so much as the state of intellectual capital in the Army. When we overused our equipment in units we "circle x'd" minor faults (then called deferred maintenance). If the odometer or the fuel gauge went on the fritz units deferred maintenance so vehicles could still be driven. Inevitably the fleet melted down under the cumulative effect of neglect over time. We are at a similar place now with our intellectual capital.
    Click on the link below to read the rest of the article.

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts..._in_the_scales

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default In Re: Pete

    Actually Pete... This is a direct paste from Ricks piece on-line...

    "There was a time a couple of decades ago when theArmy's Training and DoctrineCommand was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding thepost-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it isdoing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.

    I was thinking about this because I was just reading the text of a speech Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."

    With regards to...

    "The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.


    As for the areas your bring up...

    The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force

    as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...highlight=COIN

    By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Hacksaw mate, Question

    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."
    Who was sloppy?
    IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
    In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
    Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some.
    The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force.
    True! The idea that you do not use Tanks in irregular Warfare is utterly fallacious, and the idea that "light is right" is utterly without evidence. You need to be able to use any tool for any job. Some are better than others.

    - and irregular warfare demands lots of good infantry, same are regular warfare. Not all troops doing dismounted operations, have to be infantry.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 12-15-2009 at 03:09 PM.
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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force
    IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Whatever Happened to TRADOC? (III)

    From the Tom Ricks blog today:

    The shallowness of General Dempsey's presentation was all the more striking to me because on the same day I read a similar piece by retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno. Like Dempsey, Barno is grappling with change and trying to look into the future, but he shows much more rigor and originality in doing so. He also challenges the Army far more than Dempsey did.
    Click on the link below for the entire story:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...arno_challenge

  12. #12
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default In Re:

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it
    couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...

    Wilf...
    "Who was sloppy?
    IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
    In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
    Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some."


    I suppose if all soldiers and leaders were nuanced enough to adapt Saint Carl's musing into a framework that allows them to perform as effective counterinsurgents we'd all be better off... the fact is the vast majority of the unwashed want/need some checklist material... I refuse to enter into the debate of whether 3-24 is good or bad (I think both... good for what it was intended by their "god fathers", bad in that it is often ill-applied) - that said it has filled a role in helping the less nuanced to think differently about their mission and their environment... and from personal observation that was a dire need... as for your point... it was a part of this discussion because Ricks used the development of 3-24 and TRADOC HQ lack of involvement in its development as an example of the deterioration of TRADOC from what it once was...

    Pete... LTG (R) Barno is/was a fine officer/great intellect according to those I know who served with him (I didn't)... I'm sure given space and time to think about the challenges the Army faces as it attempts to build a force to prevail in current operations and set a stance to succeed in the future, that he has some worthwile and perhaps even novel ideas (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)... I'm sure Barno is probably in some way shape or form in dialogue with TRADOC since his intellectual interests seem to lean in that direction...

    comparing a 10 page paper with a presentation at AUSA is in a word... Silly on the part of Ricks... and lacks rigour...

    Didn't I say I was going to excuse myself -- truly hell is freezing over when I'm defending TRADOC
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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    The main appeal of the lighter MTOE is its strategic deployability--the problem of course is what to do if once in-theater an adversary confronts us with heavy weapons. I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...
    Yep, and we seem to ignore factual evidence that when we created a Cavalry Constabulary in both the early Philippine campaigns and Germany WW2 the US was very successful.

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post

    as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...highlight=COIN

    By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE
    I know the guy you describe. He's a hack.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Anybody who would call Hawaii a hardship tour ...

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Gentlemen:

    Hacksaw:
    (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)
    Nay, not so -- tons of good novel ideas here from a great many folks on a daily basis. There are also those who will acknowledge the status quo is not good but surprisingly, still defend it...

    Take ad-hocery, that's the way the US of A always fights. Having served with a few ad-hoc aggregations and seen the good and bad, I have no particular problem with it. My contributions aren't novel, they are simply what I have seen work -- or not -- over many years. What never works is hidebound bureaucracy...

    Pete
    :
    I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.
    Like you, I served in regular infantry divisions -- including the 7th in Korea post war -- the old style Infantry Division TOE had a lot going for it and IMO it was a mistake to 'lighten' of 'heavy-ize' all of them.

    Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.

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    Council Member 82redleg's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.
    I don't think that the division echelon can simply "go away"- the span of control from Corps to BDE in Iraq would be over 20 (even now), over 30 at the height of the surge.

    I think that the BCTs should be truly independent (a simple first step would be calling them something unique, rather than # of whatever division), and capable of operating independently- a BG CDR, COL DCO, 4 maneuver battalions, 4 (or 5) troops in the RSTA, 4 (or 5) firing batteries in the FA, increased CS and CSS elements- the BN and especially the BCT HQ can handle it, we cut line units at the expense of HQs in 2004-2006. Functional and multifunctional BDEs aren't too bad, and can retain COL CDRs (they are smaller, and they shouldn't maneuver)- the equivalent "CMD" for maneuver COLs can be the DCO positions, just a MAJs don't command now.

    BG Was de Czege agreed with you on the regular infantry organization- way back in JUL-AUG 1985 Infantry Journal (article called "3 Kinds of Infantry"). I could argue that, at the BN level, the ABN/AASLT infantry (and the current IBCT battalions) were/are a esxtremely lightened version of the regular IN, and that the SBCTs fit the bill rather nicely. M2 mech IN is clearly "armored" infantry (to use Was de Czege's term), while the former light infantry battalion's were pretty decent "light" infantry- the RGR RGT's organization works as well. The problem with the ABN/AASLT organization is that it only cross-pollinated with the light and RGR units, and not much at all with the mech units, thus becoming "light" by ethos in spite of a (extremely lightened) medium MTOE.

    Bottom line, I agree on light, medium and heavy BCTs- we need to beef all the BCTs up in #s, and enable their C2 to operate a 2 maneuver BN (+ enabler slice) task force under the DCO if required for a mission. Divisions need to remain (maybe not as many, but some HQ between corps and BCT/BDE), and probably without DCGs (the BGs go the BCT command positions).

  19. #19
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Lighter Force Structure

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't.
    Yup, you were right.

    Review: Army should add Stryker units

    By Matthew Cox - Staff writer
    Army Times
    Posted : Wednesday Jan 27, 2010 21:22:55 EST

    The Army should trim several heavy brigade combat teams from its future fighting force to make room for more Stryker units, according to a Dec. 3 draft of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.

    “Our assessment of security trends points strongly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility,” the draft document states. “By FY13 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available, [DoD] intends to convert several more BCTs” to the medium weight, rapidly deployable Stryker model. Currently, the Army has seven Stryker BCTs, six active and one National Guard. The service would add up to four more Stryker brigades in the future, according to the draft QDR report.

    A congressional mandate requires the Defense Department to conduct a QDR every four years to evaluate its strategies and policies that directly affect how the services set force structure and procure weapon systems.

    Surprisingly, the Pentagon document makes no mention of the Army’s primary modernization effort — the Ground Combat Vehicle, a new class of infantry fighting vehicle that will eventually replace the Bradley.

    The December draft report also calls for the increase in “rotary wing assets.”

    “Vertical lift has been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere,” the draft report states. “As operations in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan grow in scope and intensity, more rotary wing lift capacity will be needed to ensure that coalition and Afghan forces can be re-supplied at remote outposts and effectively cover their areas of responsibility.”

    The Army and other services “will take steps, including expanding pilot training, to make selected vertical lift assets more readily accessible to forces in forward theaters of operations,” the report states.

    U.S. Special Operations command will field an “additional company of cargo helicopters."

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Tradoc (iv)

    From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

    I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
    For the rest, click on:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain
    Last edited by Pete; 12-16-2009 at 05:44 PM. Reason: Capitalization

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