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Thread: TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

  1. #21
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default In Re: Pete

    Actually Pete... This is a direct paste from Ricks piece on-line...

    "There was a time a couple of decades ago when theArmy's Training and DoctrineCommand was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding thepost-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it isdoing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.

    I was thinking about this because I was just reading the text of a speech Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."

    With regards to...

    "The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.


    As for the areas your bring up...

    The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force

    as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...highlight=COIN

    By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE

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  2. #22
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Hacksaw mate, Question

    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."
    Who was sloppy?
    IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
    In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
    Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some.
    The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force.
    True! The idea that you do not use Tanks in irregular Warfare is utterly fallacious, and the idea that "light is right" is utterly without evidence. You need to be able to use any tool for any job. Some are better than others.

    - and irregular warfare demands lots of good infantry, same are regular warfare. Not all troops doing dismounted operations, have to be infantry.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 12-15-2009 at 03:09 PM.
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  3. #23
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force
    IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it

  4. #24
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I'd certainly hope so...

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    ...because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations...
    That would be a huge mistake.

    They've already added 'light' Bdes to heavy Divs and that isn't going to end well.

  5. #25
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Whatever Happened to TRADOC? (III)

    From the Tom Ricks blog today:

    The shallowness of General Dempsey's presentation was all the more striking to me because on the same day I read a similar piece by retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno. Like Dempsey, Barno is grappling with change and trying to look into the future, but he shows much more rigor and originality in doing so. He also challenges the Army far more than Dempsey did.
    Click on the link below for the entire story:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...arno_challenge

  6. #26
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default In Re:

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it
    couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...

    Wilf...
    "Who was sloppy?
    IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
    In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
    Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some."


    I suppose if all soldiers and leaders were nuanced enough to adapt Saint Carl's musing into a framework that allows them to perform as effective counterinsurgents we'd all be better off... the fact is the vast majority of the unwashed want/need some checklist material... I refuse to enter into the debate of whether 3-24 is good or bad (I think both... good for what it was intended by their "god fathers", bad in that it is often ill-applied) - that said it has filled a role in helping the less nuanced to think differently about their mission and their environment... and from personal observation that was a dire need... as for your point... it was a part of this discussion because Ricks used the development of 3-24 and TRADOC HQ lack of involvement in its development as an example of the deterioration of TRADOC from what it once was...

    Pete... LTG (R) Barno is/was a fine officer/great intellect according to those I know who served with him (I didn't)... I'm sure given space and time to think about the challenges the Army faces as it attempts to build a force to prevail in current operations and set a stance to succeed in the future, that he has some worthwile and perhaps even novel ideas (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)... I'm sure Barno is probably in some way shape or form in dialogue with TRADOC since his intellectual interests seem to lean in that direction...

    comparing a 10 page paper with a presentation at AUSA is in a word... Silly on the part of Ricks... and lacks rigour...

    Didn't I say I was going to excuse myself -- truly hell is freezing over when I'm defending TRADOC
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  7. #27
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    The main appeal of the lighter MTOE is its strategic deployability--the problem of course is what to do if once in-theater an adversary confronts us with heavy weapons. I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.

  8. #28
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...
    Yep, and we seem to ignore factual evidence that when we created a Cavalry Constabulary in both the early Philippine campaigns and Germany WW2 the US was very successful.

  9. #29
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post

    as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...highlight=COIN

    By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE
    I know the guy you describe. He's a hack.
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  10. #30
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Anybody who would call Hawaii a hardship tour ...

  11. #31
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Gentlemen:

    Hacksaw:
    (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)
    Nay, not so -- tons of good novel ideas here from a great many folks on a daily basis. There are also those who will acknowledge the status quo is not good but surprisingly, still defend it...

    Take ad-hocery, that's the way the US of A always fights. Having served with a few ad-hoc aggregations and seen the good and bad, I have no particular problem with it. My contributions aren't novel, they are simply what I have seen work -- or not -- over many years. What never works is hidebound bureaucracy...

    Pete
    :
    I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.
    Like you, I served in regular infantry divisions -- including the 7th in Korea post war -- the old style Infantry Division TOE had a lot going for it and IMO it was a mistake to 'lighten' of 'heavy-ize' all of them.

    Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.

  12. #32
    Council Member 82redleg's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.
    I don't think that the division echelon can simply "go away"- the span of control from Corps to BDE in Iraq would be over 20 (even now), over 30 at the height of the surge.

    I think that the BCTs should be truly independent (a simple first step would be calling them something unique, rather than # of whatever division), and capable of operating independently- a BG CDR, COL DCO, 4 maneuver battalions, 4 (or 5) troops in the RSTA, 4 (or 5) firing batteries in the FA, increased CS and CSS elements- the BN and especially the BCT HQ can handle it, we cut line units at the expense of HQs in 2004-2006. Functional and multifunctional BDEs aren't too bad, and can retain COL CDRs (they are smaller, and they shouldn't maneuver)- the equivalent "CMD" for maneuver COLs can be the DCO positions, just a MAJs don't command now.

    BG Was de Czege agreed with you on the regular infantry organization- way back in JUL-AUG 1985 Infantry Journal (article called "3 Kinds of Infantry"). I could argue that, at the BN level, the ABN/AASLT infantry (and the current IBCT battalions) were/are a esxtremely lightened version of the regular IN, and that the SBCTs fit the bill rather nicely. M2 mech IN is clearly "armored" infantry (to use Was de Czege's term), while the former light infantry battalion's were pretty decent "light" infantry- the RGR RGT's organization works as well. The problem with the ABN/AASLT organization is that it only cross-pollinated with the light and RGR units, and not much at all with the mech units, thus becoming "light" by ethos in spite of a (extremely lightened) medium MTOE.

    Bottom line, I agree on light, medium and heavy BCTs- we need to beef all the BCTs up in #s, and enable their C2 to operate a 2 maneuver BN (+ enabler slice) task force under the DCO if required for a mission. Divisions need to remain (maybe not as many, but some HQ between corps and BCT/BDE), and probably without DCGs (the BGs go the BCT command positions).

  13. #33
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Armored Infantry

    During World War II and for some years afterward we had armored infantry battalions in many of our armored divisions. Their main combat vehicle was the half-track. The term armored infantry isn't one that de Czege invented.

  14. #34
    Council Member 82redleg's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    During World War II and for some years afterward we had armored infantry battalions in many of our armored divisions. Their main combat vehicle was the half-track. The term armored infantry isn't one that de Czege invented.
    Correct- I merely meant that I was using the term in the way the Was de Czege defined it. The term was used before that.

    And I believe armored infantry WERE the infantry in armored divisions- not in many of them.
    Last edited by 82redleg; 12-16-2009 at 01:36 AM. Reason: edited to add another thought

  15. #35
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Tradoc (iv)

    From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

    I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
    For the rest, click on:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain
    Last edited by Pete; 12-16-2009 at 05:44 PM. Reason: Capitalization

  16. #36
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default TRADOC interview over at National Journal Online

    There is an interview over at National Journal Online with GEN Dempsey. The title: Adaptability is Power

    Best, Rob

  17. #37
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:


    Quote:
    I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
    For the rest, click on:

    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain
    I can't say for sure they are avoiding the assignments, some of it is due to operating force demands. However a hole is a hole, and I suspect there will be more of them and one sourcing solution will be contractors, another DA civilians.

    I'm also not totally convinced of the quality issues associated with the use of civilians to teach ILE. From my perspective, the folks that taught my ILE class were very good, they were not outmoded or outdated, and they were very curious about our uniformed experiences and encouraged and facilitated working them into the course. At the top of the schools there is a uniformed leader who charts the course of what will be taught.

    What concerns me is not the quality of the instruction, or the ability of the instructors to deliver the material (or take advantage of the students' experiences), rather its the question of determining if the things that are taught are in line with what we say we desire and require out of leaders. Until we answer the question of what we want our leaders to be capable of at each grade or position it will be hard to determine if what they are being taught is right or wrong, or can be improved upon. I think we could say the same for the other generating force responsibilities as well.

    Best, Rob

  18. #38
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

  19. #39
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?
    Giving up or surrendering, more or less.
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  20. #40
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Quote:
    Originally Posted by Fuchs
    What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?
    Giving up or surrendering, more or less.
    Steve, I think in this case the context did imply taking a break from operational assignments, or MTO&E units - or in today's terms deployments.

    However, I have not seen that to be the case, Niel Smith is an example of a guy who prior to attending ILE was in a generating force assignment to help Army integrate COIN lessons into big Army. Niel not only benefitted Army by this assignment (and through his efforts many others), but also got some insights into how other parts of the Army work which I think benefitted him and may provide him with insights as he moves on to increasing positions of responsibility and authority.

    There was a discussion on another thread about guys working in post BQ (branch qualifying) assignments as part of TRADOC and how they are selected - this not only includes time at Leavenworth, or the various branch school instructor positions, but also assignments in the NCR (National Capital Region), ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling), service academies, CTCs (Combat Training Centers) etc. Add to that a growing requirment for Army to augment MTO&E units and staff in theater to meet requirments for advisors, contracting officers, and a host of other functions and pretty soon Army is running the marathon at sprint speed. Indeed there are holes all over, so I'm not sure anybody is really taking a knee - but I do know that there are an awful lot of balls in the air, and I'm not sure we know which ones are glass, or why they are glass - hell, they may all be glass.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 12-17-2009 at 12:26 AM.

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