TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

[Pete]

I didn't realize that the RMA was going on until around 2001, when an E7 with an intel MOS told me about it. I had rejointed AUSA some years previously and hadn't read a thing about it in Army magazine either.

I don't recall hearing about BTMS until 1981. There wasn't anything revolutionary about it--it's long-range planning, that's all.

[Ken White]

legend in its own mind...

IOW, it doesn't exist. Unfortunately, BTMS is far more than long range planning. It tried -- and failed -- to say the Bn Cdr was the Trainer of the unit; it introduced the Task, Condition and Standard stupidity to the Army (as well as the flawed ARTEP) and it attempted to place task performance on a "Go-No Go" basis allowing standards to be modified to achieve 'acceptable' "Go" rates in institutional training.

It was introduced in TRADOC service schools in the late 70s, finally made it to the field in early 80s. It was designed by Civilian training specialists with no military experience to replicate industrial training practice and it was flawed from the beginning. That the Army today, marginally trained as it is, does much right is a tribute to a host of Officers and NCOs who have managed to train people fairly well in spite of a deeply flawed training process.

Combat is not accomplishment of tasks, it is the amalgamation of many tasks to accomplish a mission and one has to KNOW which tasks must be accomplished and which are not necessary. Conditions vary widely -- my pet example is clear a building; the Capitol, your local City Hall, The Ford plant or a mud hut in Outer Bafloofistan? I watched standards manipulated downward to enhance the 'Go' rate for a good many years. Fortunately, that got spotted in the 90s and has generally been reversed...

It's a dumb system and needs to be retired so we can move to Outcome Based Training and Evaluation.

[marct]

It's a dumb system and needs to be retired so we can move to Outcome Based Training and Evaluation.

The only problem with outcome based training and evaluation is that it is based on outcomes. Mein Gott, Ken - are you trying to destroy the politically correct proposition that all results must be equal !

[Ken White]

It seems like a good idea...

However, I'm sure Congress will object just as they did to the 'Thou shalt not get preggers' edict.

Marc, your comment reminds me of the old saw to the effect that lust is an objective universal measure; love -- and combat training -- OTOH are subjective values...

[Pete]

Comment posted today by Col Gian Gentile on Tom Ricks' blog:

Counterinsurgency is not, NOT, a strategy. I am continually amazed by folks who so easily throw that term out there. Even David Kilcullen has acknowledged as much that it is not strategy.

Instead Population Centric Counterinsurgency which the de jour term of Coin implies is an operational method, nothing more and nothing less. The mistake we make is when folks elevate it to the realm of strategy which it is not. But see that is the problem nowadays in Afghanistan in that we really have no strategy, but just a set of Coin operational methods and tactics; or, a strategy of Coin tactics.

Um, Tom, in fact Counterinsurgency is by demand a massive nation building effort. Nation building is the essential element to the kind of Coin that has become the American Army's New Way of War. FM 3-24 acknowledged that Coin is nation building as did Galula, Thompson, and the rest.

But I ask, if we are not doing nation building in Afghanistan then what are we doing there, Jack McCuen's notions of Hybrid War? I get more and more confused by the minute in this age of the graduate level of war.

gian

[Cavguy]

I have never held that COIN is a strategy. However, this doesn't negate that learning COIN tactics and their useful employment is a good thing. It's a way to get at the strategic end.

[Fuchs]

There is no revolution, war hasn't changed a bit -- but warfare always changes due to technological and societal changes. That change is always incremental. Been that way for over 5,000 years.

Many people agreed to call that a generation and that's OK.
The French Revolution didn't change that much either once you got used to the changes.

The introduction of PGMs in WW2 (after a failed attempt to do it in WWI) and the late near-full realization of their potential during the 80's and 90's has (in addition to astonishing sensor capabilities that have almost reached Star Trek TOS levels) changed many aspects of high-end war. That doesn't prevent that people can kill each other with old methods and tools, of course.

[Ken White]

The French Revolution didn't change that much either once you got used to the changes.

"It is too early to say."

[Pete]

Col Gentile's article in the autumn issue of Parameters was entitled "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army." Perhaps the irony was lost on some people.

[Pete]

After reading about the avoidance of information overload in a recent paper on the Army Capstone program, Tom Ricks wrote in his blog, "I take back some of the bad things I said about TRADOC recently." (No doubt this will make Hacksaw's day, and this time he will not let slip his 2 x 4s of vengeance on Mr. Ricks.) The blog entry can be read on the link below:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...by_information

[Hacksaw]

Only because we are talking about Ricks...

I believe in his earlier postings he referred to TRADOC in general and Dempsey in particular as "Intellectually sloppy"...

Hmmm...

"I know the concept isn't new, but this is the first time I can recall an Army doctrinal document elevating the issue to key aspect of command. I take back some of the bad things I said about TRADOC recently."

The document to which Mr. Ricks refers is a Capstone Concept not doctrine...

As for whether it is novel in Army doctrine... no... it's in an obscure manual called FM 3-0, Operations (Chapter 7)...

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
7-59. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information. Information management disseminates timely and protected relevant information to commanders and staffs. Information management helps commanders develop situational understanding. It also helps them make and disseminate effective decisions faster than the enemy can. Among other aspects, information management includes lower level mechanical methods, such as organizing, collating, plotting, and arranging. However, information management is more than technical control of data flowing across networks. It employs both
staff management and automatic processes to focus a vast array of information and make relevant information available to the right person at the right time. Information management centers on commanders and the information they need to exercise command and control. It has two components: information systems and relevant information.

Petty... I know

These transgressions only required a sharp slap of the hand across the back of his head... the kind my pappy used to deliver on a routine basis to signal that I had once again miscalculated my left and right limits

[Pete]

The British Army was far better prepared for Operations in Ulster than the US was for Iraq. We had two generations of soldiers who had fought irregular warfare, and serving officers who wrote on the subject - and it still took us 7-8 years to get it right, because warfare is generally pretty context specific.

To concede one of Willf's points, the British soldier of the 19th century indeed had a special knack for winning over the hearts and minds of local indigenous populations, as is shown by the following diary entry by the Englishman R. D. Blumenfeld for June 27th 1887:

There was present at luncheon a tall, extremely well-dressed young man, with whom I returned to town in a hansom cab. I noticed that part of his forehead was very much sunburned, but one part, from the hair to the nose above the right eye, was of a different colour. This is ‘the swagger mark’ indicating a soldier. It comes from the pill-box, which protects only a small portion of the head and forehead from the sun; a much-coveted distinction. On the way he told me that he is a private in the 2nd Life Guards, and that ‘the gentlemen of the Guards’ are permitted to go off duty in mufti if they so desire. A large number of these Guardsmen, however, prefer to go out in uniform, shell jacket, very tight overalls, and pill-box askew on head, ready to be hired for an afternoon or evening by nursemaids to ‘walk out’. There is a regular, fixed tariff. Household Cavalry for afternoon out in Park, half-a-crown and beer. Brigade of Foot Guards, eighteen pence and beer. Royal Horse Artillery, two shillings. Other services, a shilling. The fact that there is a big demand is shown by the large number of females at barrack gates early in the afternoon and evening waiting to engage escorts.

[davidbfpo]

Pete,

To concede one of Wilf's points, the British soldier of the 19th century indeed had a special knack for winning over the hears and minds of local indigenous populations.

A funny example cited - "walking out" ladies in London. Might have worked there, I doubt it worked anywhere else like that - with the "locals". Consider the reaction in South Wales to military intervention to support the police pre-1914, let alone in the Empire, say in India after the 'Mutiny'.

[Pete]

You've got a point. Discussion on the Great War Forum over whether Haig and the other generals were butchers often takes on an aspect of class warfare, with Labour-leaning people on one side, the Tories on the other, and the Social Democrats somewhere in between. I've got a book that alleges that the Muslim participation in the Indian Mutiny was led by the Deobandi sect, the Indian version of the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia.

[William F. Owen]

A large number of these Guardsmen, however, prefer to go out in uniform, shell jacket, very tight overalls, and pill-box askew on head, ready to be hired for an afternoon or evening by nursemaids to ‘walk out’.

Dam!! Woman hiring soldiers? In my day it was the other way around!

What the Guards and Household Division don't tell is this persisted well into to the 1980's with the cliental being London's Gay community

[Pete]

Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't.

Yup, you were right.

Review: Army should add Stryker units

By Matthew Cox - Staff writer
Army Times
Posted : Wednesday Jan 27, 2010 21:22:55 EST

The Army should trim several heavy brigade combat teams from its future fighting force to make room for more Stryker units, according to a Dec. 3 draft of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.

“Our assessment of security trends points strongly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility,” the draft document states. “By FY13 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available, [DoD] intends to convert several more BCTs” to the medium weight, rapidly deployable Stryker model. Currently, the Army has seven Stryker BCTs, six active and one National Guard. The service would add up to four more Stryker brigades in the future, according to the draft QDR report.

A congressional mandate requires the Defense Department to conduct a QDR every four years to evaluate its strategies and policies that directly affect how the services set force structure and procure weapon systems.

Surprisingly, the Pentagon document makes no mention of the Army’s primary modernization effort — the Ground Combat Vehicle, a new class of infantry fighting vehicle that will eventually replace the Bradley.

The December draft report also calls for the increase in “rotary wing assets.”

“Vertical lift has been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere,” the draft report states. “As operations in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan grow in scope and intensity, more rotary wing lift capacity will be needed to ensure that coalition and Afghan forces can be re-supplied at remote outposts and effectively cover their areas of responsibility.”

The Army and other services “will take steps, including expanding pilot training, to make selected vertical lift assets more readily accessible to forces in forward theaters of operations,” the report states.

U.S. Special Operations command will field an “additional company of cargo helicopters."

[William F. Owen]

“Our assessment of security trends points strongly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility,” the draft document states. “By FY13 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available, [DoD] intends to convert several more BCTs” to the medium weight, rapidly deployable Stryker model. Currently, the Army has seven Stryker BCTs, six active and one National Guard. The service would add up to four more Stryker brigades in the future, according to the draft QDR report.

This makes as much sense as saying, "because it rained today I am going to buy a puppy."
So more Strykers are the answer to the "Hezbollah-Hybrids" with IEDs, ATGMs, and RPG-7/29?

[82redleg]

This makes as much sense as saying, "because it rained today I am going to buy a puppy."
So more Strykers are the answer to the "Hezbollah-Hybrids" with IEDs, ATGMs, and RPG-7/29?

I agree that the actual Stryker vehicle itself is open to improvement, but the organization (3 IN BNs of 3 COs, each with its own Assault Gun platoon, plus a RSTA squadron) is a HUGE improvement over the HBCT, with a much better balance of AR to IN for MOST operations. The battle command improvements are also HUGE.

[William F. Owen]

I agree that the actual Stryker vehicle itself is open to improvement, but the organization (3 IN BNs of 3 COs, each with its own Assault Gun platoon, plus a RSTA squadron) is a HUGE improvement over the HBCT, with a much better balance of AR to IN for MOST operations. The battle command improvements are also HUGE.

I don't doubt that some thinking lead to some improvements. It would be odd if it didn't.
Beyond that I remain sceptical about almost every aspect of Stryker Brigades.

[Pete]

Oh well, when it comes to force structure some people are such traditionalists that they aren't to be satisfied, as in the link below.

http://www.doctormacro1.info/Images/...Apache)_03.jpg