Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[Fuchs]

Kingjaja,

Press TV for once is catching up with it's report, Russian private aircraft have already been helping. What would be significant is if the Russian Air Force contributed heavy airlift capability.

As I posted earlier privately operated Antonov heavy lift aircraft are a regular feature in UN and non-UN expeditions - including NATO, not sure about the USA.

The USAF chartered lots of big Antonovs for air lift into AFG all while lots of Americans chastised Europeans for having insufficient logistical means for stupid wars in distant places.


Read the correct blogs and you would know

[davidbfpo]

Mali has become 'Sahelistan' or is at risk of becoming so? Well if this report is accepted this is not a matter of "black or white". Sounds more like the Yemen, Pakistan and a few others places the West is entangled with. Hostages ransoms shared with the government, sorry persons in the government.

Note this is December 2012 report.

For years Malian Tuaregs have been complaining that their government was in bed with al-Qaeda, but their cries fell on deaf ears. According to numerous northern residents, AQIM fighters have been circulating openly in Tuareg towns, not for the past year, but for the past 10 years; shopping, attending weddings, and parading fully armed in the streets, in front of police stations and military barracks.

Colonel Habi ag Al Salat, a Malian army commander who defected in 2011 to join the MNLA, was one of the first to notice the Algerian fighters from the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) entering Tuareg towns of the far north such as Aguelhoc, which was under his command.

But when Habi warned his army superiors they told him to stand down and leave the men alone because they were "not enemies" of Mali. When the GSPC changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, following a pact announced by Ayman Al Zawahiri, that policy did not change.

Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spo...157169557.html

The conclusion, with my emphasis:

The one armed force that has both the numbers and local knowledge to credibly expel al-Qaeda from a wide swath of the Sahara and keep them out over the long term would be the region's indigenous Tuareg fighters.

But giving them a mandate to do that would mean recognising and empowering them as a force with legitimate demands, which neither Mali, nor any neighbouring country wants to do. Meanwhile the Tuaregs have a sinking feeling: The fear that they are the ones who will be killed in any coming war, in the name of fighting al-Qaeda.

[Fuchs]

The classic Western solution to the heterogeneity of Mali and the North's opinion that it's being neglected is to apply federalism:
Some autonomy for the North, reduction of commonality to defence, borders security, tariffs, official language(s), citizenship/passports, foreign policy etc.

The North would learn that it probably hasn't been exploited; that its economy is simply unsustainable due to desertification and population growth.


This solution isn't going to work, even if national elites were willing to cede some power. The North would be too close to sovereignty and the national government would fear secession (which is apparently not what they want, although I cannot tell why).

An old European solution might be more helpful; independent cities. The pattern would be the same, except that it wouldn't be the North as a whole, but only smaller entities which would get autonomy.


Now who wants to bet against my assertion that neither will happen, that the intervention of foreigners with their uncompromising aversion against all fighters which talk a lot about Qu'ran will instead be aimed at international interests:
(1) stability of the African states overall
(2) elimination of jihadist political power / territorial control

They won't give a damn about Mali's long-term issues.

[davidbfpo]

A veritable deluge of commentary today on Mali, plus Algeria and the effects way beyond the Sahel. Late in the day I have a couple that are worth reading.

Citing the International Crisis Group's regional analyst (Marc's colleague):

This is linked to the Libyan conflict, it's linked to the Mali conflict, it's linked to 50 years of struggle by the Tuareg, it's linked to 20 years of struggle in Algeria...A security response is at best a partial response. Until a robust political, humanitarian and economic effort is implemented, the security effort won't solve these problems,

Link:http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_15860/cont...tguid=5y6vdwVX

For once, even if writing from the USA, a Mauritanian activist blogger; with a fascinating context and some stinging passages, especially on Western naivety. In summary:

Mali’s problems did not start with the fall of Libya’s Qadhafi. They started even before it gained independence from France. A diverse set of ethnic groups were forced to coexist without much thought of the immense potential for conflict caused by that arrangement. France’s 25th hour short-legged attempt at Shock and Awe, is potentially a doomed effort because it is a decade late. Relying on inept militaries, and hoping to win a guerilla warfare without a credible strategy is a defeat waiting to happen. A decade into wars of pacification, Western nations should resist the urge to fight in yet another war without fully thinking through the consequences– potentially disastrous. None of this is an argument to look the other way on the spread of Jihadism, it is a call to think, then act decisively. Too much is at stake.

One wonders if the French military and those back in Paris realise this

The skeleton of an untested idea became a doctrinal principle in France’s Operation Serval: we will stop the Jihadis, but the Africans will have to go north and defeat the enemy. The notion that an ECOWAS force with the backing of the African Union, and the necessary paperwork from the UN Security Council is a recipe for disaster. Rotten and corrupt militaries, commanded by equally corrupt leaders cannot be a credible partner once the shooting starts.

The African Union's previously over-riding principle, before Sudan's split comes back:

The other principle complicating the matter is Africa’s biggest taboo. Today, no one is willing to recognize that Mali, like many most of Africa, is an artificial construct.

Link:http://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2013/...in-the-making/

[Firn]

The classic Western solution to the heterogeneity of Mali and the North's opinion that it's being neglected is to apply federalism:
Some autonomy for the North, reduction of commonality to defence, borders security, tariffs, official language(s), citizenship/passports, foreign policy etc.

The North would learn that it probably hasn't been exploited; that its economy is simply unsustainable due to desertification and population growth.


This solution isn't going to work, even if national elites were willing to cede some power. The North would be too close to sovereignty and the national government would fear secession (which is apparently not what they want, although I cannot tell why).

An old European solution might be more helpful; independent cities. The pattern would be the same, except that it wouldn't be the North as a whole, but only smaller entities which would get autonomy.


Now who wants to bet against my assertion that neither will happen, that the intervention of foreigners with their uncompromising aversion against all fighters which talk a lot about Qu'ran will instead be aimed at international interests:
(1) stability of the African states overall
(2) elimination of jihadist political power / territorial control

They won't give a damn about Mali's long-term issues.

A Divide et impera (and maybe impara , italian pun) autonomy should be at least feasible in theory with so many factions competing within and betwen ethnic groups.

It is difficult to compare it to European/Italian solutions but I guess that allowing those entities to relative strong financial autonomy to potentially support their autonomy in other areas might possibly work. In short they could keep a high share of their tax revenue, getting thus only indirect subventions by supporting less of the common state goods like defence etc. This would transfer a fair bit of the burden of governance to the regions, letting them the (big) chance to screw up.

Of course the chances of a success in this area are small considering the current situation, as some already wrote.

P.S: Ancora qui, by a girl from one of the (northern) autonomous regions of Italy.

[Dayuhan]

potentially support their autonomy in other areas might possibly work. In short they could keep a high share of their tax revenue, getting thus only indirect subventions by supporting less of the common state goods like defence etc. This would transfer a fair bit of the burden of governance to the regions, letting them the (big) chance to screw up.

I wonder how much tax revenue northern Mali generates. I suspect not much.

I get the impression that most of the countries with a substantial Tuareg population regard the Tuareg mainly at pests, and may see western assistance aimed at AQIM largely as an opportunity for a bit of pest control or pest eradication. In terms of reducing jihadi influence it might be well worth building Tuareg autonomy and self governance, and taking other steps aimed at resolving Tuareg grievances. Whether or not the governments in the region would be in any way interested in that outcome is of course a very large question.

[Fuchs]

Aren't the Tuareg the traders, with the actual townfolk / oasis dwellers being some other tribe?
____________

Northern Mali should be mostly evacuated, just as most semi-arid regions of the world.
Making much agricultural use of semiarid regions (with livestock) merely drives desertification. Having population growth in such areas is a recipe for long-term disaster. Even monetary transfers won't change this; there's not enough water.

The populations from semi-arid regions need to unload all their growth to more inhabitable regions and this should happen peacefully, without immigrants or left-behind people trying to transform the more densely populated regions in their image.
It's sad that Mali's densely populated regions had lost the required resilience due to the coup.

[Dayuhan]

Northern Mali should be mostly evacuated, just as most semi-arid regions of the world... The populations from semi-arid regions need to unload all their growth to more inhabitable regions and this should happen peacefully, without immigrants or left-behind people trying to transform the more densely populated regions in their image.

Wanted: Deus ex Machina. Preferably not American.

It's sad that Mali's densely populated regions had lost the required resilience due to the coup.

If they "lost the required resilience due to the coup", they probably didn't have much of it in the first place.