Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[davidbfpo]

From Andrew Lebovich on al-Wasat and the opening paragraphs:

Since it first burst onto the scene in December 2011, the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (generally MUJWA in English, or MUJAO in French) has been a difficult group to pin down. The group, originally characterized as a "dissident" faction of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its actions have raised a number of possible contradictions and open questions. Recently, some local and international actors have taken in particular to questioning MUJWA's actions, and speculating that MUJWA, believed to be heavily funded by the cocaine and now the kidnapping business, may in essence be using jihadist activities as a sort of front for its criminal behavior.

This post is an attempt to explore and analyze some of the possible explanations for MUJWA's behavior, with a focus on its activities, composition, and role in the city of Gao. Ultimately, I will question some of the assumptions local and international observers have made about MUJWA's motivations, in particular attempts to frame MUJWA as a "criminal" rather than a "terrorist" or "insurgent" organization, when available evidence paints a far more complicated picture of overlapping motivations and multiple sub-groupings within the same organization.

On the drugs trade aspect:

While much ink has been spilled about the spread of the drug trade in the Sahel, precious little direct evidence has been publicly provided with regards to the actual size and profitability of this trade. This is due largely to the incredible difficulty of researching the trade, efforts by traders to launder or otherwise hide money behind businesses in multiple regional countries, though I suspect part of it is also lazy writing and analysis.

Loads of links within and link:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/0...erstand-mujwa/

[davidbfpo]

A strange report on a patrol with the army in Mali. I expect this passage is not "winning hearts & minds":

This, for now, is as far we can go, an army captain tells me. We decide to film this unmarked border between north and south. As we jump off the truck, a coach full of people - possibly northern refugees - comes tearing around the corner towards us.

While we wait for the vehicle to pass out of shot, the captain starts shouting and waving his arms. In an effort to be helpful to our film, he orders the coach off the road and out of sight.

Within seconds (this being the wet season) it is stuck in an ocean of mud and that - despite the efforts of its many pushing passengers - is the last we see of them all, as our patrol turns around and heads for home.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19372083

[ganulv]

Sitting on a sofa in what passes for the officers' mess is Colonel Didier Dako. Speaking in clear, well articulated English, he extends his hands and invites us to sit down.

Gently stroking his well-tended moustache, our host smiles warmly and says, "Wherever you go here, my special forces will ensure your safety."

After thanking him for this generous offer, I ask what distinguishes his "special forces" from the rest of his men? "Ah," he whispers with a gentle shake of the head, "that is sensitive information".

[…]

As promised, we are being tailed by a pick-up truck full of heavily armed soldiers and these, it seems, are not any old squaddies. They are wearing light brown instead of green uniforms, as well as fancy knee pads and black T-shirts. Are these the Mali Army's special forces? It appears so.

during which hours of nothing was discussed but prior to which great effort was expended in the procurement of stackable white plastic chairs and refreshments I must compliment the author on his fine balance of cheek and tact in this piece.

The next morning – after a night of intermittent power cuts, clouds of ravenous mosquitoes and thunderous downpours – we pile into an old Landrover, before speeding off to join an army patrol hunting for insurgents.

As someone who has spent a rainy season lodging in a household set up with the assumption of the presence of electricity, I count the realization that daily life would actually have been less hassle for all of us if things were set up to run without electricity altogether as one of the more important insights I have had about the state of the modern world.

[ganulv]

related to the current situation in Mali via Global Observatory. Important meeting in Abidjan tomorrow, apparently.

[davidbfpo]

More and more refugees arrive in Mauritania every day from Mali: last January at the beginning of the conflict in Northern Mali, there were 16,000; today there are more than 100,000. And the influx continues.



Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/intagri...ds-of-refugees



In the beginning, the reason for the flight from the conflict area was the people’s belief that the Malian Army would exact reprisals following their confrontation with the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). But the next wave of refugees occurred due to the pressure exercised by the Islamists.



[M-A Lagrange]

Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action

Africa Briefing N°90
24 Sep 2012
Please note the full briefing is only available in French

OVERVIEW

In the absence of rapid, firm and coherent decisions at the regional (Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS), continental (African Union, AU) and international (UN) levels by the end of September, the political, security, economic and social situation in Mali will deteriorate. All scenarios are still possible, including another military coup and social unrest in the capital, which risks undermining the transitional institutions and creating chaos that could allow religious extremism and terrorist violence to spread in Mali and beyond. None of the three actors sharing power, namely the interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, the prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, and the ex-junta leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo, enjoys sufficient popular legitimacy or has the ability to prevent the aggravation of the crisis. The country urgently needs to mobilise the best Malian expertise irrespective of political allegiance rather than engaging in power plays that will lead the country to the verge of collapse.

Almost six months after a coup overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) and the Malian army relinquished control of the three northern administrative regions to armed groups – the Tuareg separatists of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist fighters of Ansar Dine (Ançar Eddine), the Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – none of the pillars of the Malian state was able to give a clear direction to the political transition and to formulate a precise and coherent demand for assistance to the international community to regain control of the north, which represents more than two thirds of the territory. The next six months will be crucial for the stability of Mali, Sahel and the entire West African region, as the risks are high and the lack of leadership at all levels of decision-making has so far been obvious.

The message from Crisis Group’s July 2012 report on Mali is still relevant. It is not a call against the principle of a military action in the north. Indeed, the use of force will probably be necessary to neutralise transnational armed groups that indulge in terrorism, jihadism and drug and arms trafficking and to restore Mali’s territorial integrity. But before resorting to force, a political and diplomatic effort is required to separate two sets of different issues: those related to intercommunal tensions within Malian society, political and economic governance of the north and management of religious diversity, and those related to collective security in the Sahel-Sahara region. The Malian army and ECOWAS’s forces will not be capable of tackling the influx of arms and combatants between a fragmented Libya and northern Mali through southern Algeria and/or northern Niger. Minimal and sustainable security in northern Mali cannot be reestablished without the clear involvement of the Algerian political and military authorities.

Following the high-level meeting on the security situation in Sahel scheduled for 26 September, on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York, Malian actors, their African and non-African partners and the UN will have to specify their course of action and clarify minimal objectives to be reached by March 2013.

The president and the prime minister should:

•constitute immediately a small informal group including Malian personalities, preferably retired from the political scene, who have specific skills and significant experience in the areas of internal security, governance and public administration, organisation of elections, decentralisation, inter-community mediation and international relations, in particular regional diplomacy, in order to help the government define a global strategy to resolve the crisis.
ECOWAS leaders should:

•recognise the limitations of the organisation in mediating the crisis and planning a military mission in Mali, and work closely with the African Union and above all with the UN, which are better equipped to respond to challenges posed by a crisis threatening international peace and security.
The UN Security Council and member states represented at the high-level meeting on the situation in Sahel should provide support to the Secretary-General to:

•appoint a special representative of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and provide him with the necessary means to achieve his mission, which must focus on reconciling the positions of ECOWAS member states, regional players (Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Mali) and Western countries;
•boost the UN presence in Mali to help the transitional government withstand the economic and social crisis, produce a credible roadmap for the restoration of territorial integrity and the organisation of transparent elections as soon as possible, and uphold the rule of law by gathering detailed information on human rights violations committed in the south (in particular in Bamako and Kati) as well as in the north;
•begin, together with the AU and ECOWAS, a mission to facilitate reconciliation within the Malian army to prevent another military coup with unpredictable consequences.
Mali’s foreign partners, in particular the European Union and the U.S., should:

•support efforts to reestablish the Malian defence and security forces by enhancing their unity, discipline and efficacy in order to ensure security in the south, constitute a credible threat of the use of force in the north and be able to participate in operations against terrorist groups;
•contribute to the resilience of the Malian economy, and employment in particular, through a rapid resumption of foreign aid so as to prevent social unrest that risks deepening the political and humanitarian crisis;
•respond favourably to demands for urgent humanitarian assistance to the civilian population seriously affected by the crisis in Mali and the entire Sahel region, in accordance with what the UN has been advocating for several months without generating mobilisation adequate to the seriousness of the situation.
Dakar/Brussels, 24 September 2012

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/region...mpaign=mremail

[davidbfpo]

The West African state of Mali has agreed to host a regional military deployment aimed at dislodging radical Islamists in control in the north....Mali was initially opposed but has now agreed to host the 3,000-strong force in the capital, Bamako. After intense regional diplomatic efforts, the authorities have given the green light for a logistical base on the outskirts of the city

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19699590

Slowly moving along, UNSC approval needed and then someone with deep pockets.