Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[ganulv]

I'm incredibly tired right now, but I remember something about Mali having had relatively decent governance until a year or two, until a coup d'tat happened.

From the late '90s until last year there had been a working multiparty electoral system. I honestly don't know how much governing the government did, though.

We have to rethink the Malian state and if necessary, let the maps reflect the reality on the ground. The more we postpone it the more time we waste.

For better or worse, Westphalian sovereignty is at the heart of how modern nation states work. The MNLA does appear to be considering confederation/semi-autonomy as a possible acceptable solution to their demands, if I hear this piece correctly.

[Firn]

I did now check up a bit on Mali, with the help that mighty Western imperialist nework. Sometimes it is important to remind oneself of the basics before writing.

To be honest I'm much surprised that Wikipedia has a rather long article about an unrecognized state called Azawad which was proclaimed by the rebels.

Demographics

Timbuktu census in 1950
Gao (which includes Kidal) census in 1950

Northern Mali has a population density of 1.5 people per square kilometre.[72] The Malian regions that are claimed by Azawad are listed hereafter (apart from the portion of Mopti Region claimed and occupied by the MNLA). The population figures are from the 2009 census of Mali, taken before Azawadi independence was proclaimed.[73]Since the start of the Tuareg rebellion in January 2012, probably 250,000 former inhabitants have fled from the territory.[74]

--

In July 2009, Mali's population was an estimated 14.5 million. The population is predominantly rural (68% in 2002), and 5–10% of Malians are nomadic.[60] More than 90% of the population lives in the southern part of the country, especially in Bamako, which has over 1 million residents.[60]

In 2007, about 48% of Malians were less than fifteen years old, 49% were 15–64 years old, and 3% were 65 and older.[42] The median age was 15.9 years.[42] The birth rate in 2012 was 45.2 births per 1,000, and the total fertility rate was 6.4 children per woman.[42] The death rate in 2007 was 16.5 deaths per 1,000.[42] Life expectancy at birth was 49.5 years total (47.6 for males and 51.5 for females).[42] Mali has one of the world's highest rates of infant mortality,[60] with 106 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2007.[42]

If the 2009 census and the reports are mostly correct the northern territory is populated, after taking some general population growth into accout, by less then a million. Overall the population is of course very young compared to developed nations and composed of a various ethnic groups with two dominant ones, the Tuareg and Songhai.

Certainly the north is very sparsely populated and I wonder what which parts parts of the population have in their hearts and minds.

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P.S: It seems that most of the French fighting force consists of medium forces using wheeled AFVs, which seems rather typical for French operations in similar circumstances. I think it is interesting to compare it to the kind of forces SA used in it's border wars.

[davidbfpo]

The Arabist blog surveys the internal situation, starting with:

it might be helpful to look forward to what the French campaign is about (and what it’s not), as well as to look north to the implications for North Africa.

and concludes:

What does all of this mean for northern Mali – expect periodic bombing campaigns and sustained guerilla fighting/insurgency for the remainder of the year, with the strong likelihood of an ever-present jihadi threat for the foreseeable future. It’s not ideal, not least for the residents of northern Mali, but for the broader Maghreb it is acceptable.

Link:http://www.arabist.net/blog/2013/1/1...e-maghreb.html

A Stratfor analyst writes:

But unlike Afghanistan, with its mountainous terrain, Mali, and other areas of the arid Sahel, are easy to surveil and thus poorly suited to host terrorist training camps. With Western and African military forces converging on Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will struggle to survive.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate...-in-the-desert

Not very convincing IMO. Mali is the same size as Afghanistan, yes it is arid mainly in the "rebel" north; the sheer scale of surveillance - especially if minus any meaningful ground coverage and 'training camps' are pre-9/11. There are ample alternatives, especially if the focus is not on attacking the 'far enemy'.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating biography, context and details on 'The Chameleon':

Since the seizure of northern Mali during 2012 the Malian jihadist figure Oumar Ould Hamaha has emerged from the often formless haze of rarely glimpsed AQIM kidnap groups operating in the Sahel region.

(It ends)..Despite the apparent fractures between AQIM, MOJWA, Belmokhtar and others, the case study of Oumar Ould Hamaha suggests that factional politics and rivalries is unlikely to alter the practical relationships on the ground of the jihadist elements in the Sahel region that have operated together in various guises for years.

Link:http://www.gctat.org/fr/analyses-rap...ee-groups.html

I've not heard of this Geneva-based think tank, their 'home' page is at:http://www.gctat.org/fr/presentation.html

[davidbfpo]

Some interesting points made, albeit from a US perspective:

But the surveillance missions in northern Mali have had only a limited effect. Islamist leaders have banned cellphones, closed Internet cafes and shut down cellular towers in an effort to cut the region off from the outside world. With the clock turned back decades, there are few electronic communications for American eavesdroppers to intercept.

General Ham said that it had been very difficult to get consistent, reliable intelligence about what he called a militant “safe haven” in Mali.

“It’s tough to penetrate...It’s tough to get access for platforms that can collect. It’s an extraordinarily tough environment for human intelligence, not just ours but the neighboring countries as well.”

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/wo...agewanted=all&

I am not so sure about the mobile network being closed, yesterday several experienced reporters cited calling people in the insurgent north.

[davidbfpo]

More useful for the context given The Guardian chimes in with:

The French government claim they are merely softening up the territory for military intervention led by the Malian army and a coalition of regional Ecowas forces. What they have failed to mention is that the Malian army hasn't won a military encounter against Tuareg rebels in the north since the early 1960s, at least not without the help of pro-government Tuareg and Arab militias who know the terrain. Unfortunately, these militias won't be on hand to help this time round - not in the short term at least.

(Later) The Tuareg, discredited by an association with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadist groups that only a small handful of their leaders ever really wanted, will be back where they were before the great rebellion of the early 1990s; a marginalised, harassed and vilified people living under military occupation and watching their nomadic lifestyle and culture slowly disappear.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...war?CMP=twt_gu

Amidst the comments was a wise one suggesting we look at the war between Morocco and Polisario in Western Sahara, a conflict in a desert, albeit one that was more conventional "hit & run" at the immense defence line built, than an insurgency amongst the people.

[Firn]

One can certainly see part of the point the Guardian makes about the Tuareg/Moor/Arab groups and the Mali army. As I have written before two major ethnic groups seem to dominate in the northern provinces.

Mali's population consists of diverse Sub-Saharan ethnic groups, sharing similar historic, cultural, and religious traditions. Exceptions are two nomadic northern groups, the Tuaregs, a Berber people, and Maurs (or Moors), of Arabo-Berber origins. The Tuaregs traditionally have opposed the central government. Starting in June 1990 in the north, Tuaregs seeking greater autonomy led to clashes with the military. In April 1992, the government and most opposing factions signed a pact to end the fighting and restore stability in the north. Its major aims are to allow greater autonomy to the north and increase government resource allocation to what has been a traditionally impoverished region. The peace agreement was celebrated in 1996 in Timbuktu during an official and highly publicized ceremony called "Flamme de la Paix"--(peace flame).

Historically, interethnic relations throughout the rest of the country were facilitated by easy mobility on the Niger River and across the country's vast savannahs. Each ethnic group was traditionally tied to a specific occupation, all working within proximity to each other, although the distinctions were often blurred. The Bambara, Malink, Sarakole, Dogon and Songhay are farmers; the Fula or Fulani, Maur, and Tuareg are herders, while the Bozo are fishers. In recent years, this linkage has shifted considerably, as ethnic groups seek diverse, nontraditional sources of income.

Ethnic groups: Mande 50% (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke), Fula[5] 17%, Voltaic 12%, Songhai 6%, Tuareg and Moor 10%, other 5%

The Songhai seem to be farmers and should be thus mostly be settled in the souther areas of the northern provinces, along the riverbeds and lakes, especially of course along the great Niger. Ok, this ethnic map ( from the African Art Virtual Gallery ) seems to give a general idea of the situation. Note that quite some of the recent fighting took place in the traditional homeland of the Songhai, in areas where relative little Tuareg live. (Both Songhay and Songhai seem to be valid).



From the Guardian:

Even if the Malian and Ecowas troops manage to march in and recapture most of the major cities in the north, they're likely to find their enemy strangely invisible. The local youth who have been fighting for one or other of the Islamist katibat or cells will no doubt stash their Kalashnikovs, khaki robes and ammo pouches and don the uniform of the local inhabitants; a civilian robe and a turban that covers the head and face, leaving only the eyes exposed. A junior army officer from Lagos, Cotonou or even Bamako will find it very hard to tell the Islamist apart from the innocent native city-dweller or nomad. Local informants will offer their services and summary executions and brutality against both the guilty and the innocent will ensue. Anger against "white" northerners - Tuareg, Arab and Fulani – that has been brewing among southern black Malians and the darker skinned northerners such as the Songhoi is likely to spill over into racial and ethnic violence. Vigilante groups, such as the feared Songhoi militia, the Ganda Izo, are ready to roar into action with their machetes and petrol cans. Human rights organisations will have to work overtime.

This linguistic map ( from the Fragile states center) shows a similar picture in the specific area:



It is of course of great importance to partly ignore the state borders, especially under the present circumstances, Afghanistan docet. The raid in Algeria was certain not needed to give further prove of that.

Guardian:

This is the land where the local Tuareg or Arab in his souped-up turbo 4x4 is king. Iyad Ag Ghali, the Tuareg leader of the Salafist Ansar Dine militia, is a master of the kind of hit-and-run guerrilla warfare that suits the desert conditions and the sheer size of territory, roughly equal to that of Spain. His mujahideen showed their verve last Sunday by capturing the small town of Diabaly, north of Mopti, with a lightening strike that originated over the border in Mauritania. This ability to crisscross borders is another important aspect of the Islamists' Houdini-esque style of combat.

In this case it was a raid out of the traditional Moorish homeland (in Mauritania) into a Southern/Central region of Mali populated by quite different ethnic and linguistic groups. With a vast area of relatively speedily crossed terrain and a rather ineffective army it is no surprise that small organized forces with enough pickups and fuel can mount such strikes.