Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[davidbfpo]

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=1&

This alone suffices:

According to one senior officer, the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units fighting in the north at the time defected to the insurrection “at the crucial moment,” taking fighters, weapons and scarce equipment with them. He said they were joined by about 1,600 other defectors from within the Malian Army, crippling the government’s hope of resisting the onslaught.

A puzzling insight into the action / in-action behind the shifting front-line in Mali:http://africasacountry.com/2013/01/1...the-fairytale/

Such as this oh not subtle change:

Second, virtually unremarked upon with all eyes in the East, several hundred French soldiers are deployed in Bamako to protect French citizens—of whom there are reportedly some 6,000 in Mali, of whom expatriates are a minority (press: please note). In the current emergency while the French troops are there ostensibly to protect their citizens and other civilians from terrorist attack, they implicitly secure the civilian government against its own military and against mobs like those ginned up by MP-22 and other radical associations. Meanwhile, soldiers from ECOWAS nations are arriving by the hundreds, although it is not yet clear what role they will play or where they will be stationed.

[KingJaja]

I know the discussion over the next few weeks is going to be about tactics, "counter insurgency", training, how the West can better partner with African armies etc. I think that misses the big picture.

Think about this.

1. Ghana lies in the same neighbourhood (it is right next door to Cote D'Ivoire), but Ghana has been remarkably stable (just had a peaceful presidential election). The economy is growing and it is moving to "mid income" status.

It is "good governance" stupid. All the military assistance and strategy in the World will not erase the uncomfortable facts on the ground. The current state of the Malian Military is the best indicator that you are dealing with (a) a failed state and (b) extremely flaky "allies".

2. The next question is how do we make "good governance" happen. We need to come to terms with the fact that someone played a game of dice with artificial borders and gave those artificial entities "statehood" in the sixties. The neat lines in the Saharan sand mean nothing to the Tuareg people.

We have to rethink the Malian state and if necessary, let the maps reflect the reality on the ground. The more we postpone it the more time we waste.

3. We Africans need to partner with the Chinese (to help us with the economic stuff) and the West (to help us with security). The problem of "terrorism" in Africa cannot be solved without a solid economic and political strategy.

Neither the US nor France have a long-term economic strategy for that part of the World, so why not work with the Chinese to integrate the economics with the security?

I've always had my reservations about the US AFRICOM-led policy in the part of the World. The events in Mali proved me right (the massive amounts of money spent on the trans Saharan counter-terrorism initiative have been wasted).

It all starts from governance.

[Fuchs]

I'm incredibly tired right now, but I remember something about Mali having had relatively decent governance until a year or two, until a coup d'tat happened.

[KingJaja]

I'm incredibly tired right now, but I remember something about Mali having had relatively decent governance until a year or two, until a coup d'tat happened.

No, it didn't (if you consider the very real issues that simmered under the surface in the North, but were ignored by both the West and the Southern-led Malian government).

[Fuchs]

No, it didn't (if you consider the very real issues that simmered under the surface in the North, but were ignored by both the West and the Southern-led Malian government).

I'm not sure that the government can be blamed. Desertification was out of their control and largely caused by the people living in the decertifying regions themselves.

Depleted land resources were a reason for Tuareg resentment of the Malian government, in that the Tuareg felt the government did not respond appropriately to the droughts and basically forced them to leave Mali. This resentment contributed to the conflict between the Tuareg and the government in the 1990s.

Over-grazing of the semi-arid lands bordering the Sahara in northern Mali and Niger, combined with widespread droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, led to the desertification of large parts of these areas.

from
The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict
by Ann Hershkowitz
ICE Case Studies
Number 151, August 2005

[ganulv]

I'm incredibly tired right now, but I remember something about Mali having had relatively decent governance until a year or two, until a coup d'tat happened.

From the late '90s until last year there had been a working multiparty electoral system. I honestly don't know how much governing the government did, though.

We have to rethink the Malian state and if necessary, let the maps reflect the reality on the ground. The more we postpone it the more time we waste.

For better or worse, Westphalian sovereignty is at the heart of how modern nation states work. The MNLA does appear to be considering confederation/semi-autonomy as a possible acceptable solution to their demands, if I hear this piece correctly.

[Firn]

I did now check up a bit on Mali, with the help that mighty Western imperialist nework. Sometimes it is important to remind oneself of the basics before writing.

To be honest I'm much surprised that Wikipedia has a rather long article about an unrecognized state called Azawad which was proclaimed by the rebels.

Demographics

Timbuktu census in 1950
Gao (which includes Kidal) census in 1950

Northern Mali has a population density of 1.5 people per square kilometre.[72] The Malian regions that are claimed by Azawad are listed hereafter (apart from the portion of Mopti Region claimed and occupied by the MNLA). The population figures are from the 2009 census of Mali, taken before Azawadi independence was proclaimed.[73]Since the start of the Tuareg rebellion in January 2012, probably 250,000 former inhabitants have fled from the territory.[74]

--

In July 2009, Mali's population was an estimated 14.5 million. The population is predominantly rural (68% in 2002), and 5–10% of Malians are nomadic.[60] More than 90% of the population lives in the southern part of the country, especially in Bamako, which has over 1 million residents.[60]

In 2007, about 48% of Malians were less than fifteen years old, 49% were 15–64 years old, and 3% were 65 and older.[42] The median age was 15.9 years.[42] The birth rate in 2012 was 45.2 births per 1,000, and the total fertility rate was 6.4 children per woman.[42] The death rate in 2007 was 16.5 deaths per 1,000.[42] Life expectancy at birth was 49.5 years total (47.6 for males and 51.5 for females).[42] Mali has one of the world's highest rates of infant mortality,[60] with 106 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2007.[42]

If the 2009 census and the reports are mostly correct the northern territory is populated, after taking some general population growth into accout, by less then a million. Overall the population is of course very young compared to developed nations and composed of a various ethnic groups with two dominant ones, the Tuareg and Songhai.

Certainly the north is very sparsely populated and I wonder what which parts parts of the population have in their hearts and minds.

---

P.S: It seems that most of the French fighting force consists of medium forces using wheeled AFVs, which seems rather typical for French operations in similar circumstances. I think it is interesting to compare it to the kind of forces SA used in it's border wars.

[davidbfpo]

The Arabist blog surveys the internal situation, starting with:

it might be helpful to look forward to what the French campaign is about (and what it’s not), as well as to look north to the implications for North Africa.

and concludes:

What does all of this mean for northern Mali – expect periodic bombing campaigns and sustained guerilla fighting/insurgency for the remainder of the year, with the strong likelihood of an ever-present jihadi threat for the foreseeable future. It’s not ideal, not least for the residents of northern Mali, but for the broader Maghreb it is acceptable.

Link:http://www.arabist.net/blog/2013/1/1...e-maghreb.html

A Stratfor analyst writes:

But unlike Afghanistan, with its mountainous terrain, Mali, and other areas of the arid Sahel, are easy to surveil and thus poorly suited to host terrorist training camps. With Western and African military forces converging on Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will struggle to survive.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate...-in-the-desert

Not very convincing IMO. Mali is the same size as Afghanistan, yes it is arid mainly in the "rebel" north; the sheer scale of surveillance - especially if minus any meaningful ground coverage and 'training camps' are pre-9/11. There are ample alternatives, especially if the focus is not on attacking the 'far enemy'.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating biography, context and details on 'The Chameleon':

Since the seizure of northern Mali during 2012 the Malian jihadist figure Oumar Ould Hamaha has emerged from the often formless haze of rarely glimpsed AQIM kidnap groups operating in the Sahel region.

(It ends)..Despite the apparent fractures between AQIM, MOJWA, Belmokhtar and others, the case study of Oumar Ould Hamaha suggests that factional politics and rivalries is unlikely to alter the practical relationships on the ground of the jihadist elements in the Sahel region that have operated together in various guises for years.

Link:http://www.gctat.org/fr/analyses-rap...ee-groups.html

I've not heard of this Geneva-based think tank, their 'home' page is at:http://www.gctat.org/fr/presentation.html

[Dayuhan]

The next question is how do we make "good governance" happen. We need to come to terms with the fact that someone played a game of dice with artificial borders and gave those artificial entities "statehood" in the sixties. The neat lines in the Saharan sand mean nothing to the Tuareg people.

I don't know that anyone has the capacity to "make good governance happen". Good governance is the product of an evolutionary process; it doesn't just "happen". That process is often long and on the ugly side.

I completely agree that artificial borders have created many problems, in Africa and elsewhere, but I'm not convinced that it will help to have any outside entity, particularly a western one, trying to redraw the lines in the sand to conform to perceived reality.

We have to rethink the Malian state and if necessary, let the maps reflect the reality on the ground. The more we postpone it the more time we waste.

Who would be the "we" in that statement?

[KingJaja]

Who would be the "we" in that statement?

"We" refers to the International Community (especially ECOWAS). Mali has to renegotiate its internal political architecture to ensure sustainable peace.

You know about South Sudan? South Sudan is the future of many African states - you can take that to the bank.

It is 50 years after independence and we now have a fair idea of which African states are workable and which African states are unworkable. Over the next few decades, this will be even clearer.

About "good governance" - it isn't a game of dice.

[Dayuhan]

"We" refers to the International Community (especially ECOWAS).

I'm not sure there is such a thing as an "international community" in any reliably coherent sense. Nations near and far may cooperate to the extent that they see common interests, but they are pursuing their own interests, not those of any other nation or any hypothetical community.

Mali has to renegotiate its internal political architecture to ensure sustainable peace.

Possibly so, but who would negotiate, and with whom?

You know about South Sudan? South Sudan is the future of many African states - you can take that to the bank.

I don't doubt it. What I doubt is the ability of any outside party to determine where and how this should happen, and the wisdom of efforts by outside parties to make this happen.

It is 50 years after independence and we now have a fair idea of which African states are workable and which African states are unworkable. Over the next few decades, this will be even clearer.

Again, describing a country as "unworkable" is easy enough, and the term may well be accurate... but any external effort to propose or impose a solution is likely to create a good deal of trouble.

About "good governance" - it isn't a game of dice.

No, it's not a game at all. For one thing, nobody seems to know the rules. We may know bad governance when we see it, but I'm not sure any of us - or any hypothetical "we" - are in a position to determine what "good governance" means for someone else, or how they should go about achieving it.

[KingJaja]

Again, describing a country as "unworkable" is easy enough, and the term may well be accurate... but any external effort to propose or impose a solution is likely to create a good deal of trouble.

South Sudan is an externally imposed solution. It is tricky, but inevitable. Expect more in future.