Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[Laeke]

Well I got beaten to the point by Mr Lagrange, as I wanted, in a less experty manner, to say the same thing.

I think airlift, air logistics (re-fueling & intelligence) all are appreciated and not just symbolic. My understanding was that it always was one of the weakest point in the French military chain, airlift is often strained, and the US has an obvious advantage in the field of technological air assets (satellites, drones, AWACS...). And my british bias may be showing but I am not too surprised they were among the first to lend support, albeit small.

I'm also not too surprised about the possible mixed signals from the USA. Ultimately I am sure there will be some support (if it is not already in place behind the scenes), but I understand that there is internal politics & international image issues that must be taken into account (plus the usual US-French divergence on how to handle problems).

Regarding the last post by davidbfpo, is that really a strategic divergence? I only see a difference in displayed optimism on the matter of reaching the ideal objective (elimination of all hostile, unwanted groups in the region).

My general impression is that France is looking to do what it usually does in Africa: A quick clean "heavy lifting" job, then control & contain the problem via our already long standing military presence in the region (with a force in Mali itself, to support an international mandated force and be able to cope with any real emergency).

I have read in several places that late Spring will end the war & big manoeuvers season because of the heat, so I suppose the plan is to go as far north as possible till then, then to consolidate the Mali and ECOWAS force, and use French forces either as a force multiplier or in targeted operations.

Could we imagine a Chinese involvement, even symbolic, in this?

Isn't China whole posture in those matters to condone as little as possible any sort of international intervention that would in turn weaken the concept of national sovereignty?
I guess China already feels like it has done its part by not shooting down on sight the UN resolution...

[davidbfpo]

Behind the catchy, if ambiguous headline 'Revealed: how Saharan caravans of cocaine help to fund al-Qaeda in terrorists' North African domain' is an article that draws together the allegations over drugs, Jihadists and others:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...an-domain.html

Leaving the Malian aspects for a moment, what is being done about this small, coastal state:

In Guinea Bissau, for example, the cartels' limitless funds have bought up so many police, politicians and soldiers that it has been dubbed Africa's first "narco-state", with a military coup last April blamed on in-fighting over drug trade proceeds.

Citing the UNODC regional rep:

Mr Lapaque cautions that hard proof of al-Qaeda's role in the cocaine trade is, by definition, difficult to come by.

[davidbfpo]

Corp Toure, whose unit was 10 miles from Diabaly at the time and was ordered to let the French do the fighting, said he later heard that among the Islamist guerrillas was one of his old comrades, who also had an older brother living in the village.

"The older brother asked him: 'Why did you join the militant people?'" recalled Corp Toure. "He replied: 'Because they pay well.' He said he was earning two million CFA (£2,600) a year, plus 500,000 CFA (£750) for every day spent fighting."

That might not sound much by Western standards, but Corp Toure said that even the basic pay level was double his own army income.

Yes an account based on one Malian soldier's account:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-pay-more.html

Makes me wonder whether money would work better in reducing the rebels.

[Fuchs]

I think you got this one wrong, this is too big for France do do alone and they know it.

You sounded serious, and this confuses me.

How could this possibly be too big for France?

It's a classic single finger sweep with the left hand for them.
Much of their ground forces are practically specialised on this sort of campaign, the French weren't even serious about readiness for intra-European-style during the Cold War. Meanwhile, they have been serious about meddling in Africa for more than a century.

Their light mechanised / 'armoured recce with big guns' forces are a clear overmatch to the few thousand opposition troops. Many of those opposition troops are deserters and will desert again. They are brittle in face of what the French are doing. The French can leave the sweeps through towns and cities to the Malian army, after all. Said army is growing in size again because deserters return - in part those very deserters who had joined the rebels earlier.
This opposition is no less susceptible to collapse than the Taliban were in 2001.
The French know there's no point in occupying, so they will almost inevitably do their usual thing - a rather short intervention followed by a trainer mission and a QRF on stand-by as fail-safe.


I've been annoyed for years by people treating European military powers (and also the U.S. military) as if combating rag tag armed groups or Third World military forces in disrepair for decades was a challenge to them.
Those people forget what real challenge, real crisis is like. Real crisis and challenge is when your army corps is fighting for survival in a intra-European style campaign, losing one or two battalion equivalents per day and reporting no smaller losses to national news than the loss of a whole regiment.

Kicking butts of loudmouths with marginal (para)military capability in distant places is not a challenge, and certainly not "too big".

Denmark cold have intervened in Mali and won quickly & decisively. It would merely have required some improvisation.


Improvisation is yet another topic which annoys me a lot. Western military bureaucracies have had so very lavish budgets for decades that they seem to have lost the mental capacity for taking into account the potential of improvisation on levels battalion and above.
The German military had no logistical means to intervene during the Boxer rebellion in China more than a century ago. So what? Passenger ships were converted to troop transports. Nobody supposed the German military was incapable or its navy should have maintained a sizeable amphibious or troops transport fleet. Budgets were tight, improvisation was sufficient.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs

You sounded serious, and this confuses me.

How could this possibly be too big for France?

Those people forget what real challenge, real crisis is like. Real crisis and challenge is when your army corps is fighting for survival in a intra-European style campaign, losing one or two battalion equivalents per day and reporting no smaller losses to national news than the loss of a whole regiment.

I am serious, but readily admit I may be over estimating this particular threat group. This quote from my last post does deserve serious consideration.

The mayor of Diabaly, Oumar Diakite, said the Malian army could never control the north, with its porous borders and network of smuggling routes.

"Those routes are not under the control of the army, and these jihadist people know those routes well through Algeria and Morocco and it is easy for them to get to Europe. It's a very vast zone that the army can never control," he said.

While AQIM doesn't control all the country and now controll considerably less, it is important to point out that Mali is almost twice the size of Texax (my apologies for our non-U.S. readers, it was the only relative comparison I could find). I believe it is almost twice the size of Afghanistan, but obviously the terrain difference is considerably different. Still that is a lot of territory and it won't be controlled by a small intervention force.

While the media focuses on Mali it is important to note this is a regional movement, so even if the French are successful in defeating the threat within the borders of Mali (the borders appear to be little more than legal illusion, and in practice non-existent) that doesn't address the threat to Niger, Algeria, etc.. The entire region presents a viable line of communication for the jihadists into Europe.

Now I think where we may differ and further debate is your comment about a real crisis. I'm part of the small percentage on SWJ that thinks we will future wars between states where the stakes are much higher, and the losses almost uncomprehensable compared to our current conflicts. Fortunately we can now fatten our ranks with women to throw into the slaughter mill as though that will somehow help. The last point supports yours because our politicians have forgotten how ugly war can get.

Yet that point is irrelevant to the situation in North Africa. I have no doubt the French will decisively win any significant battles they have with the Jihadists, and I suspect the Jihadists and unlike Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001 and 2002 they will avoid pitched battles and wage the "War of the Flea", which will require significant ground forces to counter (unless they get creative and come up with a very different approach). The Fleas are not trying to defeat the West in battle but by waging a conflict that exhausts the West politically and economically. What is the French way to victory? How do they achieve their objectives without getting drawn into a long conflict? This is something all of us have a common interest in discovering.

[Fuchs]

Some news reports claim that the majority of the rebels already fled to the north.

I suppose the French way is to provoke exactly this, and to help the Malian army to reconquer the south.

North Mali tends to produce one revolt per decade, so there will probably be silence for years to come - and the usual suspects will understand that allying with jihadists provokes an avoidable intervention.
Next time, they will probably have learned and simply loot one or two cities, try to get some ransoms and withdraw without provoking Western crusaders and without questioning the integrity of Mali's government (which runs counter to French Africa policies).

Meanwhile, the jihadists may understand they cannot achieve anything beyond a certain threshold and will probably stay in the confines of their freedom of action; dominate most remote, economically irrelevant communities.
I doubt they're going to be any threat to 'us' there.


These northerner rebels did and do not enjoy elusiveness. They cannot hide among the people for long. Hiding against a Mirage 2000 may work, but when ground troops arrive some locals will indicate the location of the rebels.
You cannot be particularly elusive in a quite empty desert either. At most you can blend in with normal traffic and hope your enemies don't have the assets to fly along a limited quantity of routes and other spotted vehicle tracks.
The French even had Horizon (mothballed, IIRC), the British have ASTOR, the U.S. has a couple radar drones and JStars. It's basically a better exercise to keep an eye on such a desert region's traffic even without any improvisation with normal aircraft.

[Laeke]

Indeed, France probably cannot afford to do "COIN" like the US army in Afghanistan or Iraq. We do not have the numbers to do so.

But on the other hand I do not think that France is looking to do that either, and I doubt anyone believes the deep problems of the Sahel region will be fixed with this operation. My opinion is that statu quo ante bellum and maybe start to adressing the Tuareg issue (but that is dependent on the good will of so many countries...) are the maximum we can achieve.

It is true that the already existing collaboration in the region between French/Western armies and local counterparts (Mauritania, at least. Probably Chad and Niger, I guess) against AQIM was not very effective and suffers beyond that from the position of a few key players (like Algeria).

Maybe an opportunity objective of opration Serval is to hit as hard those groups now to ease future containement. As often, war is a way to buy time for working out a more favourable political solution or preparing for the next one.

[M-A Lagrange]

Indeed, France probably cannot afford to do "COIN" like the US army in Afghanistan or Iraq. We do not have the numbers to do so.

Well I believe that post North Mali "reconquista" will looks like Epervier in Chad, which followed for decades the Manta operation.
COIN should be the Malian government regime problem (Basically addressing the Tuareg demands in a Malaysian style). For the West the objective looks basically like preventing AQMI to threat allied regimes and controlling strategic piece of land.

Strategically, Sahara is a sea of sand cutting Africa in 2. No one is looking to control the whole area. Once major cities like Timbuktu would have been sized the objective will probably be controlling movements and identifying gathering spots. Malian government and regional countries will be left with destroying those pockets with a light support from western armies. Nothing really new and this does not require huge number of troops.

[Laeke]

I think we are in agreement.
A limited scope means that the war aims are modest and only seek to adress the most urgent issues. I don't think it is necessarily a bad thing either, a lot of recent (and not so recent) expeditionary massive engagements by Western forces not being very convincing in terms of results anyway.
Hopefully this operation will go as smoothly as usual (at least for our men in uniforms).

The big question, I suspect, is whether or not a political processus of some kind under "international" supervision (France, CEDEAO/ECOWAS, UN...) will be put in place to adress the Tuareg issue.

[davidbfpo]

Size matters and a Google search found some help (in square kilometres):

1) Mali 1240
2) Northern Mali 827
3) Texas 692
4) Afghanistan 647
5) Iraq 438

The OECD has a short summary on Northern Mali:http://www.oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm

If northern Mali were to become a state, it would be twice the size of Germany but with 1.6 residents per square kilometre. It would share with Mongolia the title of the country with the lowest population density in the world.

[M-A Lagrange]

F. Holland just detailled the French approach for Mali:

Nous sommes en train de gagner cette bataille, quand je dis nous, c'est l'arme malienne, ce sont les Africains soutenus par les Franais, a-t-il dclar, alors que les armes franaise et malienne viennent de reprendre le contrle des villes stratgiques de Gao et Tombouctou.

"Maintenant, les Africains peuvent prendre le relais et ce sont eux qui iront dans la partie du Nord dont nous savons qu'elle est la plus difficile puisque des terroristes y sont cachs et qu'ils peuvent encore mener des oprations extrmement dangereuses pour les pays voisins et pour le Mali", a ajout Franois Hollande lors d'une confrence de presse l'Elyse.

"We are winning that battle, when I say us, I mean the Malian army, the Africans with the support of France, declared F. Holland as Malian and French armies just took control of the strategic cities of Gao and Timbuktu.

Now, the Africans can take the lead and that is them who will go in the northern part of Mali that we know will be the harshest one as terrorists are hidden there and still can conduct extremely dangerous operations against neighbouring countries and against Mali.

Added F. Holland in a press conference at Elyse.

From Reuters (in French)
http://fr.news.yahoo.com/la-bataille...3Rpb25z;_ylv=3

Added

This link should work:
In French
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/topne...e-au-mali.html

In English
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/topne...e-au-mali.html

[Fuchs]

Link doesn't work for me.
Related article:
http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/in...lle-7757411999

translated:
http://tinyurl.com/awjkkmg

[Laeke]

The Guardian give details of UK involvement:

Special forces (in non combat), more reco, more advisors for Mali army formation.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...es-active-mali

Also in Le Monde, mentions of US drones to be based in Niger.

[davidbfpo]

From RFI:

Members of the Malian National Assembly adopted unanimously on Tuesday 29 January, the establishment of a political roadmap for the post-war period. The Government must exercise its sovereignty over the entire national territory before we talk about elections....(Citing the Assembly majority leader)...Reconciliation is needed but can not negotiate the independence of a territory or part of secularism.

Link:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130129-m...ute-transition

Given the state of internal politics in Mali, as illustrated by the endless negotiation over allowing ECOWAS troops to arrive and the precarious state of their own army -v- politicians - is this a good sign? Not am I sure if this means dialogue does not have a place, nor whether insurgency in the north will postpone a national election.

[M-A Lagrange]

A simple but not too bad artile on why Kidal is important and why the French took the airport alone without Malian support in order to not spoil the coming peace process.

MALI. The issue of Kidal

What happens today to Kidal? MIA and MNLA are on site and they feared and denied the arrival of Malian troops: "Given their hatred of the Tuareg and their desire for revenge after their defeat for nearly a year, if the Malian army entered the city It would be a massacre, "said a Tuareg from Kidal.

The French quickly realized the situation. A ratonnade, even massacres in Kidal, any solution would have rotted future. "The Tuareg are our friends," forcefully reminded the French defense minister. Result: The plane landed at this airport that night included no Malian military. Best device from Burkina Faso is expected to bring a delegation Kidal MIA-MNLA to Ouagadougou to resume negotiations with the government of Mali.

Surprise. At the same time, while Bamako had dragged feet last November to discuss the Tuareg and is keen resentment towards the men of the North, the Malian National Assembly has just voted "unanimously" a piece of road includes discussions with "armed groups", hear the MNLA and MIA rid of Iyad Ag Ghali. No doubt that France , a position of strength, did not hesitate to twist the arm of his ally Mali to explain that his intervention miracle had not intended to give a blank check Bamako to break the Tuareg.

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/guerr...-de-kidal.html
The link is to the english version
Frankly the translation is not really that good by the way...

[davidbfpo]

Two review articles, each with numerous good points. The shortest is by an American academic from FP 'Mali Is Not a Stan: When it comes to covering Africa's latest conflict, it's suddenly amateur hour':http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...rica?page=full

How is Mali different from Afghanistan? First, Mali is not where empires go to die. Afghanistan is well-known as a place that has always been difficult for any outsiders to invade and sustain military engagement, much less establish governing institutions. What governing institutions are established have long been weak and largely decentralized structures that allow local and tribal leaders maximum autonomy. Mali, by contrast, has a longer history of at least some centralized rule. The Mali Empire, which governed a huge swath of West Africa from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, included the renowned city of scholarship in Timbuktu. Mali's colonization by France in 1892 was largely peaceful, and the country has never engaged in a serious war until now, with the exception of a brief and violent border dispute with Burkina Faso in the mid-1980s. France's exit from Mali at the end of colonization was accomplished peacefully as well.

France's engagement in Mali is also unlike U.S. engagement in Afghanistan in that, because of their colonial history, the French know what they are getting into. There are decades of outstanding French scholarship on Mali; France is practically drowning in Mali experts in government, academia, and the private sector. This is more important than many realize; having deep cultural and historical knowledge and a shared language (most educated Malians still speak French) makes it much easier for French forces to relate to average Malians and build friendships with key local leaders whose support will be necessary for long-term success.

The tip for success:

...knowing the importance of greeting others correctly is probably the single most important means by which French soldiers will win Malian hearts and minds.

The second is longer 'In Search of Monsters: on the French intervention in Mali' by Stephen W. Smith, a journalist with French papers and now an academic in the USA:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n03/stephen...q_v=8853d77b01

I am not sure who was going to fly in supplies to the insurgents:

When the jihadists pushed south to seize the airport near Mopti, which would have allowed heavy cargo planes to supply them in their landlocked sanctuary and put them in a position to march on the capital, Paris decided to act.

[davidbfpo]

A BBC piece 'Why Mali's Tuareg are lying low' which is a little bit "light", but has this worrying passage:

Just a few minutes drive away hundreds of young men are running whooping and singing through the bush.

They are the Ganda Izo, the Children of the Land, a militia composed largely of black refugees from the north that is training now to go home - and help the Malian army root out those who collaborated with the rebels.

We are the ones who know who's who, they say - who looted, who stole, who ordered or administered Islamic punishments for smoking and drinking - and who raped.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21296746

[davidbfpo]

An interesting, if very optimistic commentary by a "local"; with some home truths that many would prefer left unsaid:http://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2013/...hed-part-deux/

[davidbfpo]

A senior Ansar Dine Moussa Mohamed Ag Mohamed, and another from Mujao, Akhmed Oumeni Ould Baba, were arrested Saturday at the Algerian border by the MNLA. This is at least one part of the assertion Tuareg movement, which states that the arrest occurred after a clash between the MNLA and a convoy of rebels who tried to cross the Algerian border.

For the MNLA, claiming the arrest of two leaders of Ansar Dine and Mujao is a nice stunt. The Tuareg movement continues to affirm its commitment to assist the French forces in their hunt for terrorist groups hiding in northern Mali.

Link:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130204-m...sar-dine-mujao

[davidbfpo]

Mali is proving itself to be truly African to outsiders, I do not currently include the French military as outsiders. Africa has the habit of appearing to have simple problems to which external solutions can be readily applied - the Africa "hands" here will now nod sagely and chuckle.

Last week RFI, a French news agency, reported a demonstration of un-armed Malian Army para-commandos, known as the 'Red Berets" in Bamako, asking why they were not being deployed on operations. The unit had opposed the coup in 2012 and although kept in being clearly had an uncertain future.

On Friday Reuters reported:

Smoke rose from the base, where mutinous members of the 'red beret' paratroop unit.... started firing with their weapons to protest attempts to redeploy them. After several hours of firing, calm returned at the camp. The paratroopers had been ordered to join other units at the front in the ongoing French-led campaign against al Qaeda-allied insurgents. But they insisted on staying together as a regiment and resisted the military police, Malian officers said.

Link:http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...91708I20130208

Now to the insurgents, who are reportedly dispersed and "on the run". A BBC News item on:

The Tegharghar mountains give the word "remote" new meaning....a region that is sometimes known as the Adagh des Ifoghas, or The mountains of the Ifoghas tribe, is 1,400 km (900 miles) from the Malian capital, Bamako. It has been at the epicentre of every single Tuareg rebellion against the central government since 1962.

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies know the area all too well. They first set up base here in 2003, using the Tegharghar mountains and the endless desert plains to the north-west as an ideal bolthole in which to hide Western hostages and train new recruits. Apart from one skirmish in 2009, the Malian army left them to it. Mali has paid the price for that laissez-faire policy.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21326831

So what did the US 'Trans-Sahara' military assistance package achieve if AQIM were left alone from 2003-2012?